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ABSTRACT 
 This dissertation seeks to identify why some local governments succeed at 
incorporating minority populations while others fail. I do this by looking at three distinct 
areas of political life: elections, policy implementation, and legislative responsiveness. In 
the first paper I investigate when and how party information affects minority electability. 
With nonpartisan ballots are used in more than three-quarters of local elections, studies 
tend to overlook the importance of party in election outcomes. However, after coding 
newspaper articles about mayoral elections across the U.S., I show that party information 
is often a central feature of partisan and nonpartisan contests alike. The importance of 
this finding should not be understated as the data reveals that an increase in voter access 
to party information substantially weakens the effect of an African American candidate’s 
race on their electability.  
The second paper uses the case of Secure Communities to argue that partisanship 
is not sufficient for explaining variation in local approaches to immigration policy. Using 
a novel dataset that combines county-level deportation rates, policing budgets, and data 
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on contracts between local prison facilities, private corporations, and federal agencies, I 
find that local compliance is explained by resource capacity first and political orientations 
second. Given the opposing positions of Republicans and Democrats on immigration 
enforcement programs, this result demonstrates that even when dealing with a 
particularly partisan issue there are other forces that can moderate the extent to which 
partisan influence matters.  
The final paper tests whether legislators are responsive to minority-based interests 
using the case of E-Verify – an employment verification system that nearly half of all 
state legislatures have implemented. Assessing both state-level variation in E-Verify 
adoption and the roll call behavior of individual legislators, I show that legislative bodies 
and their members are responsive to sub-constituencies with the strongest preferences on 
E-Verify: agribusiness and the foreign-born community. However, responsiveness only 
occurs if that group is a constituency that the legislator would normally cater to. In other 
words, Republicans are willing to break with their party position and vote against E-
Verify, but only if they represent districts with large agribusiness interests. Likewise, 
Democrats are responsive to their foreign-born constituents, but not farm owners. The 
implication of this is that the interests of minorities in Republican districts may suffer 
when they are not aligned with aggregate opinion or another sub-constituency that holds 
substantial influence over Republican lawmakers.  
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PREFACE 
 
As the United States becomes increasingly multiracial and multiethnic, how are 
local communities – states, counties, and cities – responding to and dealing with this 
change? When I began my dissertation I had this broad question in mind, believing that 
local governments could play a key role in fostering the political incorporation of 
minorities by helping them to achieve access to socioeconomic and political opportunities 
and, in turn, develop feelings of social inclusion and belonging. However, I found that 
scholarship was deeply divided when it came to explaining why some localities succeed 
at creating inclusive environments while others establish a reputation as exclusionary and 
discriminatory. To identify why existing studies lacked consensus, I pursued a 
dissertation project that looked into three distinct areas of political life: elections, policy 
implementation, and legislative responsiveness. It was my hope that by broadening my 
inquiry into various areas of political life I could resolve some of the ongoing debates and 
push our knowledge of minority incorporation forward. While there is certainly room for 
further advancements, the three papers in this dissertation point out key omissions in 
prevailing studies and, subsequently, provide us with a strong foundation for how future 
research should move forward.  
In the first paper, for example, I investigate what contexts are most beneficial for 
the electoral success of African American mayoral candidates. As far as the political 
incorporation literature is concerned, minority electability has received ample attention. 
In addition to consistently accounting for candidate attributes and the powerful affect that 
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the racial composition of a jurisdiction has on minority success, scholarship on this topic 
has relied on institutional factors such as single-member vs. at-large districts and partisan 
vs. nonpartisan ballots to explain minority electability. Since the former has no bearing in 
the case of mayoral elections, I began exploring the literature surrounding the partisan-
nonpartisan elections debate. Interestingly, I found that the evidence supporting each side 
of this disagreement was along methodological lines: experiments indicated that minority 
candidates are more electable when voters know their party affiliation while 
observational studies concluded that minorities fare just as well in nonpartisan elections. 
Upon closer examination, the reason for this tension became clear: observational studies 
assumed that because an election was nonpartisan, party played no role in the contest. I 
show that in fact party information is often abundant in both partisan and nonpartisan 
contexts and that as its availability to voters increases, the effect of a candidate’s race on 
vote choice is substantially weakened. The implication of this is that minority candidates 
have tools that can be deployed to overcome racial prejudice and that local elections - 
even officially “nonpartisan” elections - are not as candidate-centered as many scholars 
have assumed. 
Whereas the first paper shows that omitting party information from models of 
minority electability fundamentally changes our understanding of how a candidate’s race 
influences their electoral success, the second paper uses the case of Secure Communities 
to argue that studies of policy implementation rely too much on party-based explanations 
to explain local compliance with federal immigration enforcement efforts and neglect the 
practical considerations that contribute to local decision-making. Since the early 2000s, 
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the pursuit of immigration-related policies at the local level has become more 
commonplace transforming the relationship between minorities and their local 
governments. Unsurprisingly, immediate inquiries into the adoption of immigration 
enforcement efforts found that the partisan-leanings of local governments and their 
citizens were highly determinant of whether or not a community elected to pursue a 
tougher stance on immigration through a program like 287(g) or a more inclusive agenda 
by passing legislation like the Dream Act. However, scholarship on federal mandates 
such as Secure Communities and the Priority Enforcement Program was rash to assume 
that partisanship would also dominate whether counties complied with federal mandates. 
In this paper, I show that when a mandate incurs costs on local governments and their 
agencies, levels of compliance are explained by resource capacity first and political 
orientations second. In other words, without the necessary financial and physical 
resources to implement a policy, local actors are pressed to limit or modify their 
compliance regardless of normative or political preferences. Given the staunch difference 
that previous scholarship has found in the types of immigration policies Republican and 
Democratic governments support, this result demonstrates that even when dealing with a 
particularly partisan issue we cannot overlook how logistical considerations moderate the 
extent to which partisan influences matter.  
The final paper uses a minority-related policy area – E-Verify – to analyze how 
legislators respond to constituency preferences. Previously, studies assumed that as an 
issue’s salience diminishes, constituency pressures have a weaker effect on legislative 
responsiveness and partisan loyalties become central to understanding legislative 
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behavior. I use the case of E-Verify to demonstrate that if we shift our focus from the 
aggregate to those sub-constituencies for which a policy is most relevant, we find that 
individual legislators and legislative bodies as a whole are responsive to their 
constituents.  The potential for sub-constituencies to affect legislative behavior has been 
considered at the national-level, but state-level analyses have virtually ignored this 
relationship. Instead, their focus has been limited to inquiring whether state policy 
reflects public opinion in the aggregate. Since E-Verify yields weak preferences 
collectively, but is especially salient to the agribusiness and foreign-born communities, 
using it as a test of legislative responsiveness to particular sub-constituencies works well. 
However, E-Verify is also a strong test case for illuminating our understanding of 
legislative responsiveness to minority-related issues more specifically. I find that 
Democrats are highly responsive to the preferences of their foreign-born constituents, but 
that only the presence of large farm owning populations sways Republicans to turn 
against E-Verify. This implies that minorities may need to form alliances with groups that 
traditionally have influence over Republican behavior in order to find responsive 
representation across the parties.  
 In addition to deepening our understanding of minority political incorporation, it 
is my hope that these cases also develop our broader theoretical knowledge about how 
local governments operate. In the case of the third paper on legislative responsiveness, 
the more general theoretical implications are clear: constituencies are capable of 
influencing legislative behavior and supplanting party loyalties even when dealing with 
policy issues of lower salience. Since the federalist system arguably places state 
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governments in a better position than national government to tailor their policies to the 
preferences of their various constituencies, exploring the relationship between legislative 
responsiveness and sub-constituencies is a natural and overdue line of inquiry. Likewise, 
that partisan information is abundant in nonpartisan as well as partisan elections has 
implications for candidates of all races and genders. Accordingly, measures of party 
information should be adopted into any model trying to explain local election outcomes 
or voting behavior. In the case of the second paper, it may not be novel to assume that 
discrepancies in the implementation of federal mandates are linked to a local 
government’s resource capacity, but a prudent (and thus far untaken) path for future 
research would be to consider if capacity also moderates the association between 
ideological preferences and compliance with various areas of federal policy.  
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CHAPTER ONE 
Electing Black Mayors:  
Does Party Information Make a Difference? 
As a diverse society, who we elect is a vital indicator of our progress towards inclusion. 
Political leaders not only represent the “face” of our society, but also reflect how power 
and influence are distributed. Thus, it is not surprising that scholars have paid a great deal 
of attention to how voters respond to minority candidates in an attempt to identify the 
steps we can take to increase descriptive representation. In the context of U.S. local 
elections, most of this attention is focused on whether particular electoral systems create 
environments that are more or less advantageous to minority electability. Scholars 
initially exhibited a great deal of skepticism about the potential of minority candidates to 
win nonpartisan elections precisely because the absence of party would encourage voters 
to give greater consideration to physical attributes like race (Adrian 1952; Jennings and 
Zeigler 1966; Karnig 1976; Lieske and Hillard 1984). Since then, party and race have 
been the focus of a vast number of studies; yet, we still have surprisingly little knowledge 
or consensus about how these two attributes interrelate to affect vote choice.  
On the one hand, experimental evidence appears to confirm our early suspicions 
that minority candidates are more electable when voters know their party affiliation 
(Burnett and Kogan 2014; Kam 2007). On the other hand, observational studies find that 
minorities fare just as well in nonpartisan elections (Abrajano, Alvarez, and Nagler 2005; 
Stein et al. 2005) and that their electoral prospects may actually improve when party is 
left off the ballot (Marschall and Ruhil 2006; Meier et al. 2005; Sonenshein 1986). Thus, 
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existing literature leaves us with a baffling puzzle: why do methodological choices 
(experimental versus observational data) produce incongruous explanations of the 
relationship between race, party, and vote choice? I propose that the problem resides in 
how observational studies measure partisanship: voters are thought to be informed of the 
candidates’ parties in partisan contests, but are assumed to be unaware of party affiliation 
in nonpartisan elections. Yet, this simple dichotomy rarely exists. Even in officially 
nonpartisan contests voters are regularly knowledgeable of candidate party affiliation. To 
correctly identify the relationship between a candidate’s race and an individual’s vote 
choice, models of local voting behavior should reflect this reality.   
I show how this is possible by considering the amount of party information 
available to voters in partisan and nonpartisan mayoral elections across the United States. 
Equipped with this continuous measure of party information, I argue that party moderates 
the influence of race on vote choice: as the level of party information available to voters 
increases, the effect of race on vote choice is weakened. I find that it is not the type of 
electoral system – partisan or nonpartisan – that affects minority electability, but rather 
the availability of party information. This means that the real and experimental worlds 
produce findings that are more alike than otherwise thought: party cues influence how 
voters react to minority candidates. The implication of these findings is that minority 
candidates have tools that can be deployed to overcome racial prejudice and that local 
elections - even officially “nonpartisan” elections - are not as candidate-centered as many 
analysts have assumed.  
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Race, Party, & Voting Behavior 
A general consensus across the political science literature is that individuals rely on 
shortcuts, such as party (Rahn 1993; Schaffner, Streb and Wright 2001), incumbency 
(Krebs 1998), and candidate attributes (Matsubayashi and Ueda 2011; Squire and Smith 
1988) to offset the high cost of obtaining, processing, and evaluating information about 
the candidate’s policy positions, political experience, and future objectives (Downs 1957; 
Popkin 1994; Lupia and McCubbins 1998). While a number of studies have reinforced 
the strong effect that cues about partisanship and incumbency have on voter decision-
making, there is less clarity when it comes to explaining the influence of a candidate’s 
attributes on voters (Krebs 1998; Wolman, Page, and Reavley 1990).  
 Nonpartisan elections – which account for nearly three-quarters of all local 
elections in America – are one arena where scholars predict that candidate attributes will 
be especially important to voter decision-making.  Indeed, political scientists projected 
early on that racial cues would be especially salient to voter decision-making in 
nonpartisan elections and, subsequently, warned of the damage that this new form of 
ballot could have on minority electability (Adrian 1952; Freeman 1958; Jennings and 
Zeigler 1966; Karnig 1976; Lieske and Hillard 1984; Mueller 1970; Pomper 1966). 
Experimental studies of minority candidates and vote choice substantiate this assertion. In 
the absence of party labels, white respondents are less likely to vote for or positively 
evaluate minority candidates across various levels of office (president, governor, and city 
councilman) regardless of their personal characteristics, issue positions, or job experience 
(McConnaughy et al. 2010; McDermott 1998; Terkildsen 1993).  
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Other experiments, however, find that this effect diminishes when respondents are 
informed of candidate partisanship. For example, respondents in Kam’s (2007) study 
were given information on three judicial candidates – two white and one Latino – to test 
whether ethnicity affected voter preferences.  Half of her respondents were provided with 
information about the party of the governor that endorsed each candidate. When given 
that cue, the support for the Latino candidate increased by 10 percentage points. 
Similarly, Burnett and Kogan (2014) relate partisan cues to the salience of a candidate’s 
ethnicity by showing participants a series of quotations from either white or Latino 
candidates. Some respondents were given information about the candidates’ parties and 
others were not. They find that quote misattribution decreased by 44 percentage points 
when information about candidate party affiliation was also provided. The authors 
acknowledge that their results fail to speak explicitly to whether or not ethnic 
categorization disadvantages minority candidates, but they nevertheless caution that 
nonpartisan elections are liable to impair minority electability. 
Based on experimental studies alone we might conclude that any negative effects 
a minority candidate’s race has on their ability to capture votes is offset by party cues. 
This explanation, however, is belied by observational studies that show nonpartisan 
elections either pose no disadvantage for minority candidates (Abrajano, Alvarez, and 
Nagler 2001; Stein et al. 2005) or, in some cases, actually increase the odds of a minority 
being elected (Marschall and Ruhil 2006; Sonenshein 1986). Yet, whereas the 
experiments control for respondent knowledge of partisanship, the observational models 
neglect the possibility that party influences vote choice in nonpartisan elections. At the 
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same time, their discussion of particular elections suggests that an unmeasured level of 
party information may actually be instrumental to explaining election outcomes. For 
example, Abrajano, Alvarez, and Nagler (2001) comment in their study of the 2001 Los 
Angeles city election that voters were well informed about the partisanship and 
ideological leanings of the contenders despite the elections being officially nonpartisan. 
Similarly, Stein and colleagues (2005) note that of surveyed voters, 86% were able to 
correctly identify the party affiliations of both candidates in Houston’s 2001 
“nonpartisan” mayoral election.  
I argue that, by failing to take into account this unmeasured level of party 
information, prevailing studies on minority candidates and vote choice have missed a 
pivotal moderating variable thereby obfuscating the true effect of racial cues on minority 
electability. In the next section, I develop a theoretical framework that explains how 
knowledge of candidate partisanship is likely to moderate inclinations toward race-based 
voting when minorities are on the ballot.  
 
Minority Electability & Cue Dominance 
The theory of minority electability presented here builds on the idea that voters utilize 
shortcuts in order to simplify decision-making during the voting process, but contends 
that particular heuristics have a stronger impact on vote choice than others. In particular, I 
argue that when a minority candidate is also a co-partisan, voters are more likely to vote 
according to party rather than racial considerations. 
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For most voters, a cue like race indirectly impacts vote choice by triggering a 
particular image of what that candidate will be like in terms of their ideology, 
competence, and character. White voters in particular depict African-Americans as 
lacking the necessary qualities of a strong political leader (Best and Williams 1990; 
Broockman et al. 2014), describing them as less hardworking (Gilens 1999; Sniderman 
and Piazza 1993), less competent (Sigelman et al. 1995), and less intelligent (Bobo et al. 
2012). Black candidates are also more likely to be associated with the Democratic Party, 
depicted as ideologically liberal, and thought to be especially sensitive to minority-related 
issues when compared to their white counterparts (Berinsky et al. 2011; Jacobsmeier 
2014; Sigelman et al. 1995). Absent other information, the stereotypes triggered by a 
black candidate’s race can certainly cost them votes (McDermott 1998). In fact, many 
African-American candidates pursue campaign agendas that consciously avoid 
emphasizing their race or racializing issues in order to lessen the use of racial stereotypes 
(Kaufmann 2004). However, media coverage of minority politicians, which tends to 
disproportionately focus on race and ethnicity, makes it difficult to prevent unfavorable – 
and typically automatic – stereotyping (Niven 2002; Zilber and Niven 2000). 
Despite the automaticity in which this process of categorization occurs, the effect 
of stereotyping on impression building is constrained when individuals receive additional 
information – what Kunda and Thagard call “individuating information” – that is 
pertinent to the judgment at hand (Kunda and Thagard 1996). This information does not 
necessarily eliminate the activation of stereotypes, but it can neutralize the importance of 
the stereotype by redirecting the observer’s attention. Individuating information is 
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thought to make stereotypes impotent because individuals view stereotype-based 
judgments as less valid than those that are rationalized from individuating information 
(Crawford et al. 2011; Hilton and Fein 1989; Locksley et al. 1980; Nisbett, Zukier, and 
Lemley 1981). In the context of a biracial election, I propose that party cues are precisely 
the type of individuating information that can counteract the negative effects that racial 
stereotypes have on vote choice.  
Whereas race incites particular impressions about a candidate that may or may not 
be substantiated with further information, party provides voters with the ability to make 
competent inferences about candidate issue positions and ideology (Conover and 
Feldman 1989; Rahn 1993). Furthermore and perhaps more importantly, party 
information activates partisan-rooted loyalties that typically make evaluating and 
weighing other pieces of information unnecessary for voters (Cohen 2003; Popkin 1991; 
Rahn 1993; Zaller 1992). As Beck (1997) explains, party labels “organize and simplify” 
electoral contests that are otherwise laden with “strident rhetoric” that most voters find 
confusing.  
But how does party supplant racial cues in nonpartisan contests? Previous studies 
of judicial elections indicate that party identification is a key indicator of vote choice 
across partisan and nonpartisan ballot formats (Bonneau and Cann 2013; Rock and Baum 
2010). If this is true, then it seems likely that partisanship also has a role to play in 
mayoral elections regardless of whether or not party labels are on the ballot. To confirm 
this, I conducted a content analysis of local newspaper coverage of biracial (white-black) 
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mayoral elections in large U.S. cities from 1991 to 2015.1 Using the News Bank 
Database, I collected every article about the relevant mayoral contest for the two months 
preceding each election. I then recorded the total number of election-related articles and 
coded the number of articles that mentioned the party and race of the top vote-getting 
black and white candidates. Although using news coverage of the elections is an 
imperfect substitute for the information that was available to voters, previous media 
studies show that newspaper articles are typically an accurate reflection of the issues 
discussed in local campaigns (Barrett and Barrington 2005; Erbring, Goldenberg and 
Miller 1980) and that newspaper readers receive approximately the same campaign 
information as television viewers (Mutz 1995). Moreover, newspaper articles are the only 
archived source of campaign coverage that is consistently available across cities and 
time.  
 In total, I found newspaper coverage for 128 of the 159 biracial elections during 
this period, resulting in 7,574 articles coded. Table 1.1 displays key summary statistics 
for the number of election-related articles and the regularity with which the party of the 
top vote-getting black candidate was mentioned. Clearly, it is not uncommon for party 
cues to be available in nonpartisan contests. In some cases nearly 82 percent of articles 
about a nonpartisan election referenced the black candidate’s party affiliation. This 
indicates that a simple dichotomous indicator of partisan elections would inadequately 
reflect the potential role of party in nonpartisan elections.  																																																								
1 Large cities are defined as those that had a population of 100,000 or more between 1991 
and 2015. More discussion about the cities sampled can be found in the section on study 
design and a complete listing in the paper’s appendix.  
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Table 1.1. Content and Frequency of Coverage of the “Top” Black Candidate 
 Mean St. Dev. Min Max 
Articles per election 59.17 37.18 9 209 
# articles mentioning candidate  
   party in all elections 22.16 28.61 0 164 
# “nonpartisan” election articles     
    mentioning candidate party 13.07 13.29 0 69 
% articles mentioning  
    candidate party in all elections 33.22 25.46 0 96.64 
% “nonpartisan” election articles     
    mentioning candidate party 23.61 19.56 0 81.81 
% partisan election articles  
    mentioning candidate party 46.79 26.79 2.32 96.64 
 
Figure 1.1 provides a visual comparison of the frequency of party cues in partisan 
and nonpartisan contests. More often than not there are some references to candidate 
party, but there is also considerable variation in terms of the regularity with which voters 
might be exposed to party information. So, how do we determine when voters are 
informed of candidate party? Unlike partisan elections, where we know with certainty 
that even the most disengaged voter will see the candidates’ parties on the ballot, it is 
difficult to identify the number of party mentions that are necessary before we can state 
with confidence that voters are knowledgeable of candidate partisanship in nonpartisan 
elections. Indeed, it is rare that every voter – or even most – read every article about an 
upcoming mayoral election. Thus, it would be hasty to assume that because references to 
the candidates’ parties exist in news coverage, voters were also knowledgeable of that 
information. 
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Figure 1.1. Partisan Cues in Partisan and Nonpartisan Elections. 
 
Like the partisan/nonpartisan distinction, simplifying elections into those that 
mention party and those that do not is an imprecise approach to measuring the influence 
of party cues. A better alternative is to consider the amount of party information on a 
continuous scale. In this case, we would expect that as the percentage of articles 
mentioning candidate partisanship increases, the likelihood that a particular voter would 
be informed about the party affiliations of the candidates also increases.2 Likewise, we 
would expect that fewer voters received partisan cues if party affiliation was mentioned 
rarely in newspaper coverage. In this way the continuous scale allows us to test whether 																																																								
2 It is possible that using the percentage of articles inflates just how “available” party 
information was for voters. For example, if there are only 9 articles about a particular 
election, but 5 of them mention the black candidate’s party, then the model would assume 
that the possibility of a voter being aware of party is relatively high. However, there are 
very few actual opportunities for voters to obtain this information. To account for this, I 
test the models using an alternate measure of party information – the number of articles 
that mention party. As discussed later on, the results, which are located in Table 6, are 
consistent with measuring information as a percentage. 
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the proportion of votes received by the black candidate changes when their partisanship is 
more or less likely to be known by voters (all else being equal). Specifically, I posit the 
following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis: Even in technically “nonpartisan” contests, as the level of party 
information in the media increases, race will become less salient leading to an 
increase in a) the black candidate’s vote share and b) the probability of a black 
candidate winning the election.   
 
In addition to Kam’s (2013) experiment mentioned previously, this hypothesis is 
in line with prior research showing that partisan cues are capable of reducing the effect of 
another candidate attribute, gender (Burnett and Tiede 2015; Matland and King 2002; but 
see: Sanbonmatsu and Dolan 2015).  Yet, thus far the evidence suggesting that party 
supplants cues like race and gender is limited to experiments in which respondent 
information about the candidates is carefully controlled and, consequently, lacks external 
validity. I improve upon this work to show that party moderates the relationship between 
race and vote choice in actual elections.  
 In sum, this theory of minority electability suggests that negative racial 
stereotypes are more likely to hurt black electability when party information is absent or 
more difficult for voters to obtain. Showing that party information varies in its 
availability and its influence on voters in local elections is especially challenging. In the 
		
12 
next section, I explain how I addressed this challenge by combining the content analysis 
discussed above with election data from mayoral elections across the United States.  
 
Study Design  
The observational study uses original data from 128 biracial mayoral elections in 39 
American cities. Table 1.2 provides an overview of the number of elections observed for 
each city and the type of election they employ. The appendix features a more detailed list 
of the year of each election, the election stage, and the number of candidates competing 
by city. Although these cities are unrepresentative of all urban contexts, they offer a 
strong and representative sample of larger, diverse cities – in other words, those cities 
where we would expect to see a minority on the ballot. The elections span from 1991-
2015 and are limited to those contests where at least one black and one white candidate 
were running. In cases where multiple black and/or white candidates were on the ballot, 
the analysis focuses on the vote share of the top vote-getting black and white candidates.3 
General elections make up the bulk of the contests in the dataset, but I also include 
primaries and runoff elections.4 Since including primaries and runoffs means that there 
																																																								
3 There are 19 elections with 2 black candidates and 3 elections with 3 black candidates. 
To be sure that elections with multiple African-Americans contending are not biasing the 
results, I employ additional analyses that exclude these elections from the dataset. The 
results, available in the appendix, reflect that regardless of the number of black 
candidates running in an election, party cues continue to be a key component to 
understanding black electability. 
4 This includes both partisan and nonpartisan primaries. Because it is possible that the 
inclusion of partisan primaries will bias the results (since partisanship is constant and 
known across candidates, making race an arguably more salient factor), I rerun the main 
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can be more than one contest for a city-year observation, the regression models include a 
dummy variable that accounts for contests that occurred within the same election 
sequence.  For example, because Albany, New York’s 2005 general election results and 
newspaper coverage may very well be influenced by their 2005 primary, there is a 
dummy variable denoting that the general election is linked to its primary.5 
 
Table 1.2. Election Type and Number of Elections Observed by City
 
 
																																																																																																																																																																					
regression models excluding them. These results, available in the appendix, show no 
meaningful differences from the models in the main text.   
5 In the appendix, I rerun the regression models without these 27 “linked” observations. 
The results are consistent with the models in the main text.  
City State Election 
Type 
Number of 
Elections 
City State Election 
Type 
Number of 
Elections 
Albany NY P 5 Memphis TN NP 2 
Athens GA NP 3 Milwaukee WI NP 3 
Atlanta GA NP 3 Mobile AL NP 3 
Augusta GA NP  7 Montgomery AL NP 2 
Aurora IL NP 3 New Orleans LA P 8 
Baltimore MD P 3 New York  NY P 3 
Boston MA NP 1 Oakland CA NP 1 
Buffalo NY P 5 Orlando FL NP 2 
Charlotte NC P 2 Philadelphia PA P 8 
Chicago IL NP 3 Pittsburg PA P 2 
Cincinnati OH NP 3 Sacramento CA NP 2 
Cleveland OH NP 2 San 
Francisco 
CA NP 2 
Columbus OH P 5 Seattle WA NP 1 
Denver CO NP 6 St. Louis MO P 7 
Detroit MI NP 2 St. 
Petersburg 
FL NP 1 
Houston TX NP 10 Syracuse NY P 2 
Indianapolis IN P 1 Tampa FL NP 2 
Jacksonville FL NP 5 Washington DC P 2 
Los Angeles CA NP 2 Wichita KS NP 2 
Macon GA NP 2     	
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Information on the number of candidates running, incumbency, gender, 
race/ethnicity, and partisanship was acquired either through official election results found 
on the city clerk or county website or through the candidates’ personal websites. When 
such information was not available from these sources, I made use of Project Vote Smart 
and Our Campaign’s catalog of political candidates as well as news stories about the 
election that featured candidate biographical information.  
To test my theory of minority electability, that an increase in party information 
improves black electability, I use the information about party cues gleaned from the 
analysis of news articles to generate the central explanatory variable: the percentage of 
articles that reference the black candidate’s party. The effect of party information is 
tested on two primary outcomes: the black candidate’s overall vote share and an electoral 
victory by the black candidate. The first outcome specifically tests the principal 
hypothesis’ claim about the relationship between party information and black vote share. 
However, because the data includes a mixture of election types – primary, general, and 
runoff elections – and variation in terms of the number of candidates running (with the 
majority of contests featuring two, but others as many as 6), the second dependent 
variable – a black election victory – is necessary to capture situations where black 
candidates win the election despite obtaining a relatively small percentage of the vote.  
The statistical model includes several independent variables that are typically 
related to vote choice and that are featured prominently in existing models of local voting 
behavior: whether the contest was partisan or nonpartisan, incumbency, if the election 
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had 3 or more candidates,6 the amount of racial information made available to voters via 
newspaper coverage, and the type of election (primary, general, or runoff). For the 
majority of cities there is only one election to analyze while for others I have up to seven. 
Consequently, the statistical models include as many potential confounding city-level 
demographics as possible: the population size, the percentage of black and white 
residents, the percent of college educated residents, the median household income, and 
the percentage unemployed. Data for each variable was matched to the year of the 
election or for the closest year that data was available. For example, the Houston mayoral 
election for 2009 uses U.S. Census population estimates from 2010 while the 1993 
election is matched with population estimates from the 1990 Census. Finally, from 
Einstein and Kogan (2015), I include the percentage of residents that voted for the 2008 
presidential candidate from the same party as the black mayoral candidate to account for 
how aligned the city’s general political preferences are with the black candidate.  
The study design used here makes a dramatic improvement over existing 
observational studies. By combining observational data with a content analysis the study 
gains considerable generalizability without losing the contextual detail that the existing 
studies, which focus on one or a few elections, excel at. Additionally, by limiting the 
dataset to elections that feature a black candidate on the ballot, I avoid conflating factors 
that influence black electability with those that increase the odds of a black candidate 
running. This makes a considerable improvement over Marschall and Ruhil’s (2006) 
study of black mayoralties, which covers an impressive 309 cities but includes elections 																																																								
6 Candidates had to obtain at least 5% of the vote in order to be included in the dataset as 
a viable candidate.   
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with no black candidates on the ballot. Recent research (Juenke 2014; Juenke and Shah 
2015; Shah 2010; Shah 2014) illustrates that failing to account for when minorities are on 
the ballot is particularly problematic for correctly specifying models that will predict the 
likelihood of a minority candidate winning.  
 
Results 
Before testing for information effects, Model 3.1 of Table 1.3 investigates the bivariate 
relationship between a simple dichotomous indicator of partisan/nonpartisan elections 
and black vote share. This allows us to compare the current study to previous work on 
minority electability in partisan/nonpartisan contests. Although the coefficient for 
nonpartisan elections in Model 3.1 is negative, suggesting that minority candidates 
perform best when party labels are on the ballot, this relationship is not statistically 
significant in the conventional sense. In other words, consistent with prevailing studies, 
Model 3.1 implies that there is no meaningful difference in how black candidates fare 
when party labels are on or off the ballots. But is this simplified depiction of party 
influence an adequate reflection of the role party plays in voter decision-making?  
 
Table 1.3. The Effect of Partisan Cues on Black Vote Share 
 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4 
% Party mentions  35.21*** (6.458) 27.02** (9.23) 25.08*** (6.243) 
% Race mentions    -2.382  (7.179) 
Nonpartisan 
elections 
-4.475(3.441) 1.659  (3.452) -4.481  (5.535) 5.003  (3.684) 
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% Party mentions 
x nonpartisan 
elections 
  17.85  (13.00)  
Incumbent    26.58*** (3.942) 
3(+) Candidates    -8.948** (2.867) 
Election Type     
General    2.701  (3.793) 
Runoff    8.766  (8.476) 
Population 
(logged) 
   0.266  (1.811) 
% Black    0.108  (0.114) 
% White    0.0174  (0.154) 
Share of pres. 
vote for 
candidate’s party 
   0.105  (0.0789) 
Bachelor’s degree    0.0560  (0.156) 
Median household 
income (logged) 
   -0.477  (7.349) 
% Unemployed    -0.219  (0.403) 
Constant 39.34***(2.73) 24.01***(3.857) 27.76***(5.08) 14.29  (85.52) 
N 128 128 128 126 
R2 0.044 0.219 0.230 0.604 
AIC 8.74 8.54 8.54 8.06 
Note: All Models use OLS regression with a dummy variable for contests that occurred in 
the same election sequence and robust standard errors in parentheses.  
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
Turning to information effects, Model 3.2 adds to our bivariate model the key 
explanatory variable: the percentage of election-related articles that mention the black 
candidate’s party affiliation. The results of this model provide us with two important 
findings. First, the official context of the election – partisan or nonpartisan – is 
inconsequential to black vote share. Second, the availability of party cues considerably 
improves black electoral prospects. On average, the black candidate receives 27% of the 
vote when no party information is available to voters. This vote share increases to more 
than 44% when half of election-related articles mention party affiliation.  
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Models 3.3 and 3.4 provide us with even more confidence that party information 
has important implications for black electability that are not captured by a simple 
partisan/nonpartisan distinction. Whereas Model 3.1 leads us to believe that black 
candidates are not systematically disadvantaged by nonpartisan contests, Model 3.3 
reveals the “hidden” information that gives this statement credibility. By adding an 
interaction between the level of party information available to voters and the 
partisan/nonpartisan status of the election to our previous model, we discover that yes, 
black candidates can perform well in nonpartisan elections, but only because so many of 
those contests provide voters with partisan cues. Although this relationship just misses 
conventional thresholds of statistical significance (with a P-value of 0.118 and 95% 
confidence interval spanning from -5.12 to 44.79), Figure 1.2 illustrates that the effect of 
party information on vote choice – though positive in both partisan and nonpartisan 
contests – is especially potent in officially “nonpartisan” elections.  
 
 
Figure 1.2. Effect of Party Information of Black Candidate 
Vote Share in Partisan and Nonpartisan Elections (with  
95% confidence intervals). 
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Importantly, Model 3.4 reveals that the relationship between party information 
and black vote share endures even when controlling for factors typically shown to affect 
vote choice in biracial elections: namely, incumbency (Hajnal 2001; Stein et al. 2005) 
and a larger field of candidates (Bullock 1984; Hajnal and Trounstine 2014). Figure 1.3 
shows us the marginal effect that additional party cues have on voter support for the 
black candidate while holding all other variables from Model 3.4 at their means. A black 
candidate’s vote share increases by more than 10 percentage points moving from an 
election with no party information to an election where half of all articles contain party 
cues. Another 11 percentage points are gained when all of the articles discuss party, 
implying that voters are more compelled to support African-American candidates if they 
are informed about their party affiliation.   
 
 
Figure 1.3. Marginal Effect of Partisan Cues on Black  
Candidate’s Vote Share (with 95% confidence interval). 
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Table 1.4 confirms that in addition to partisan cues boosting a black candidate’s 
vote share, this information also produces more black mayoral victories. Relying only on 
the conventional binary distinction of partisan/nonpartisan elections, as shown in Model 
4.1, implies that black candidates have a 40 percent chance of winning any nonpartisan 
election – only slightly less than their 43 percent chance of winning a partisan contest. By 
adding a continuous measure of party information to Model 4.2, we find that black 
electability is actually highly dependent on voter access to party information. The 
probability of a black candidate winning, illustrated in Figure 1.4, more than doubles 
from 19 percent to 54 percent when moving from an election with no party information to 
an election where 50 percent of articles mention the black candidate’s party.  
 
Table 1.4. The Effect of Partisan Cues on a Black Election Victory 
 4.1 4.2 4.3 
% Party mentions  3.480*** (0.916) 3.722** (1.316) 
% Race mentions   0.444  (1.568) 
Nonpartisan elections -0.145  (0.366) 0.457  (0.433) 1.410  (0.756) 
Incumbent   4.207*** (1.242) 
3(+) Candidates   -0.001  (0.626) 
Election Type    
General   0.399  (0.680) 
Runoff   0.511  (1.308) 
Population (logged)   0.199  (0.349) 
% Black   0.0102  (0.0234) 
% White   0.0180  (0.0325) 
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Share of pres. vote for 
candidate’s party 
  
0.0315  (0.0221) 
Bachelor’s degree   0.0251  (0.0343) 
Median household 
income (logged) 
  
0.259  (1.421) 
% Unemployed 
  
-0.0998  (0.0883) 
Constant -0.322  (0.294) -1.875** (0.543) -12.16  (15.79) 
N 128 128 126 
R2 0.003 0.103 0.320 
AIC 1.39 1.29 1.16 
Note: Models are logistic regressions with a dummy variable for contests that occurred in 
the same election sequence and robust standard errors in parentheses.  
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
 
Figure 1.4. Effect of Partisan Cues on the Probability of a 
Black Candidate Winning (with 95% confidence interval). 
 
Again, this relationship holds even when controlling for the variables added to 
Model 4.3. Holding all other variables from Model 4.3 at their means, Figure 1.5 
compares how partisan cues improve the probability of a black candidate winning in 
partisan and nonpartisan elections. The probability of a black candidate winning a 
mayoral election increases from 0.2 in a “nonpartisan” election with no cues to 0.61 in a 
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“nonpartisan” election where half of the articles contain information about candidate 
party. Unsurprisingly, the confidence intervals for partisan and nonpartisan elections 
overlap considerably at the highest levels of party information – those elections where we 
would expect the majority of voters to be aware of candidate party affiliation regardless 
of whether or not party is on the ballot. However, Figure 1.5 illustrates that, in general, 
party information’s sharpest effect is on vote choice in nonpartisan contests.  
 
 
Figure 1.5. Effect of Party Information on the Probability  
of a Black Candidate Winning Partisan or Nonpartisan  
Election (with 95% confidence intervals). 
 
What remains puzzling about the findings from both Table 1.3 and Table 1.4 is 
why party information also has a positive effect on black electability in partisan elections 
– where party affiliation is plainly marked on voter ballots. Although the theory of 
minority electability – that voter access to party information offsets negative biases 
stemming from racial cues – was meant to highlight the influential role that unmeasured 
levels of party information have in nonpartisan elections, it might be the case that 
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additional information about candidate partisanship chips away at the relative importance 
voters place on racial cues in officially partisan elections as well. Put simply, black 
candidates benefit from elections where party affiliation becomes an increasingly central 
aspect of the contest regardless of whether that election is officially partisan or 
nonpartisan. This suggests that releasing more information about their partisanship to 
voters could be a well thought-out campaign strategy employed by the candidate to 
increase their vote share. Indeed, Spiliotes and Vavreck (2002) report that candidates are 
particularly tactical when deciding whether to make partisanship a main component of 
their campaign rhetoric. In this scenario, the relationship between partisan information 
and vote share/election outcome may be more endogenous than causal. I examine this 
possibility in the following section.  
 
Robustness Checks 
In this section I perform a series of robustness checks on our main models (3.2, 3.4, 4.2, 
and 4.3) to address the potential limitations of a causal relationship between party 
information and minority electability.  First, as suggested above, it is possible that levels 
of party information vary in response to expectations about how such information will 
affect voter preferences. If this is the case, then to accurately assess the relationship 
between party information and vote share we need to identify a set of instrumental 
variables that are highly correlated with former, but have no direct effect on the latter. 
These instruments will be used in a two-stage least squares regression model (TSLS) to 
estimate the effect of our potentially endogenous variable, party information. I use two 
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variables to do this: whether or not the candidate’s main opponent identifies with a 
different party and whether or not the city’s news outlets have a pronounced partisan 
bias.  
The first instrument, opposition party, is coded 1 if the white candidate’s party is 
different from the black candidate’s party and 0 if they both affiliate with the same party. 
According to our theory of minority electability, the use of party information helps to 
offset negative biases stemming from racial cues, but this information is considerably less 
valuable to voters if both candidates are from the same party. The application of this idea 
to nonpartisan elections is clear: candidates should be more prone to using party cues 
when their opposition is from another party and less so when they share partisanship. But 
how does this help us to understand the utility of party information as a campaign 
strategy in partisan elections, which presumably produce candidates from the same party 
in primaries and opposite parties in general elections? The interesting thing about 
mayoral elections is that we actually do find cases where officially partisan elections 
yield different-party candidates in primaries and same-party candidates in general 
elections. In some cases this results from cities that offer open primaries. In other cases, it 
is not uncommon for the runner-up in the primary election to continue their run into the 
general election if the city is overwhelmingly Democratic or Republican. In this dataset, 
32 percent of the “partisan” general elections feature candidates from the same party.  
 While it seems probable that a candidate would seek to share party information 
only in contexts where they believe it will increase their odds of winning an election, 
their campaign strategy cannot control for how the media reports it. Traditional models of 
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vote choice depicted the media as a conduit for elite discourse (Bennett 1990; Zaller 
1992), but we now know that the media both report the campaign as carried out by the 
candidates and offer their own point of view (Box-Steffensmeier et al. 2009). Recall that 
one of the major setbacks faced by minority candidates is the inordinate amount of 
attention that the media draws to their race or ethnicity even when they attempt to run a 
race-free campaign (Kaufmann 2004). This means that while media references to a 
candidate’s partisanship may be the consequence of the candidates bringing party into 
their campaigns, we need to also accept the possibility that the media itself has a stake in 
offering this information to its readers. Under such conditions we should find the highest 
levels of party information in cities that have particularly partisan news outlets. To 
account for this, I use Gentzkow and Shapiro’s (2010) index of media slant, which 
measures the partisan slant of newspapers in major cities across America.  Gentzkow and 
Shapiro developed this index by measuring the frequency with which newspapers used 
phrases regularly employed by Republicans or Democrats as captured in the 
Congressional Record. From this index, I created our second instrumental variable, 
partisan news, which is coded 1 if the news outlet in the city is especially prone to using 
partisan language and 0 if its content is “unbiased,” which in this case means that it rarely 
frames its stories with a Republican or Democratic angle.  
Transforming Gentzkow and Shapiro’s original index into a binary scale is done 
for two reasons. First, given that we want to account for the possibility that cities with 
partisan news outlets are more likely to report the party affiliation of the candidates 
regardless of their partisan bias, categorizing a city’s news source as partisan (or not) 
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makes more sense than if we were to measure to what degree the news reports stories 
with a Democratic or Republican spin. For example, a Republican-leaning news source 
may be more likely to reveal a Democratic candidate’s party affiliation to persuade voters 
to cast their ballots against them even if the said Democrat attempts to minimize public 
knowledge of their party. The second reason for the transformation is to eliminate any 
concern of collinearity between the political preferences of a city (captured by 
presidential vote share in our model) and the political leanings of the newspaper.  
Table 1.5 reports the first stage of the TSLS regressions, which estimate how well 
our instrumental variables predict party information, and the results of a series of 
specification tests done to ensure that the instruments chosen are a viable substitute for 
party information. The regression model employed uses a limited information maximum 
likelihood estimator (LIML), which is more robust to the presence of weak instruments 
(Hahn et al. 2004).  As shown in both models 5.1 and 5.2, the instruments are highly 
significant predictors of the percentage of party information and, aside from nonpartisan 
elections and education level, are the only variables that explain variation in the level of 
party information. While the statistical significance of these instruments is a good sign, it 
is not enough to conclude that they are sufficient instruments. As advised by Sovey and 
Green (2010), I further test the tenability of these variables as instruments and provide 
the results at the bottom of the Table 1.5. 
Following Stock and Yogo (2005), I performed a test of weak instruments, which 
looks at the ratio of the bias of the estimator to the bias of the OLS estimator. If the null 
hypothesis – that the instruments are weak – holds, then we would conclude that the 
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instrumented model’s estimates are biased. According to Staiger and Stock (2002) a key 
criterion for measuring the reliability of an instrumental estimator is that it has an F-
statistic of 10 or greater. The two reported in models 5.1 and 5.2 are 22.96 and 20.55, 
respectively. Using these values we can easily reject the null hypothesis that the chosen 
instruments are weak. In other words, our models tolerate a bias of no more than 5% in 
the TSLS estimator. Additionally, the significant p-value indicates that the instruments 
(opposite party and partisan news) have meaningful explanatory power for the percentage 
of party mentions even after controlling for the other covariates (e.g., nonpartisan 
elections in Model 5.1 and all of the additional covariates in Model 5.2).  
The Anderson-Rubin test (1950) (A-R test) further confirms that the instruments 
chosen are significant: the null hypothesis, that the coefficients of the endogenous 
regressors in the equation are jointly equal to 0, is rejected. The A-R test is especially 
useful to test the robustness of potentially weak instruments since the power of the test is 
tied to the strength of the instruments. In other words, as instruments become weaker, the 
power of the test declines and the null is less likely to be rejected.  
 
Table 1.5. First-Stage Regressions for Estimating Party Information 
 5.1 % Party Mentions 
5.2 
% Party Mentions 
Opposite Party 0.172*** (0.036) 0.154** (0.060) 
Partisan News 0.135*** (0.037) 0.209*** (0.039) 
Nonpartisan elections -0.182** (0.036) -0.131* (0.053) 
Racial Cues  -0.047 (0.106) 
Incumbent  -0.012  (0.052) 
3(+) Candidates  0.064  (0.048) 
Election Type   
General  -0.085  (0.059) 
Runoff  -0.106  (0.104) 
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Population   0.000  (0.000) 
% Black   -0.002  (0.002) 
% White  0.004  (0.002) 
Share of pres. vote for  
candidate’s party 
 -0.000  (0.001) 
Bachelor’s degree  -0.009** (0.003) 
Median household  
income (logged) 
 -0.158  (0.134) 
% Unemployed  0.007  (0.006) 
Constant 0.296***(0.033) 2.027  (1.472) 
N 128 126 
F statistic 22.96 (p-val: 0.0000) 
20.55  
 (p-val: 0.0000) 
A-R statistic 30.36  (p-val: 0.0000) 
11.16  
(p-val: 0.0038) 
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic 27.53 (p-val: 0.0000) 
25.57  
(p-val: 0.0000) 
Basmann F-test 0.005  (p-val: 0.9411) 
0.039  
(p-val: 0.8434) 
Note: Models 5.1 and 5.2 are the first stage of a Two Stage Least Squares (TSLS) 
regression and use a limited information maximum likelihood estimator. Both models 
include a dummy variable for contests that occurred in the same election sequence and 
report robust standard errors.  
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. 
 
 The Kleibergen-Paap (2006) rk LM statistic tests for underidentification. The 
significant p-value tells us that the chosen instruments adequately identify the equation. 
This test is a generalization of the Anderson (1951) or Cragg and Donaldson (1993) 
correlation tests to the non-i.i.d. case and, thus, has the advantage of its results being 
robust to heteroskedacity, autocorrelation, and clustering. The fourth statistic, Basmann’s 
(1960) F-test, checks for overidentification in two ways: whether the instruments are 
uncorrelated with the error term and whether any of the excluded exogenous variables 
should be included in the structural equation. In this case, a significant test statistic would 
mean that our model employs a poor instrument or fails to treat one of the exogenous 
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variables as an instrument.  As reported, both F-statistics are non-significant, suggesting 
that our instruments are a good fit and that the models are correctly specified.  
The chosen instruments appear to satisfy various tests of robustness. The next step 
is to test whether controlling for the possibility of endogeneity changes the relationship 
between party information and black vote share. Re-estimation using the instrumental 
variables in Table 1.6 shows that party information continues to affect a black candidate’s 
vote share in a meaningful way. Comparing Model 3.2 to Model 6.1 we find that the 
coefficients for both party information and nonpartisan elections increase substantially. 
While nonpartisan elections appear to have a stronger influence on the black candidate’s 
vote share, the relative impact of the two variables on our outcome remains unchanged. 
The difference between Model 3.4 and Model 6.2 is much more subtle. Again, we find a 
slight increase in the coefficients for party information, but no significant change in terms 
of its marginal effect on vote share or election outcome. The main difference we find is in 
Models 6.3 and 6.4, which report that nonpartisan elections now appear to significantly 
affect the probability of a black candidate winning an election. Yet, party information 
continues to play a strong role in predicting black electability even with this newfound 
relationship. Overall, the TSLS estimations provide confidence that our original models 
sufficiently tested and correctly reported the relationship between party information and 
black electability.   
 
Table 1.6. Second-Stage Results for the Effects of Party Information on Black 
Electability 
 6.1: Vote Share 
6.2: 
Vote Share 
6.3: 
Election Win 
6.4: 
Election Win 
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% Party 
mentions 
68.016***  
(14.547) 
30.33**  
(10.163) 4.155
*** (0.560) 4.663*** (0.741) 
% Race 
mentions 
 -1.777  (7.028)  -0.114  (0.798) 
Nonpartisan 
elections 7.372  (4.230) 4.719  (4.026) 0.652
* (0.255) 0.877* (0.387) 
Incumbent  26.05*** (3.868)  1.749** (0.604) 
3(+) Candidates  -8.277** (2.868)  0.304  (0.315) 
Election Type     
General  2.419  (3.825)  -0.0460  (0.373) 
Runoff  8.329  (8.456)  -0.202  (0.680) 
Population   -0.121  (.063)  -0.372** (0.013) 
% Black  0.0286  (0.105)  -0.0126  (0.0115) 
% White  -0.120  (0.147)  -0.030  (0.0163) 
Share of pres. 
vote for 
candidate’s 
party 
 
0.108  (0.0756) 
 
0.013  (0.010) 
Bachelor’s 
degree 
 0.0605  (0.173)  0.029  (0.016) 
Median 
household 
income (logged) 
 
1.008  (7.645) 
 
0.498  (0.719) 
% Unemployed 
 
-0.290  (0.427) 
 
-0.084  (0.45) 
Constant 9.726 (6.740) 10.84  (80.07) -1.977*** (0.308) -6.693  (7.495) 
N 128 126 128 126 
R2 0.168 0.527   
Note: Models 6.1, 6.2, 6.3, and 6.4 are the second stage of a Two Stage Least Squares 
(TSLS) regression model. Models 6.1 and 6.2 use TSLS regression with a limited 
information maximum likelihood estimator while Models 6.3 and 6.4 use TSLS probit 
regression. All models include a dummy variable for contests that occurred in the same 
election sequence and report robust standard errors. 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. 
 
It is also possible that the model suffers from another form of endogeneity: 
omitted variable bias. Perhaps, for example, cities with higher levels of turnout or more 
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competitive elections have more partisan cues. To address the possibility of an omitted 
variable influencing the results, I created a smaller data set of 19 cities that have multiple 
observations. In Table 1.7, I use city fixed effects to check the robustness of the results. 
Given the small number of observations for this dataset, I limit its testing to the black 
candidate’s vote share. Using this smaller data set yields the same pattern of results: party 
information, as tested in Model 7.1, explains nearly 21 percent of the variation in an 
African-American candidate’s vote share.  When we combine this with our other 
covariates in Model 7.2 more than 56% of the variation within cities and 58% of variation 
across cities is explained. Since a city’s election type (partisan or nonpartisan) is 
unchanging for the years covered by the dataset, Model 7.3 limits our observations even 
further by considering the effect of party information in a “nonpartisan” setting 
exclusively. Model 7.3 looks remarkably similar to Model 7.2, but loses significance in 
the statistical sense with a reported p-value of 0.108 for the percentage of party mentions.  
 
Table 1.7. Fixed Effects Models for Black Vote Share  
  7.1  
7.2 
 
7.3 
(NP Elections Only) 
    
% Party mentions 29.82* (12.68) 27.14** (9.323) 20.79 (12.57) 
% Race mentions  
 
-6.268 
 
-10.16 
(10.40) (14.72) 
Incumbent  
 
23.66*** 
 
29.03*** 
(3.752) (5.250) 
3(+) Candidates  
-11.31** -4.961 
(3.839) (5.338) 
Election Type    
General   -2.728 (4.199) 
 
24.86  (13.77) 
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Runoff   5.105 (7.137) 
 
36.87* (14.83) 
Constant  30.18*** (4.902) 
 
30.27*** (6.173) 
 
8.292  (14.32) 
N 93 91 49 
City Groups 19 19 11 
Within R2 0.07 0.555 0.619 
Between R2 0.209 0.584 0.369 
Overall R2 0.119 0.567 0.545 
AIC 8.198 7.606 7.477 
Note: Models 7.1, 7.2, and 7.3 use Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression with a 
dummy variable for contests that occurred in the same election sequence and city fixed 
effects.  
 * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. 
  
Third, some elections may have a high proportion of articles that mention 
candidate party, but very few actual articles about the election. For example, Table 1.1 
tells us that some contests had as few as 9 articles about the election.  If 5 of those 
mention the black candidate’s party, then a whopping 56% of articles have party cues, but 
there are still relatively few opportunities for voters to obtain information about candidate 
party. To account for this possibility I reran the models above using the total number of 
articles with partisan cues (as well as the total number of articles with racial cues) as the 
key independent variable. Party information does lose some of its explanatory capacity in 
models 8.3 and 8.6 (the number of party mentions has a p-value of 0.061 in Model 8.3 
and a p-value of 0.057 in Model 8.6), which include other potential predictors of black 
support. Despite this, the overall results shown in Table 1.8 confirm that even when 
measured as a count, partisan cues continue to influence black electability.   
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Table 1.8. Effect of Number of Party Mentions on Black Vote Share & Electoral 
Victory 
 
8.1:  
Vote Share 
8.2:  
Vote Share 
8.3:  
Vote Share 
8.4:  
Victory 
8.5:  
Victory 
8.6:  
Victory 
# Party 
mentions 
0.163**  
(0.0527) 
0.156**  
(0.0548) 
0.144^   
(0.076) 
0.016* 
(0.006) 
0.018* 
 (0.007) 
0.0367^   
(0.018) 
# Race 
mentions 
   -0.187   (0.117) 
   -0.041
^   
(0.026) 
Nonpartisa
n elections 
 -1.201   
(3.492) 
4.072   
(3.660) 
 0.221   
(0.428) 
1.297^ 
(0.702) 
Incumbent    27.01
***  
(4.482) 
   3.91
**  
(1.236) 
3(+) 
Candidates 
   -11.81
***  
(3.002) 
   -0.483   (0.619) 
Election 
Type 
      
General    3.287   (3.598) 
   0.579   (0.747) 
Runoff    9.357   (8.388) 
   0.685   (1.302) 
Population 
(logged) 
   2.052   (2.158) 
   0.341   (0.388) 
% Black    0.185   (0.128) 
   0.021   (0.024) 
% White    0.157   (0.160) 
   0.028   (0.032) 
Share of 
pres. vote  
 
  0.082   (0.077) 
 
  0.024   (0.019) 
Bachelor’s 
degree 
   -0.0215   (0.168) 
   0.0164   (0.034) 
Median 
household 
income 
(logged) 
 
  -4.169   (8.125) 
 
  -0.355   (1.554) 
% 
Unemploy
ed 
 
  -0.0329   (0.441) 
 
  -0.065   (0.084) 
Constant 33.00
*** 
(2.364) 
33.87***  
(3.334) 
31.84   
(94.47) 
-0.784** 
(0.252) 
-0.946*  
(0.381) 
-6.385   
(17.727) 
N 128 128 126 128 128 126 
R2 0.09 0.091 0.546 0.030 0.038 0.294 
AIC 8.684 8.720 8.180 1.362 1.365 1.197 
Note: Models 8.1, 8.2, and 8.3 use Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression and Models 
8.4, 8.5 and 8.6 use logistic regression. All models have a dummy variable for contests 
that occurred in the same election sequence and robust standard errors in parentheses. 
 ^ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. 
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Conclusions 
This paper sought to resolve why observational and experimental studies of minority 
electability tend to produce diverging conclusions about the relationship between 
candidate race, partisanship, and vote choice. Combining a novel dataset of mayoral 
elections with a content analysis of election news coverage, I demonstrated that when we 
properly account for partisan information, the real and experimental worlds produce 
similar conclusions: party cues improve black electability. This has important 
methodological and substantive implications. 
Methodologically, the findings confirm that it takes a continuous measure of party 
information to truly capture how party affects minority electability. Indeed, as noted in 
the discussion of the models from Table 1.3 and Table 1.4, a black candidate gains more 
than 10 percentage points of the vote share when moving from a nonpartisan election 
with no party information to one where half of all articles reference party. Furthermore, 
that candidate has a nearly 60 percent chance of winning their election. Yet, had we 
relied on the conventional binary classification of partisan/nonpartisan elections we 
would have concluded that a black candidate has only a 40 percent chance of being 
elected in any nonpartisan election. Clearly, relying on a partisan/nonpartisan distinction 
misinforms us about the relationship between party, race, and vote choice and, 
consequently, encumbers our theoretical understanding of minority electability. 
Substantively, this means that the official status of the election – partisan or 
nonpartisan – rarely reflects the actual role that party is playing in the contest. Indeed, 
aside from incumbency and the number of candidates running, voter access to party 
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information is the most consistent factor for explaining voter support for black 
candidates. Again this highlights the importance of how we measure partisanship: when 
we take the amount of party information available into account, it reveals that black 
candidates have a tool they can use to overcome racial prejudice in partisan and 
nonpartisan elections alike.  
 There is unmistakably an important role for party information to play in future 
models of voting behavior. That said, the cue-based theory of minority electability 
presented here still requires some development. First, there is a very real chance of the 
relationship between party information and vote choice being endogenous. While the 
two-stage least squares regressions reported in Tables 1.6 and 1.7 does its best to account 
for this possibility, it is difficult to identify strong instrumental variables that completely 
dispel concerns about endogeneity. However, there is evidence to indicate that this theory 
also holds in an experimental setting, which would confirm the causal influence of party 
information on minority electability (Jaeger, forthcoming).  
Second, it would be informative to determine whose vote choice is affected by 
party information. Do black candidates make comparable gains in their support from 
Republicans, Democrats, and Independents when their party affiliation is revealed? 
Considering that the vast majority of African-Americans do identify as Democrats, it is 
feasible that revealing a Republican identity could lead to a profound boost in Republican 
support, but also cost them votes amongst liberals. Likewise, does the availability of 
party information have similar consequences for voters of all racial and ethnic 
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backgrounds? Possibilities such as this raise questions about whether party information is 
always beneficial to black electability.  
Another important line of inquiry would be to consider other minority candidates: 
do Latino and Asian candidates experience the same boost in voter support from party 
information? Both Latinos and Asians are less likely to be associated with a particular 
party affiliation, so it could be that partisan cues are even more consequential for how 
voters evaluate their candidacy. Future work should pursue these questions through a 
combination of additional observational data and experiments. Combining these 
approaches would assist in fully developing and testing the causal claims behind the 
theory of minority electability.   
Given what we know about the primacy of party affiliation for voting behavior, 
research concerning local elections should be better at incorporating appropriate 
measures of party into its models. It is not simply a matter of distinguishing which 
elections put party labels on the ballot and which do not. Rather, this paper demonstrates 
that party can play a fundamental role in determining who wins elections even when it 
has no “official” role.  
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CHAPTER TWO 
Securing Communities or Profits? 
The Effect of Federal-Local Partnerships on Immigration Enforcement 
 
Courts and legal scholars have consistently placed the power to regulate 
immigration within the realm of federal authority. Yet, the National Conference of State 
Legislatures (2015) reports that since 2010, state and local governments have enacted 
1,655 laws and resolutions related to immigration. Although these initiatives were not 
met without contestation, rulings by the Supreme Court suggest that immigration policy 
is no longer exclusively within the federal domain (Chacon 2012; Chin and Miller 2011). 
Furthermore, the federal government has reformed its own approach to immigration by 
actively pursuing partnerships with local actors to expand immigration enforcement from 
the border into the country’s interior. Although subnational assistance in immigration 
enforcement was clearly recognized in the 1996 amendments to the Immigration and 
Nationality Act, the government’s more recent push for states to use 287(g) authority and 
their execution of programs such as Secure Communities and the newly fashioned 
Priority Enforcement Program, sends a strong message: immigration control now 
operates under a decentralized agenda. Scholarly inquiries attempting to make sense of 
the many and varied local policy initiatives popping up across the country have become 
common, but to date there exists no underlying theory to explain when and why local 
actors cooperate with federal initiatives. Since all signs point to a continued role for local 
actors in the execution of federal immigration enforcement, this paper uses the case of the 
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Secure Communities program to develop a better understanding of federal-local 
partnerships in terms of program implementation and outcomes. 
Secure Communities, also known as S-Comm, is an interior deportation program 
that depends on local law enforcement to assist federal agents in apprehending and 
detaining unlawful residents. Unlike 287(g), where local actors volunteered to partner 
with Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) to enforce federal immigration laws, 
counties were “activated” into S-Comm via a federal directive. Secure Communities was 
seen as a successor to the 287(g) program and a model for how the government plans on 
moving immigration enforcement forward. Indeed, its replacement, the Priority 
Enforcement Program, has the same policy objectives and relies on a similar level of 
local cooperation in order to achieve its purpose.  In this way, Secure Communities 
represents not only an appropriate case study to examine how immigration enforcement 
has been carried out, but also a realistic example of what implementation programs will 
look like.  
In this paper, I show that because Secure Communities depends on the 
cooperation of local law enforcement agencies to achieve its mandate, any conclusion 
about the program’s outcomes depends on an understanding of the partnership between 
federal and local actors. Drawing on existing theories of intergovernmental policy 
implementation, I reveal that ICE uses financial incentives to simultaneously minimize 
their own logistical barriers to implementation and motivate local cooperation. Moreover, 
unlike existing studies on local responses to immigration, I find no evidence to suggest 
that Republican-leaning counties produce more deportations. Instead, resource capacity 
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appears to strongly moderate the relationship between political orientations and 
deportation outcomes.  
 
The Secure Communities Partnership 
In the face of opposition from governors, law enforcement officials, and immigrant rights 
advocates, the Obama administration oversaw a rapid rollout of the Secure Communities 
program – expanding it from 14 jurisdictions in 2008 to all 3,181 jurisdictions by 2013. 
The program relies on local cooperation at two specific phases. In the pre-custody phase, 
law enforcement personnel are expected to run the fingerprints of apprehended 
individuals through the FBI criminal database. That information is then automatically 
forwarded to ICE to be checked against the Department of Homeland Security’s 
biometric database, IDENT, which links digital fingerprints, photographs, iris scans, and 
facial images to biographic information meant for verifying identities. If the database 
produces a “match,” indicating the individual is eligible for removal, ICE issues a 
detainer request asking the law enforcement agency (LEA) to hold the individual until 
ICE can assume custody.  
Once ICE assumes custody, immigrants are transferred to detention centers. Since 
2005, the number of immigrants in federal detention waiting for a deportation decision 
has doubled since 2005 to more than 400,000 individuals a year (TRAC 2015). Given 
that there are less than 8,000 detention beds in facilities owned and operated by ICE, the 
agency faces a considerable logistical dilemma. To overcome this predicament, ICE 
contracts local jails and private prison companies to assist in housing detainees. Although 
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post-custody detainment was not a planned aspect of the federal-local partnership, it has 
become essential to S-Comm’s implementation and, consequently, fundamental to 
explaining deportation outcomes.   
 
Political Culture, Resources, and Implementation 
Federal-local partnerships are now considered a common approach to policy 
implementation in the U.S. (O’Toole 2000); however, the strategic value of this method 
for achieving successful policy implementation is continually called into question 
because of principal-agent problems. Local compliance with federal initiatives can be 
erratic, producing inconsistent and often undesirable outcomes (Hill and Hupe 2002; 
Shapiro 2005). The resulting disconnect between policy objectives and policy outcomes 
has become known as “the implementation gap.”  
One explanation for the implementation gap is that local actors bring their own 
normative standards and political cultures into the implementation process. The 
consequence is that policies are interpreted and enacted to fit preexisting agendas and 
political preferences resulting in uneven levels of compliance (Cho et al. 2005; Keiser 
and Soss 1998; Mazmanian and Sabatier 1981; McLaughlin and Talbert 2001; Meier and 
O’Toole 2006; Spillane et al. 2002; Weissert 1994).  Others have shown, however, that 
without the necessary financial and physical resources to implement a policy, local actors 
are pressed to limit or modify their compliance regardless of normative or political 
preferences (Barrilleaux, Feiock, and Crew 1992; Hasenfeld and Brock 1991; Lipsky 
1984; Scholz and Wei 1986). Since the early 1990s, an increase in federal mandates and a 
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simultaneous decline in federal aid have made it even more difficult for the federal 
government to obtain consistent and comprehensive cooperation across local 
governments (Ray and Conlan 1996). In effect, states and local agencies have become 
“reluctant partners” in the task of intergovernmental implementation (Stoker 1991). 
Chand and Shreckhise (2014) clearly situate local compliance with the Secure 
Communities program in the political culture camp, arguing that Republican jurisdictions 
should be more apt to comply with the S-Comm mandate and engage in more deportation 
efforts than their Democratic counterparts precisely because it is inline with their Party’s 
ideological commitment to pursue a tough immigration enforcement program. Given the 
strong correlation between Republican governments and the adoption of other restrictive 
immigration efforts at the local level (Chavez and Provine 2009; Creek and Yoder 2012; 
Ramakrishnan and Wong 2010; Zingher 2014), this line of thought makes sense. 
Additionally, compliance with Secure Communities should not place any additional fiscal 
burden on local governments and agencies – in theory.  
In the following section, I show, however, that Secure Communities does impose 
financial hardship on counties. With this clear, I argue that a more nuanced relationship 
between political orientations, resources, and policy compliance exists. The resource-
based framework that I propose does not disregard a role for political orientations, but 
insists that financial capabilities and incentives are foundational to understanding when 
and where deportations are most likely to occur. This develops existing theory on 
intergovernmental policy implementation, which has been described as “unsatisfactory” 
(Weissert 2001) and “lacking rigour” (Kettl 2000), in two ways. First, it demonstrates 
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that we need not rely on political culture or resources alone to explain policy compliance. 
As the case of Secure Communities illustrates resources are a prerequisite to policy 
implementation while the influence of political culture comes later. Second, whereas 
extant studies have highlighted the importance of local resource capacity, I submit that 
because intergovernmental policy implementation is a partnered effort it depends on the 
resource capacity of both local and national actors. 
 
A Resource-based Framework 
Secure Communities was intended to be a “simple and common sense way” to improve 
federal removal efforts in the country’s interior without creating an additional burden on 
local agencies (Department of Homeland Security 2015).  Despite this, reports across the 
country suggest participating in Secure Communities takes a toll on local resources. In 
Washington State the program has increased average jail time by 161 percent, driving up 
detention costs by about $3 million (Beckett 2013). In Los Angeles County, California, 
where immigrants are detained 21 days more than the average inmate, the county pays 
more than $26 million a year (Greene 2012). And, in New York City, ICE detainers led 
to non-citizens staying, on average, approximately 73 more days in jail than other 
offenders (Shahani 2010). The Salt Lake City Police Chief, Chris Burbank, comments 
that when local officers engage in immigration enforcement, it “diverts resources away 
from [the department’s] central responsibilities during a time of budget cuts and staffing 
shortages” (U.S. Congress 2010). Lieutenant Michael Barry of Martin County, Florida, 
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further explains how the demands of fulfilling the Secure Communities directive places a 
strain on law enforcement: 
 
Sending I.A.Q’s [Immigration Alien Queries], waiting for responses, making 
phone calls to different immigration officials for clarification on detainees status, 
gathering additional information for immigration such as photos, booking sheets, 
fingerprints, and palm prints takes away from the deputies regular duties. 
 
These officers make clear that even if an agency with wants to cooperate, their limited 
resources may make them incapable of doing so. Thus, we should see a marked 
difference in deportation rates depending on the existing budgets of local law 
enforcement: 
 
Resource Constraints Hypothesis: jurisdictions with larger operational 
budgets for law enforcement will have more deportations than those with 
smaller budgets.  
 
 Yet, the policing resources of local governments are only half of the equation. As 
Hall and O’Toole (2004) note, unlike traditional studies of policy implementation, which 
look to its hierarchical nature to inform theories, many of today’s policies are applied in a 
“horizontal” environment, where “national programs are implemented by a variety of 
different kinds of actors both within and without government” (190).  McGuire (2006) 
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notes that while scholars of policy implementation have been quick to note the structural 
differences that “collaborative” policy implementation brings, research has been slow to 
assess the effects of partnered efforts on policy outcomes.  
Just as law enforcement agencies often lack the financial resources to hold 
individuals until ICE assumes custody, ICE agents, as “aerial-level” bureaucrats, also 
face resource limitations. Specifically, once ICE agents assume custody they need a place 
to house detainees waiting on a deportation decision. Although Congress set a detention-
bed mandate that requires ICE to “maintain a level of not less than 34,000 detention 
beds” at any given time (Office of Management and Budget 2014, 520), ICE owns and 
operates less than 8,000 beds. Consequently, ICE has entered into Intergovernmental 
Service Agreements (IGSAs) and private contracts with local jails and privately owned 
correctional facilities to house detainees. As shown in Figure 2.1, the usage of IGSA and 
private facilities by ICE is widespread. 
IGSAs and private contracts not only offer a solution to ICE’s logistical dilemma, 
but they also encourage local compliance by compensating private, local, and county 
facilities an average of $119 per day per bed filled (DHS 2015, 60). The majority of the 
more than 400 Intergovernmental Service Agreements are direct contracts between ICE 
and local governments, but an analysis of ICE records shows that 33 percent of IGSAs 
are for use of local jails that are operated by private prison companies. In such cases, 
local governments receive a bed-fee from ICE as well as annual compensation from the 
prison companies they have contracted. For example, an internal audit by ICE (2012) of 
its contract with Pinal County, Arizona, reveals that the county made approximately $9.6 
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million from its contract in 2012. In the same year, Pinal County’s contract with private 
prison giant, Corrections Corporation of America (CCA), contributed $1.1 million to the 
county’s general fund (Kirkham 2012).  
 
 
Figure 2.1. IGSA and Private Correctional Facility Locations. This map displays the 
counties that have entered into Intergovernmental Service Agreements with the federal 
government in order to house detainees (green-shaded regions) and the location of private 
correctional facilities (brown dots). As shown, a substantial number of the private 
facilities are located within IGSA counties. 
 
The relationship between private prison corporations and federal and local 
authorities is becoming even more convoluted. In 2014, Eloy, Arizona, agreed to be the 
financial go-between for ICE and its new CCA immigrant detention facility in Dilley, 
Texas – yes, Texas. Despite being located more than 900 miles from the facility, the city 
of Eloy modified an existing IGSA with ICE to expand its contract to cover the Dilley 
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facility. According to an ICE spokesman, the use of an IGSA allowed ICE to avoid a 
competitive bidding process, saving them an estimated “18 months to get the facility up 
and running” (Burnett 2014). For the city of Eloy, which is promised $0.50 per bed per 
day (regardless of whether its filled), this translates to about $438,000 a year to, as Eloy 
City Manager Harvey Krauss, puts it, “manage the money” (Harris 2015).  
Even when IGSAs are not part of the story, ICE contracts with private detention 
facilities may still increase the number local deportations resulting from Secure 
Communities, albeit indirectly. In 2009, 49 percent of detention beds were in private 
facilities. Today, private beds house 62 percent of all detainees (Carson and Diaz 2015). 
Indeed, of the ten largest immigrant detention centers, nine are privately run and as the 
demand for bed space continues to grow so too does bidding for contracts to build new 
private facilities. Knowing the potential financial return, local governments often 
compete for the right to build facilities within their jurisdictions. This is what led to the 
Willacy County Detention Center in Texas, once the largest immigrant detention center 
in the United States. In return for a daily fee for each inmate held, Willacy County agreed 
to assume the financial risk of building the facility, which was contracted by ICE and is 
run by Management & Training Corporation (MTC). In 2014, revenue from the facility 
injected $2.7 million into the county’s $8.18 million general and capital funds (Del Valle 
2015).  
By contracting out detention services, ICE created a solution to their capacity 
problem and a financial incentive for local cooperation. If resources truly are 
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foundational to cooperation, then incentives are logically the second key aspect to this 
framework: 
 
Financial Incentives hypothesis: jurisdictions with IGSAs or private 
correctional facilities will have more deportations. 
 
Stoker (1991) claims that to bring ideologically reluctant actors on board the federal 
government must alter the conditions of the implementation process in a way that 
incentivizes them to cooperate with the implementation procedures as intended. I argue 
that the case of Secure Communities illustrates that incentives do not require policy 
modification to persuade the reluctant, but simply policy appeal to attract not only the 
ideologically averse, but also the resource deficient. In short, promising dollars for 
detainment solves two problems at once, fueling cooperation and, as a result, resolving 
ICE’s capacity predicament.  
Unlike existing theoretical perspectives, which portray resource and ideological-
based explanations as competing theories to explain variation in policy implementation, I 
suggest that once LEAs have resources, therefore, the ability to comply with the Secure 
Communities directive, it is more likely that county political orientations will help to 
explain the extent to which they cooperate with ICE. Specifically, 
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Political Orientations hypothesis: Republican-leaning counties will yield 
more deportations if they have larger policing budgets, are part of an 
IGSA, or have a private correctional facility in their jurisdiction.  
 
As the above discussion indicates, this paper assumes that differences in levels of 
compliance result from a county’s resource security, first, and their political preferences, 
second. These predictions break with previous work on local immigration policy and 
compliance with the Secure Communities program specifically, which emphasize the 
dominant role played by partisan preferences.  In the following section I discuss the 
Secure Communities deportations data and how its unique structure warrants a particular 
type of statistical analysis. Correctly analyzing this data is crucial to accurately test the 
merits of the resource-based theory advocated here against prevailing theories that 
emphasize political ideology.   
 
Research Design and Data 
To assess the impact of federal-local partnerships on the implementation of the Secure 
Communities program, I engage in a large-N analysis of county-level deportations from 
2008 until the program’s termination in 2014. The dependent variable, the total number 
of deportations within each county, ranges from zero to thousands across the activated 
jurisdictions with the average number of deportations at 127.7 It should be noted that the 
																																																								
7 The appendix provides a more detailed discussion and series of robustness checks to 
reassure the reader that the dependent variable’s large range is not affecting the results.  
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dependent variable has several particular characteristics that influenced my choice of 
modeling strategy. First, county deportations are both discrete and non-negative counts, 
suggesting the use of a Poisson model.  However, because the variance is much greater 
than the mean in this particular data, the standard assumption of the Poisson model, that 
the variance is equal to the mean, is violated (Hilbe 2014).  
The negative binomial regression model (NBRM) is a well-equipped alternative 
to account for overdispersion. Unfortunately, the NBRM is based on the expectation that 
the percentage of zero counts in the data will go down as the mean increases. In this case, 
however, the data produces far more zeros than expected: 26 percent of the counties 
experienced no deportations while NBRM predicts nearly 0 percent. To account for 
excess zeros and overdispersion, I turn to the zero-inflated negative binomial model 
(ZINB). Rather than making inferences about the relationship between the number of 0 
counts and the mean, the ZINB model estimates the number of deportations by 
incorporating the zero counts into both a binary and a negative binomial model. 
Specifically, for each observation, there are two possible data generating processes: one 
that is generated by a binary distribution producing only zero counts and one that is 
governed by a negative binomial distribution, some of which are zero. In other words, it 
assumes that some counties will always produce 0 deportations, while others might report 
0 deportations, but in fact have a positive probability of having more than 0 deportations. 
Additionally, comparisons of NBRM and ZINB using the AIC and a Vuong test reveal 
that the ZINB model is the better choice.8  																																																								
8 Results from these tests are shown in the model outputs below.  
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My overview of the modeling strategy is important not only for understanding 
how I arrived at my results, but also why I expect my results to differ from those of 
Chand and Schreckhise (2014), currently the only other empirical study examining why 
deportations deriving from Secure Communities vary across counties. While Chand and 
Schreckhise provide a nice foundation for inquiry, we should be cautious of their results 
for a couple of reasons. First and more simply, their data is incomplete. Since it contains 
deportation outcomes only through May 2013, it leaves out about a year and a half of 
additional data. Second and more importantly, Chand and Shreckhise use OLS to model a 
count outcome – never explaining how their data fit the model or avoid violating key 
assumptions of OLS. This in and of itself warrants that their findings be interpreted with 
a considerable amount of caution. In the section that follows, I test their model using 
OLS and ZINB regression in order to demonstrate the necessity of modeling the 
deportations data with a ZINB model.  
As the hypotheses make clear, there are four primary explanatory variables that 
are examined. Summary statistics for these variables and other control variables can be 
found in Table 2.1. The first independent variable, the operational budget for law 
enforcement in the county, comes from the Department of Justice’s 2008 Census of State 
and Local Law Enforcement Agencies. This data is especially pertinent as it provides 
budget information for not only the county Sheriff’s office, but also local police 
departments within the county. Combining statistics from all LEAs with the capacity to 
hold or transfer inmates, I created a variable for the operating law enforcement budget 
per county resident. 
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The second predictor is a dummy variable, with 1 indicating that the jurisdiction 
has at least one private correctional facility in its borders. This data was collected using 
the facility location information found on the websites of the three largest private prison 
companies: CCA, GEO Group, and MTC. Similarly, I compiled an indicator variable for 
whether or not a county has an IGSA with ICE using a DHS list of ICE contracted 
detention facilities. The final explanatory variable is each county’s average share of 
Republican votes in the 2008 and 2012 presidential election.  
If the implementation of Secure Communities has been carried out as its purpose 
states, to target unlawful immigrants, then we should see markedly more deportations 
take place in counties with higher proportions of unauthorized immigrants and higher 
rates of crime. Unfortunately, approximations of the size of the unauthorized population 
are only available at the state level (Passel and Cohn 2011).  Thus, I supplement this 
predictor with the county’s proportion of foreign-born residents (U.S. Census 2010) to 
indicate the percentage of potentially deportable individuals. For the crime rate, a 
composite variable of the number of violent and property crimes was compiled using the 
2011 FBI Uniform Crime Reporting Statistics.  
In addition to the main predictors of interest, there are several control variables. 
Following Chand and Schreckhise (2014), the first group attempts to capture established 
attitudes toward immigration within counties. The first variable is coded 1 if the county 
includes any 287(g) participants. I also include a measure of state-level voter support for 
Arizona’s SB1070 (a 2010 Rasmussen Poll whose results are listed at the Federation for 
Immigration Reform website). Support for SB1070 and 287(g) participation are both 
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meant to identify those counties that might be more predisposed to compliance. Finally, a 
dummy variable representing whether or not the county is located in a state that has 
passed a Dream Act (National Conference of State Legislatures 2014) is included to 
account for jurisdictions that may be more reluctant to comply.  
 
Table 2.1. Summary Statistics for All Variables 
Variables Observations Mean St. Deviation Min Max 
Total Deportations 3129 126.74 1100.166 0 35468 
Budget per resident 2939 170.236 214.885 1.127 5804.384 
IGSA Contract 3129 0.087 0.282 0 1 
Private Correctional 
Facility 3129 0.033 0.179 0 1 
Republican support 3129 58.28 14.02 6.89 94.25 
287(g) Participant 3129 0.217 0.412 0 1 
% Favors SB1070 2703 56.67 11.73 25 73 
Dream Act 3010 0.385 0.486 0 1 
Border State 3129 0.139 0.346 0 1 
County Population  3129 98852 339707 82 9818605 
Foreign-Born 3129 4.32 5.49 0 72.2 
Latino Population 3129 8.25 13.17 0 95.74 
Change in Latino 
Population 3125 85.40 93.31 -100 1741 
% State Unauthorized 3010 2.85 1.81 0.5 7.2 
Crime Rate 2701 123.23 397.75 0 15370.7 
% GDP Construction  3129 4.02 0.685 1.1 5.7 
% GDP Fruits & 
Vegetables  2855 3.28 4.03 0.1 18 
Unemployment Rate 3128 8.53 2.95 1.1 28.9 
Median Household 
Income 3128 45,965.5 11,598.2 21,572 117,680 
      
 
The second group of control variables is focused on demographic factors. From 
the U.S. Census and American Community Survey, I gathered data on the county’s 
population in 2010 and the percentage of Latino residents in 2000 and 2010. To account 
for trends in existing research, I look at the Latino population and its growth in particular. 
For example, it could be that Secure Communities unfairly targets Latinos because 
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members of their community are more often depicted as “illegals” (Cox and Miles 2013) 
and that enforcement is more likely to be pursued in areas where the Latino population 
has grown rapidly (Hopkins 2010; Newman et al. 2012). A dummy variable for whether 
or not the county is located in a border state (states that typically have large Latino and 
large unauthorized populations) was also created.  
Finally, I include a number of economic variables often linked to immigration and 
public attitudes. Some local governments justify harsher measures against immigrants 
because they are perceived as an economic threat (Meuleman, Davidov, and Billiet 
2009). To account for this, I include the 2011 unemployment rate from the Bureau of 
Labor Statistics as well as the state’s percentage of GDP coming from construction (U.S. 
Bureau of Economic Analysis 2014) and fruits and vegetables (U.S. Department of 
Agriculture 2010), two industries that as Chand and Schreckhise (2014) point out are 
often reliant on undocumented labor. Additionally, I include the county’s median 
household income (U.S. Census Bureau, American Community Survey 2013) to account 
for the possibility that because communities with higher incomes are often more 
concerned about the fiscal burdens that immigration brings (Facchini and Mayda 2009; 
Hanson, Scheve, and Slaughter 2007), they may be more prone to implementing the 
Secure Communities mandate.  
 
Replicating Chand & Schreckhise 
I have implied that the explanation put forward by Chand and Schreckhise, that more 
Republican-leaning counties engage in more deportations, is not theoretically sound. In 
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Table 2.2 I test whether there is statistically support for it. Model 2.1 recreates Chand and 
Schreckhise’s OLS regression model and compares it to Model 2.2,which uses ZINB 
analysis to test the effect of the same variables on deportation rates.9  
The OLS results in Model 2.1 match the main effects found in Chand and 
Shreckhise’s original analysis, providing us with confidence that we have adequately 
recreated their dataset. Some of the relationships tested are consistent in the ZINB model; 
those that differ significantly are in bold. Notably, the coefficient for Republican support 
retains its significance, but is negatively related to deportations when using ZINB 
regression. And, while Republican support is negatively related to the odds of being in 
the “0” deportations group, it is statistically insignificant. This further confirms that the 
negative relationship in the count model is not simply a product of Republican support 
being a strong indicator at the zero-inflation stage of the model. The border state, 
unemployment, and crime variables also change direction, while the presence of a Dream 
Act continues to be inversely related to deportations, but loses significance. The bottom 
of the table reports the AIC, showing ZINB to be a vast improvement over OLS. 
Additionally, Breusch-Pagan and Shapiro-Wilk tests demonstrate, respectively, that the 
																																																								
9 Each of these variables was obtained from the same sources used by Chand & 
Schreckhise except for the construction variable, which I could not find from the source 
they provided in the references section. I obtained this figure, instead, from the U.S. 
Bureau of Economic Analysis and checked the accuracy of the figures using various 
statistics from the Department of Labor’s website (where Chand & Schreckhise said to 
have acquired it). All variables are specified according to the explanation provided by 
Chand and Schreckhise. However, in the ZINB models, Days Active is used as an 
exposure variable.  
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residuals are highly heteroskedastic and abnormal.10 Given the negative relationship 
between Republican support and deportation rates, it is only fitting that we turn to 
alternative explanations to determine what exactly is responsible for compliance in this 
case.  
 
Table 2.2. Deportations from Secure Communities, U.S. Counties 2008 through  
May 31, 2013 
 C&S OLS Model 2.1 C&S ZINB Model 2.2 
Independent Variables   
Favors SB1070 5.653** (1.90) 0.0242*** (0.005) 
Dream Act -156.638*** (35.24) -0.0861  (0.091) 
Republican support 4.415*** (1.111) -0.012*** (0.003) 
Border State 264.196*** (58.53) -0.154  (0.139) 
Latino Population 2.629* (1.275) 0.031*** (0.003) 
State % Unauthorized 25.25  1(13.48) 0.316*** (0.038) 
GDP Fruits & Vegetables 19.095(37.907) 0.156  (0.109) 
GDP Construction 54.956* (23.574) 0.227*** (0.065) 
Unemployment Rate 8.969(5.288) -0.0139* (0.015) 
County Population 0.003*** (0.000) 3.79e-06*** (2.46e-07) 
Crime -0.029*** (0.003) 5.92e-05***(1.31-e05) 
287(g) Participant 31.986(35.316) 0.099  (0.092) 
Days Active -0.047  (0.0478)   
Constant -1055.54*** (173.966) -6.955*** (0.477) 
Inflated Model   
Favors SB1070   0.005  (0.022) 
Dream Act   0.655  (0.365) 
Republican support   -0.009  (0.011) 
Border State   0.211(0.662) 
Latino Population   -0.672*** (0.174) 
State % Unauthorized   -0.158  (0.160) 
GDP Fruits & Vegetables   -0.213  (0.360) 
 GDP Construction    0.481* (0.217) 
Unemployment Rate   0.148** (0.045) 
County Population   -1.19e-04*** (2.31e-05) 
Crime   -0.0026  (0.002) 
287(g) Participant   -0.331  (0.345) 																																																								
10 With results from the Breusch-Pagan test reporting chi2(1)= 90151.47 and 
Prob>chi2=0.000 and results from the Shapiro-Wilk test reporting z=17.443 and 
Prob>z=0.000. 
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Constant   1.168  (1.784) 
Observations 2396 2396 
AIC 15.742 6.363 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
Testing the Impact of Resources & Incentives  
The hypotheses put forward in this paper suggest that financial resources and incentives 
may be more effective than ideology to understand jurisdictional variation in 
deportations. In this section, I examine the total number of deportations from all counties 
that were active during the tenure of Secure Communities. Due to the broad spread of 
county-level deportations (with 821 counties reporting 0 deportations and Los Angeles 
County reporting more than 35,000), I run these models again dropping observations one 
and two standard deviations above the mean. These models, shown in the appendix, 
provide robustness checks to confirm that the results found in Table 2.3 are not simply 
due to the presence of a few counties with extreme deportation counts.11  To test 
hypotheses one and two, Model 3.1 of Table 2.3 adds the Private Correctional Facility, 
IGSA Contract, and Law Enforcement Budget variables to the model specified by Chand 
and Shreckhise. Model 3.2 varies slightly from Model 3.1: it replaces the Latino 
population variable with the percentage of foreign-born residents and adds a measure 
capturing the percent change in each county’s Latino population as well as the median 																																																								
11 In addition to the reduced models, I provide two other robustness checks in the 
appendix. First, I created a transformed model, where I use the log of deportations (with 
counties reporting 0 deportations maintaining their 0 count) as the dependent variable and 
analyze the model with OLS. Second, I ran a series of diagnostic tests to determine if 
influential points are skewing the results using Cook’s distance. These various re-
specifications had no substantive impact on the results.   
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household income of the county. I discuss the implications of these modifications below. 
Each model is run with an exposure variable capturing the number of years a county was 
active in the Secure Communities program in order to account for differences resulting 
from longer activation times. The results report the coefficients with robust standard 
errors in parentheses.12 
  
Table 2.3. Total Deportations from Secure Communities, U.S. Counties 2008 to 2014  
 3.1 3.2 
Independent Variables   
Private Correctional Facility 0.604* (0.274) 0.588* (0.281) 
IGSA Contract 0.616*** (0.118) 0.712*** (0.131) 
Budget per resident  0.073***  (0.018) 0.063*** (0.016) 
Republican support -0.008  (0.005) -0.014** (0.005) 
Foreign-born Population  0.160*** (0.017) 
Latino Population 0.043*** (0.007)  
Crime  0.00003(0.00002) 0.00001  (0.00002) 
% Change in Latino Population  0.003*** (0.0008) 
County Population (centered) 0.004*** (0.0005) 0.0024*** (0.0006) 
GDP Fruits & Vegetables  -0.008(0.122) -0.179  (0.117) 
GDP Construction  0.067  (0.099) 0.250** (0.086) 
Unemployment Rate -0.044*(0.018) 0.018* (0.024) 
Median Household Income (centered)  0.001(0.0006) 
287(g) Participant 0.024  (0.097) 0.042  (0.092) 
Border State 0.025  (0.189) 0.436** (0.162) 
Dream Act -0.284** (0.095) -0.085  (0.099) 
Favors SB1070 0.017  *(0.008) 0.009(0.007) 
State % Unauthorized 0.304*** (0.044) 0.143** (0.046) 
Constant -0.413  (0.566) -0.986* (0.586) 
Inflated Model   
Private Correctional Facility -0.954  (1.848) -0.168  (0.974) 
IGSA Contract -0.389  (0.514) -0.462  (0.533) 
Law Enforcement Budget -0.149* (0.070) -0.261* (0.115) 
Republican support 0.0004  (0.013) -0.013 (0.013) 
Foreign-born Population   -0.472*** (0.116) 
Latino Population -0.880*** (0.249)  
Crime -0.0006  (0.001) -0.001  (0.001) 
% Change in Latino Population   -0.001  (0.0007) 
County Population (centered) -0.149*** (0.027) -0.164*** (0.032) 																																																								
12 Although King and Roberts (2015) have noted that robust standard errors may hide 
bias, running the models with classical standard errors results in no substantive 
differences and changes the standard errors negligibly. These results and further 
discussion can be found in the appendix.   
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Fruits & Vegetables GDP 0.312  (0.381) 0.365  (0.399) 
Construction GDP 0.435  (0.245) 0.564* (0.250) 
Unemployment Rate 0.179*** (0.056) 0.132  (0.072) 
Median Household Income (centered)  -0.007** (0.002) 
287(g) Participant -0.491  (0.395) -0.429  (0.372) 
Border State -1.080  (1.313) -1.477* (0.674) 
Dream Act 0.7524(0.431) 1.155** (0.409) 
Percent Favors SB1070 0.011  (0.031) -0.053* (0.027) 
State Percent Unauthorized -0.342  (0.186) -0.815*** (0.183) 
Constant -14.711*** (3.630) -11.624** (4.267) 
Observations 2271 2271 
AIC 7.191 7.077 
BIC 16520.1 16283.7 
Vuong test vs. NBRM z=9.20, Pr>z=0.000 z=8.70, Pr>z=0.000 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
The Resource Constraints and Financial Incentives hypotheses are both supported 
by the models: the size of the county’s law enforcement budget, private correctional 
facilities, and IGSA contracts are all positively and significantly related to the number of 
jurisdictional deportations. Figure 2.2 illustrates quite clearly that in the case of Secure 
Communities it is financial resources – not political ideology – that has a substantive 
effect on deportations. Additionally, it suggests that while deportations are certainly more 
common in areas with larger Latino populations, the crime rate is not necessarily a factor 
motivating such an outcome.  This indicates, as Cox and Miles (2014) and Chand and 
Schreckhise (2014) have suggested, that the implementation of S-Comm is not 
completely reflective of its stated objective to target criminal aliens. 
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Figure 2.2. Coefficients of Key Variables. Each point shows the coefficient of the 
corresponding variable from Model 3.1 with a 95% confidence interval.  The graph 
demonstrates considerable support to the proposition that the Resource Constraints 
hypothesis is a preferable alternative to assessing policy outcomes in terms of political 
preferences.  
 
Moreover, in the inflated components of Models 3.1 and 3.2, county’s with larger 
law enforcement budgets are significantly more likely to members of the deportations 
group while, once again, high levels of Republican support are no more or less likely to 
shift a county from 0 deportations to at least 1 deportation.  On the other hand, the 
coefficients for the other predictors of conservative attitudes toward 
immigrants/immigration do seem to be in the expected direction. In particular, counties in 
states that have implemented their own versions of a Dream Act are less likely to deport 
and apt to deport fewer individuals on average. Contrastingly, counties that are active in 
the 287(g) program or that are located in states with voters that support Arizona’s 
SB1070 are more likely to deport. Still, the results from the negative binomial model 
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make it unclear if support for these policies also leads to more deportations. 
Consequently, these findings make it no easier to conclude that political preferences 
alone help us to understand jurisdictional variation in deportation rates. In the next 
section, I explore the possibility that political inclinations do matter, but that their 
importance depends on the financial resources available to law enforcement 
Like existing resources, the promise of future resources is also positively related 
to a county yielding more deportations. The presence of a private correctional facility 
increases the average number of deportations from 17 to 31. Similarly, counties with an 
IGSA contract have more than twice as many deportations, on average, than counties 
with no contract. Thus, all else equal, moving to a county with either a private facility or 
an IGSA contract increases the number of deportations that occur by a factor of 1.8 and 
2.1, respectively. Figures 2.3a and 2.3b depict visually the effect of these institutions on 
deportation rates. As we can see, IGSA contracts have a much stronger and consistent 
impact on deportation rates. While both counties with an IGSA contract and those with a 
private prison produce rather wide confidence intervals for the number of deportations 
yielded, the smallest number of expected deportations in IGSA contracted counties is still 
far greater than the expected number of deportations in counties without.  
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Figures 2.3a and 2.3b. Effect of Private Prisons (2.3a) and IGSA Contracts (2.3b) on 
Deportation Rates. Each graph shows the change in the expected number of 
deportations (with 95% confidence intervals) when moving from a county without to a 
county with a private prison or IGSA contract.  
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Given that for deportations to take place there must be a potentially deportable 
population, it is not surprising that a county being located in a border state or a county 
with a larger Latino or unauthorized population matters. However, replacing the Latino 
population variable with the county’s foreign-born population is perhaps a better 
specification. Model 3.2 in Table 2.3 illustrates this, revealing significantly lower BIC 
and AIC values than Model 3.1. As the Latino and foreign-born population variables are 
highly correlated (r=0.71), Model 3.2 captures the variation in county deportations that 
the Latino population variable is explaining in Model 3.1, but avoids problems of 
collinearity between the Latino population with the border state and unauthorized 
population variables.13 Additionally, because research showing that sudden increases in 
the Latino population are associated with more negative attitudes toward immigration 
(Hopkins 2010; Newman et al. 2012), including a variable that captures the change in the 
Latino population in Model 3.2 continues to account for the possibility that it is the 
Latino population in particular that is increasing the probability of deportation.  
The economic variables used by Chand and Schreckhise do a good job of 
accounting for the possibility that immigrants are viewed as economic competition in 
certain communities and, thus, more likely to be targeted via programs like Secure 
Communities. However, other studies conclude that the fiscal burdens associated with 
immigration strengthen exclusionary attitudes amongst individuals with higher incomes 
(Facchini and Mayda 2009; Hanson et al. 2007). Thus, by adding the median household 
income to Model 3.2, I hope to obtain a clearer picture of how economic considerations 																																																								
13 In the appendix, I discuss this and other issues of collinearity in the models that could 
be affecting the results. 
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affect compliance more generally. While the median household income does not help us 
to understand which counties are likely to produce the most deportations, it does tell us 
that counties with higher median incomes are substantially less likely to be in the zero 
deportations group (our outcome being tested in the inflated model). Moreover, if the 
relationship between income and deportations is, as the literature suggests, a reflection of 
concerns about immigration and financial stress, then finding that deportations are more 
likely to occur in wealthier counties reinforces that compliance with Secure Communities 
is largely tied to considerations about resource availability.   
 
Do Resources Moderate the Effect of Republican Support on Deportations? 
This section tests whether levels of Republican support in a county have any role to play 
in predicting deportation outcomes. If the political orientations hypothesis is correct, then 
we should see that Republican-leaning counties engage in more deportations when they 
have larger levels of existing resources (i.e. large policing budgets) and when they 
possess more financial incentives to do so because of an IGSA contract or their hosting of 
a private prison. These interactions are tested, respectively, in Table 2.4 below.  
Model 4.1 centers and interacts the Republican support and Law Enforcement Budget 
variables so that we can better estimate the main and interactive effects of both variables. 
We find that a larger law enforcement budget does alter the relationship between 
Republican support and deportations, indicating that as the size of a county’s law 
enforcement budget increases a more conservative county will produce more 
deportations. The inflated component of this model also lends credibility to the 
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moderating effect of budget size: Republican-leaning counties are les likely to be in the 
“0” deportations group as the size of their law enforcement budget increases.  
 
Table 2.4. Moderating Effect of Resources on Republican Support and  
Deportation Outcome 
 4.1: Budget 4.2: IGSA 4.3: Private Facility 
Independent Variables    
Private Correctional 
Facility 0.534  (0.280) 0.618
* (0.282) 0.571  (0.295)   
IGSA Contract 0.723*** (0.131) 0.803*** (0.137) 0.711*** (0.130) 
Law Enforcement 
Budget (centered)  0.050
* *  (0.018) 0.0643*** (0.0158) 0.0650*** (0.0163) 
Republican support 
(centered) -0.015
** (0.005) -0.0164** (0.00536) -0.0139* (0.00542) 
Budget X Republican 
support 0.0034
** (0.001)   
IGSA X Republican 
support  0.0247
* (0.0106)  
Private Facility X 
Republican support   -0.00578  (0.0166)   
Foreign-born Population 0.161*** (0.017) 0.159*** (0.0166) 0.160*** (0.0168) 
Crime  0.000009  (0.00001) 0.00330*** (0.000825) 0.00337
*** (0.00080
7) 
% Change in Latino 
Population 0.003
*** (0.0008) 0.0000159  (0.0000183) 0.0000134  (0.0000182) 
County Population 
(centered) 0.002
*** (0.0005) 0.00241*** (0.000598) 0.00241
*** (0.00061
3) 
GDP Fruits & 
Vegetables  -0.170(0.117) -0.235
* (0.118) -0.176  (0.118) 
GDP Construction  0.239***(0.086) 0.252** (0.0843) 0.246** (0.0861) 
Unemployment Rate 0.019(0.024) 0.0192  (0.0241) 0.0164  (0.0243) 
Median Household 
Income (centered) 0.001  (0.0006) 0.00121  (0.000635) 0.00118  (0.000640) 
287(g) Participant 0.039  (0.091) 0.0385  (0.0920) 0.0451  (0.0913) 
Border State 0.454** (0.163) 0.425** (0.161) 0.437** (0.161) 
Dream Act -0.097  (0.100) -0.0780  (0.0993) -0.0829  (0.0999) 
Favors SB1070 0.011  (0.008) 0.00939  (0.00756) 0.00951  (0.00755) 
State % Unauthorized 0.153** (0.047) 0.145** (0.0467) 0.145** (0.0459) 
Constant -1.759** (0.642) -1.814** (0.630) -1.793** (0.641) 
Inflated Model    
Private Correctional 
Facility -0.018  (0.904) -0.153  (1.047) -0.145  (0.839)   
IGSA Contract -0.400  (0.535) -0.386  (0.555) -0.461  (0.509)   
Law Enforcement 
Budget (centered)  -0.238
* (0.106) -0.259* (0.117) -0.263* (0.115) 
Republican support 
(centered) -0.018  (0.014) -0.0127  (0.0136) -0.0155  (0.0135) 
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Budget X Republican 
support -0.018  
*(0.007)   
IGSA X Republican 
support  -0.0657  (0.0495)  
Private Facility X 
Republican support   0.0433  (0.0488)   
Foreign-born Population -0.487*** (0.114) -0.479*** (0.116) -0.472*** (0.115) 
Crime -0.0008  (0.002) -0.00129  (0.000734) -0.00125  (0.000763) 
% Change in Latino 
Population -0.001  (0.0007) -0.00128  (0.00153) -0.00132  (0.00150) 
County Population 
(centered) -0.167
*** (0.034) -0.165*** (0.0321) -0.167*** (0.0329) 
Fruits & Vegetables 
GDP 0.459  (0.408) 0.326  (0.407) 0.385  (0.404) 
Construction GDP 0.499* (0.245) 0.559* (0.254) 0.556* (0.246) 
Unemployment Rate 0.115  (0.077) 0.130  (0.0720) 0.130  (0.0724) 
Median Household 
Income (centered) -0.007
** (0.002) -0.00675** (0.00229) -0.00678** (0.00232) 
287(g) Participant -0.487  (0.367) -0.426  (0.378) -0.394  (0.374) 
Border State -1.411* (0.637) -1.493* (0.687) -1.414* (0.639) 
Dream Act 1.022** (0.408) 1.143** (0.413) 1.188** (0.412) 
Percent Favors SB1070 -0.050(0.029) -0.0521  (0.0277) -0.0540* (0.0268) 
State Percent 
Unauthorized -0.786
*** (0.190) -0.808*** (0.185) -0.824*** (0.184) 
Constant -12.88** (4.301) -12.47** (4.073) -12.50** (4.062) 
Observations 2271 2271 2271 
AIC 7.073 7.078 7.078 
BIC 16287.1 16298.15 16298.15 
Vuong test vs. NBRM z=8.67, Pr>z=0.000 z=8.72, Pr>z=0.000 z=8.72, Pr>z=0.000 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
To get a better idea of what the effect of resources on this relationship actually is, 
Figure 2.4 looks at the marginal effect of Republican support on deportations for an 
average county at the 25th, 50th, and 75th percentiles of law enforcement budget size. This 
Figure clarifies what the interaction between these variables implies for deportation rates. 
Interestingly, the marginal effect of Republican support results in fewer deportations for 
an average county with a budget in the 25th or 50th percentiles (keeping all other variables 
at their means). In fact, Republican counties with smaller budgets are expected to 
		
66 
produce about 10 fewer deportations than their Democratic counterparts. By contrast, 
counties with budgets in 75th percentile experience significantly more deportations as the 
percentage of voters who cast their ballots for the Republican presidential candidate 
increases. This supports the Political Orientations hypothesis that until a certain level of 
financial security is reached, political orientations play a negligible role in explaining 
compliance. This means that even if more conservative counties want to assist ICE 
officials to a greater extent, they may not be able to do so until they have the necessary 
financial resources.  
 
 
Figure 2.4. Interactive Effect of Law Enforcement Budget and County Levels of 
Republican Presidential Support on Deportations.  This graph demonstrates how the 
marginal effect of a conservative constituency on the number of deportations reported in 
county changes depending on the size of the law enforcement budget (all other variables 
being held at their means). The graph plots county budgets at the 25th, 50th, and 75th 
percentiles.   
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Model 4.2 reports a similar finding between Republican counties and IGSA 
contracts. As shown in Figure 2.5, we find that moving from a county where 7 percent of 
voters supported the Republican candidate in the 2008 and 2012 elections to a county 
where 97 percent of voters supported that candidate more than doubles the number of 
deportations from 24 to 51 for those counties that have IGSA contracts. In counties 
without, this shift in support drops the number of deportations from 38 deportations to 
just 9.  
 
 
Figure 2.5. Interactive Effect of IGSA Contracts and County Levels of Republican 
Presidential Support on Deportations. This graph demonstrates how the marginal effect 
of a Republican-leaning jurisdiction on the number of deportations reported in county 
changes depending on whether or not that county has an IGSA contract (all other variables 
being held at their means).   
 
 Although we do not find any meaningful relationship between levels of 
Republican support and the presence of a private prison in Model 4.3, the results from 
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Models 4.1 and 4.2 are more than sufficient to demonstrate support for the political 
orientations hypothesis: only once a county has secured resources do political preferences 
influence compliance.  
 
Discussion 
This work contributes to existing theories of intergovernmental policy implementation by 
showing a need to rethink the relationship between resources, ideology, and local 
cooperation. Instead of insisting that resource constraints and political culture represent 
two unique systems for how we might understand federal-local cooperation, this paper 
shows that they contribute to our understanding of implementation both discretely and 
jointly.  The findings suggest that the extent to which local actors cooperate with federal 
initiatives is largely dependent on resource considerations, first, and political reasons, 
second. The bottom-line being that in cases where implementation is not so fiscally 
tasking variation in how localities comply may indeed be along ideological lines, but 
when implementation is associated with a particularly large resource burden, it may be 
more difficult for actors to comply with mandates even if they agree with its objective.  
A discernible area for further testing of this theory is environmental mandates. In 
addition to the ideological divisions connected with environmental regulations (Eisner et 
al. 2000; Jones and Dunlap 1992), these federal directives have imposed a tremendous 
financial burden on local governments with scarce resources (Laufenberg 1998; Pollans 
2015; Weiland 1998). Indeed, in response to the release of Columbus, Ohio’s 1991 
publication expressing their inability to meet the growing costs accompanying federal 
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environmental legislation, the New York Times claimed that “environmental costs were 
about to swamp Columbus in red ink – or generate a revolt” (Schneider 1992). It seems 
quite likely that discrepancies in the implementation of federal environmental regulations 
are linked to a local government’s resource capacity, but a prudent path for future 
research would be to consider if capacity also moderates the association between 
ideological preferences and compliance with environmental regulations.  
The case study of Secure Communities also suggests that fiscal incentives may 
motivate compliance from actors ordinarily reluctant to implement such policies. 
Counties with IGSA contracts and private correctional facilities report significantly more 
deportations than those without. It makes sense that if cooperation is associated with 
financial opportunity, counties would be more likely to assist ICE with its deportation 
efforts while trying to improve or prevent their own financial problems. In fact, such an 
incentive structure is remarkably similar to federal laws that allow police departments to 
keep a generous portion of assets they seize during drug arrests in order to improve anti-
drug enforcement at the local level. As studies show, this incentivized approach to 
garnering local cooperation not only induces the assistance of LEAs, but also gains 
support from local governments who use seizures to justify police budget reductions in 
order to ease their own financial stress (Baicker and Jacobson 2007).  
 In sum, discrepancies in local cooperation with federal programs may be due 
more to the fact that some jurisdictions have a larger resource capacity than others or 
because certain localities are persuaded to collaborate when financial returns are linked to 
such compliance. This means that even if local actors are hesitant to adopt particular 
		
70 
types of policies due to political orientations they may not be deterred from assisting with 
the implementation of similar federal policies. These findings have strong implications 
for considering when and how financial incentives are used as a tool to solve compliancy 
issues in federal-local partnerships more generally. Furthermore, since detainer requests, 
the use of IGSAs, and the use of private prisons by ICE are not unique to the agency’s 
Secure Communities program, we can apply the approach taken here to better understand 
the implementation and outcomes of other immigration enforcement programs.   
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CHAPTER THREE 
 Salient Sub-constituencies, Partisan Pressure, and Legislative 
Responsiveness 
 
Early studies of public influence on state legislative behavior painted a dismal picture of 
responsiveness. Not only did there appear to be no link between public opinion and 
policy output (Dye 1966; Plotnick and Winters 1985), the accepted rationale for this 
disconnect was that voters were uninformed and apathetic (Treadway 1985). Recent 
research, however, is more optimistic. After Erikson, Wright, and McIver’s (1993) 
foundational study demonstrated that states in fact adopt policy regimes that align with 
the ideology of their citizens, research has repeatedly shown a strong relationship 
between public opinion and state policy on highly salient issues (Brace et al 2002; Lax 
and Phillips 2009; Lupia et al. 2010). Nevertheless, it is unclear whether legislators are 
also responsive to their constituents when issues are less publically visible. Although 
some speculate that legislators try their best to estimate public opinion and act 
accordingly (Uslaner and Weber 1979), most conclude that without a strong position 
from the general public, legislators shirk constituency preferences and succumb to party-
based influences (Jenkins 2010; Kirkland and Harden 2016; Lax and Phillips 2012; 
LeBlanc 1969; Patterson 1996). While both of these accounts are reasonable, I contend 
that existing scholarship overlooks an alternative explanation: when it comes to less 
salient policy issues, legislators respond to the sub-constituency preferences for which 
that policy matters.  
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Building on Fenno’s (1978) insights that members of congress are influenced in 
distinct ways by various groupings of constituents, I argue that extant studies focus too 
much on the relationship between aggregate opinion and legislative responsiveness when 
an issue need only be salient amongst a particular sub-constituency to influence 
legislative output. In doing so, I contribute to the bourgeoning work being done on state 
legislative behavior in two ways. First, I depart from existing studies that rely exclusively 
on the state legislature as their unit of analysis and instead examine the determinants of 
both state implementation of public policy and legislator voting on it. The state-level 
analysis allows us to compare our theoretical findings to similar studies of legislative 
behavior while the legislator-level extends our testing of theory into a context-dependent 
setting by matching representatives with the unique characteristics of their districts. The 
consequence of this combination is that we are able to parcel out meaningful differences 
between the motivations behind a legislative body’s responsiveness versus that of an 
individual legislator. Second, while the potential for sub-constituencies to affect 
legislative behavior has been considered at the national-level (Bishin 2000; Clinton 2006; 
Fenno 1978; Hayes and Bishin 2012; Shapiro et al. 1990), state-level analyses have 
virtually ignored this relationship; instead, limiting their focus to whether state policy 
reflects public opinion in the aggregate. Since the federalist system arguably places state 
governments in a better position than national government to tailor their policies to the 
preferences of their constituents, exploring the relationship between legislative 
responsiveness and sub-constituencies is a natural and overdue line of inquiry.   
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To demonstrate the importance of sub-constituencies for understanding legislative 
responsiveness, I look specifically at the motivations behind state adopted E-Verify laws. 
E-Verify is an apt case for showing the essential role that sub-constituencies can play in 
the legislative process for two reasons. First, E-Verify has received little attention from 
the general public, putting it neatly into the category of low-profile legislation. Yet, while 
E-Verify yields weak preferences in general, it is especially salient to two groups of 
constituents who are directly impacted by its enforcement: the agribusiness and foreign-
born communities. Second, whereas other research has struggled to disentangle the 
effects of constituency and party-based pressures on legislative behavior (Battista and 
Richman 2011; Clinton 2006; Lax and Phillips 2012), E-Verify is an issue where party 
positions and the preferences of salient constituencies are at odds. This conflict makes it 
possible to separate the relative effect of sub-constituencies from party-based influences 
on legislative responsiveness.  
 Using data on state adoption of E-Verify laws since 2006 and legislator roll call 
voting on these measures, I find that state legislatures and legislators themselves are 
highly responsive to sub-constituency preferences, but that responsiveness plays out in 
different ways depending on the level of analysis. At the state-level, E-Verify is kept off 
the agenda in states where pressure from the agribusiness and foreign-born populations is 
strongest while such legislation passes in states where the voting power of these sub-
constituencies is considerably weaker. This effect occurs regardless of the legislature’s 
partisan composition. At the individual-level, legislator support for E-Verify is more 
clearly divided along partisan lines, but even here we find that sub-constituency pressures 
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are capable of altering both Republican and Democratic positions. These findings call 
into question existing beliefs that legislators shirk their responsibility to their constituents 
when a policy issue lacks public visibility. Instead, they suggest that without intense 
aggregate preferences to guide their actions, legislators become particularly sensitive to 
those constituents for whom a policy matters most and act accordingly.  
 
Responsiveness & Issue Salience 
Some level of legislative responsiveness is key to achieving a democracy. Yet, it was not 
until the early 1990s, when Erickson, Wright, and McIver (1993) demonstrated that state 
policies reflect the general ideology of their citizens, that a connection between public 
preferences and state policy direction was firmly established. Gray et al. (2004) replicate 
and update this model by including measures of organized interests, but still find that 
public opinion is the strongest predictor of policy direction. Jacoby and Schneider (2001) 
further show that public opinion not only influences policy direction, but also state policy 
priorities. Other studies confirm a direct link between public attitudes and the adoption of 
specific policies, such as gay rights, the death penalty, and abortion policy (Arceneaux 
2002; Brace et al. 2002; Gerber 1996; Haider-Markel and Kaufman 2006; Lax and 
Phillips 2009; Norrander 2000).    
Although research has taken significant steps in terms of extending Erickson, 
Wright, and McIver’s findings to specific attitudes and subsequent policy adoption, these 
improvements are not without their own limitations. Thus far any connection between 
public opinion and state policy has been limited to those issues that are especially salient 
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to the general public. For example, Gerber (1996) finds that members of California’s 
legislature voted in accordance with their district when legislation was highly salient, 
while those representing districts where the same issues were deemed insignificant to 
constituents tended to vote against their majority’s preferences. And, Lax and Phillips 
(2009) conclude simply and emphatically that “higher salience means greater 
responsiveness.”  
But what about policy issues that lack general salience? Do constituency 
pressures simply disappear and, if so, what guides legislative behavior? Extant studies 
have basically ignored this question, at best speculating that as issue salience diminishes 
party-based pressures takeover to drive legislative behavior (Jenkins 2010; Kirkland and 
Harden 2016; Lax and Phillips 2012; LeBlanc 1969; Patterson 1996). However, this 
explanation is rarely foolproof. It could be that what is interpreted as party pressure is 
actually legislators acting on their personal preferences (Krehbiel 1993), legislative rules 
making party influence easier (Jenkins 2010), or, as Kingdon (1968) argues, that party 
pressure “masks an underlying constituency influence.” Lax and Phillips (2012) suggest 
that if it is not party driving policy direction, it could be that legislators “overshoot” their 
assumptions about where majority preferences lie on a particular issue. Subsequently, 
states adopt conservative/liberal policy responses in more conservative/liberal states 
despite majority preferences being more liberal/conservative on that particular issue. 
However, Lax and Phillips concede that they have no way to discern whether legislators 
are in fact acting based on their expectations of public opinion or if they are appealing to 
their ideological base, personal preferences, or party pressure. To address this weakness 
		
76 
in the literature and further develop our understanding of legislative responsiveness at the 
state-level, I turn to the rich and extensive literature on legislative behavior at the 
national-level. 
Studies of Congress also find a heightened role for party-pressure in contexts 
where representatives are faced with low-salience policy (Clinton 2006; Lee 2013; 
RePass 1971), however, this body of scholarship points to an additional source to explain 
legislative behavior: sub-constituencies. Fenno’s (1978) study of how representatives 
view their constituents revealed that the larger geographical constituency is split into 
multiple groups that serve different functions in terms of helping the representative meet 
their goals: namely, reelection. Indeed, levels of policy responsiveness and congruence 
are much stronger when we look at the relationship between legislators and sub-
constituency groups than legislators and their constituencies as a whole (Bishin 2009; 
Bullock and Brady 1983; Powell 1982). Arnold (1990) clarifies this further explaining 
that representatives sort their constituents into issue-based sub-constituencies based on 
their perceived preferences and opinion intensity. This preference mapping is done in 
order to guide legislators in their decision-making so they can avoid isolating sub-
constituencies and protect their reelection prospects.  
In this way, issue salience once again becomes vital to explaining responsiveness. 
The main difference is that in this case an issue need only be salient amongst a particular 
group rather than the constituency at large. For example, Hayes and Bishin (2012) 
discover that legislators are not any more likely to respond to the general preferences of 
their constituents as a low-profile issue becomes more visible, but that they do improve 
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their responsiveness to the preferences of those sub-constituencies for which the issue is 
especially salient. This is because groups with strong preferences on niche issues are 
more likely to be aware of their legislator’s voting record on those issues, punishing or 
rewarding their representative accordingly (Arnold 1990; Bishin 2009). I use this 
theoretical foundation to test the possibility that taking into account salient sub-
constituencies will also help us to better understand legislative responsiveness at the 
state-level. I do this by looking at the motivations behind state adopted E-Verify laws.   
 
E-Verify in the States 
E-Verify, a system that mandates employers electronically verify the legal status of 
prospective employees using federal databases, is a fitting case for showing the important 
role that sub-constituencies can play in the legislative process. To date, nearly every state 
legislature has introduced some form of E-Verify legislation14, but only 23 states have 
adopted mandatory policies, as summarized in Table 3.1. Importantly, variation in 
adoption has not been tied to the partisan composition of the legislatures or the 
ideological disposition of their populations (Newman et al. 2012; Zingher 2014). This is 
in stark contrast to other state-level immigration policies, which have been established 
under distinctively partisan circumstances (Creek and Yoder 2012; Monogan 2013; 
Wong 2012).  
 
Table 3.1. State E-Verify Laws, 2006-2015 
State Bill Year Employers Targeted 																																																								
14 Only 4 states have not: Alaska, Maine, North Dakota, and Vermont. 
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Alabama H 56 2011 All employers  
Alabama H 658 2012 All contractors, subcontractors (prime contractors not 
liable) 
Arizona H 2779 2007 All employers  
Arizona H 2745 2008 All contractors, subcontractors (excluding independent 
contractors) 
Colorado H 1343 2006 State agencies, contractors  
Florida EO 11-02 2011 State agencies, contractors, subcontractors 
Georgia S 529 2006 Public employers, contractors, subcontractors with 500+ 
employees 
Georgia H 87 2011 Private employers with more than 10 employees  
Idaho EO 09-10 2009 State agencies; public contractors and subcontractors  
Indiana S 590 2011 State/local agencies and contractors  
Indiana H 1019 2015 Public works contractors  
Louisiana H 342 2011 State contractors  
Louisiana H 646 2011 Private employers  
Michigan H 5365 2012 Contractors, subcontractors of the Department of Human 
Services and Department of Transportation  
Minnesota EO 08-01 2008 Public employers; contractors in excess of $50,000 
(expired) 
Minnesota SF 12 2011 Contracts in excess of $50,000; vendors and 
subcontractors  
Mississippi S 2988 2008 All employers, contractors, and subcontractors  
Missouri H 1549 2008 Public employers, contractors, subcontractors  
Nebraska L 403 2009 Public employers, contractors, and businesses qualifying 
for state tax incentives  
North Carolina S 1523 2006 Public employers 
North Carolina H 36 2011 All employers, counties, and municipalities  
North Carolina H 786 2013 All contractors and subcontractors (excluding employment 
less than 9 months) 
Oklahoma H 1804 2007 Public employers, contractors, subcontractors  
Pennsylvania S 637 2012 Public works contractors and subcontractors  
Rhode Island EO 11-02 2008 Public employers, contractors, subcontractors  (rescinded) 
South Carolina S 20 2011 All employers  
Tennessee H 1378 2011 All employers  
Texas S 374 2015 State agencies  
Utah S 81 2008 Public employers, contractors, subcontractors  
Utah S 251 2010 Private employers with more than 15 employees  
Virginia H 737  2010 State agencies  
Virginia H 1859 2011 Public contractors, subcontractors with 50+ employees 
West Virginia S 659 2012 Public employers and contractors  
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Zingher (2014) suggests that E-Verify is not as “high profile” as other immigrant-
related policies and, subsequently, less likely to evoke strong preferences or become 
politicized. National opinion polls corroborate this explanation, showing that public 
preferences on E-Verify are weak and highly contingent upon question phrasing (Ekins 
2013). Yet, even if E-Verify triggers weaker public preferences than other immigration 
enforcement efforts in general, it is surely important to particular groups of constituents 
who are directly impacted by its enforcement – specifically, the agribusiness and 
immigrant communities. In this way E-Verify presents itself as an excellent test case for 
measuring the effect of sub-constituencies on legislative behavior: it lacks general public 
salience, but is of crucial importance to specific groups of voters.    
According to Krehbiel’s (1993) standards, E-verify is also an appropriate test case 
because it enables us to differentiate between constituency effects and party pressure. 
Republican legislators, typically in favor of stronger immigration enforcement policies, 
are cross-pressured when it comes to E-Verify since its enforcement means targeting U.S. 
business owners that rely on immigrant labor. This leaves Republican legislators with a 
dilemma: continue the refrain of the Republican Party and crackdown on undocumented 
workers or guard the interests of their farmer constituents? The Democratic Party, on the 
other hand, has yet to claim an official position on E-Verify, showing more flexibility in 
its support/opposition. Without looming party pressure, Democratic legislators should be 
especially reactive to the preferences of any large constituencies with a stake in E-Verify. 
In the next section, I build on the legislative behavior literature to explain why I expect 
state legislators to respond to the preferences of agribusiness and the foreign-born 
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community and how this is anticipated to affect our understanding of state variation in E-
Verify policy.  
 
Salient Constituencies & Legislative Responsiveness  
The national-level work on sub-constituencies has developed a strong theoretical 
foundation to explain why we should expect legislative behavior to be influenced by the 
preferences of sub-constituencies (Arnold 1990; Fenno 1978; Fiorina 1974), but it is only 
recently that scholarship has begun to test how specific groups influence the outcome of 
specific policies (Bishin 2000; Clinton 2006; Hayes and Bishin 2012). In fact, conflicting 
findings in the legislative voting literature are thought to derive at least in part from 
scholars’ failing to identify precisely which group of constituents legislators are 
appealing to when they act (Bishin 2000; Jackson and Kingdon 1992).  Like the work of 
Bishin, Clinton, and Hayes on the House and Senate, I apply the theoretical 
underpinnings of this early scholarship to the state-level by estimating the impact of the 
preferences of farm owners and the foreign-born community on state implementation of 
E-Verify and individual legislator voting on such legislation.   
If the behavior of elected officials is motivated by reelection (Mayhew 1974), 
then constituents can have a profound effect on legislative behavior. Yet, not all 
constituents in a district are equally as likely to affect a legislator’s reelection efforts and, 
consequently, not all opinions are weighted the same (Arnold 1990; Goff and Grier 1993; 
Kingdon 1973; Miler 2010). In the context of E-Verify, farm owners and the foreign-born 
community are exactly the types of sub-constituents that Arnold (1990) and others claim 
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can be effective at appealing to their elected officials: they have a clear agenda that they 
care deeply about and will hold their legislators accountable on any issue that affects that 
agenda.   
The agricultural industry has expressed its concern that a mandatory E-Verify 
system would mean relying on the H-2A visa system for meeting immigrant labor needs. 
According to Cathleen Enright, vice president of governmental affairs at the Western 
Growers Association, the H2-A program is “unbelievably crushing” for the agricultural 
industry due to its inability to supply access to a constant and dependable workforce 
(Enright, as quoted in Caldwell 2011). The dairy industry, for example, requires a skilled 
year-round workforce that cannot be supplied by H-2A seasonal workers. Consequently, 
dairy farmers rely almost entirely on unauthorized immigrants (Wickham 2011).  
The President of the National Council of Farmer Cooperatives, Chuck Conner, 
has called for any E-Verify legislation to include a clear plan for an improved H2-A Visa 
program as well as a process to adjust the status of existing workers (Conner 2011). This 
two-pronged approach – making the current guest worker program more efficient and 
allowing existing unauthorized workers to adjust their status – has become the mantra 
across agriculture.15 Indeed, the American Farm Bureau Federation, the nation’s largest 
farmers’ organization, claims that unless E-Verify also includes a worker program its 
implementation will “cripple agriculture production in America”  (Farm Bureau 2017).  
																																																								
15 The Agriculture Workforce Coalition and the United Farm Workers union combined 
forces to show that the employers and employees of America’s agricultural industry stand 
together on this issue. AWC includes 70 organizations that represent agricultural 
employers. (See: “The Agricultural Workforce Coalition” 2017). 
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The Hispanic Federation (U.S. Congress House Committee on the Judiciary 2013, 
p. 69) and the Asian American Justice Center (U.S. Congress House Committee on the 
Judiciary 2013, p. 94) have echoed agriculture’s position that a legalization program must 
accompany E-verify. However, in this case the foreign-born community is worried about 
E-Verify’s potential to disproportionately affect work-eligible immigrants, legal 
residents, and naturalized citizens. Both groups cite a DHS-commissioned study that 
found employers pre-screen employees to weed out those who may be more likely to 
receive a non-confirmation notice and that error rates were 20 times higher for foreign-
born workers than U.S.-born workers (Westat 2009, p. XXXV). Thus, it is not surprising 
that nearly 72 percent of foreign-born Latinos report being worried about themselves, a 
family member, or close friend being deported and 35 percent of U.S.-born Latinos note 
the same anxiety (Pew 2008).  
If election-minded legislators are in fact responsive to their sub-constituencies, 
then we should find that states with larger agribusiness and foreign-born communities are 
less prone to adopting E-Verify: 
 
H1: State legislatures with larger proportions of agricultural and foreign-born 
constituencies will be less likely to adopt E-Verify.  
 
While we expect that sizable agricultural and foreign-born constituencies will 
prevent state legislatures from adopting E-Verify, it is also likely that the effect of these 
constituencies on E-Verify adoption will vary depending on a) the employer targeted by 
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the E-Verify mandate and b) the partisan composition of the legislature. As shown in 
Table 3.1 above, some state mandates apply to all employers while others are specific to 
private employers, government/public employers, or contractors. Foreign-born workers 
are overwhelmingly employed by the private sector (Lewis, Liu, and Edwards 2014) 
while the interests of farm owners are clearly limited to the private and contractor 
realms.16  We would expect that the influence of the agricultural and foreign-born 
constituencies would be greatest for mandates that apply to private employers and 
contractors. Thus: 
 
H2: The agricultural and foreign-born constituencies should have the greatest 
effect on limiting passage of private employer and contractor-specific E-Verify 
mandates. 
 
We also know that Republicans and Democrats have very different relationships 
with farm owners and the foreign-born community. Agribusiness is one of the more 
partisan industries in politics, consistently ranking in the top 10 of the Republican Party’s 
most generous and reliable contributors. For example, in the 2010, 2012, and 2014 
election cycles, agribusiness contributed more than $2 billion to political campaigns and 
party committees – about 70 percent of which went to the Republican Party and its 																																																								
16 Until the 1980s most workers were hired directly by farms, but after the Immigration 
Reform and Control Act’s (IRCA) passage reliance on contractors, who were wiling to 
absorb the risk for immigration violations, became the norm. According to Martin (2011), 
farms in California alone use contractors to secure about half of their employees overall 
and approximately 70 percent of their seasonal workers. 
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candidates (Center for Responsive Politics 2016). Even if a direct link between 
agriculture contributions and voting does not exist (Alvarez 2005; Vesenka 1989; Welch 
and Peters 1983), legislators do appear to be profoundly influenced by agricultural 
interests because of the pressure they feel from this constituency at the polls (Bellemare 
and Carnes 2015). As a result, it is likely that the size of the agricultural constituency will 
be especially predictive for how Republicans respond to E-Verify: 
 
H3: Republican-controlled legislatures with large agricultural constituencies 
should be less likely to adopt E-Verify laws than those with smaller agricultural 
constituencies.  
 
Contrastingly, I expect Democratic preferences for E-Verify to be tied to the size 
of both the agricultural and the foreign-born constituencies. Although the agricultural 
industry might be predominantly in the Republican camp, it makes sense that Democrats 
would protect their interests if farming plays a vital economic role in their states, 
especially given that Democrats have yet to display unified support or opposition toward 
E-Verify. By contrast, we would not expect Republicans, who typically favor E-Verify, 
to be responsive to the foreign-born constituency when such pandering is likely to reap 
them few – if any – electoral benefits.   
Although the Democratic Party has shown a willingness to support E-Verify, they 
have also expressed their commitment to safeguarding the positions of existing 
undocumented workers and preventing E-Verify from unfairly targeting legal foreign-
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born workers (U.S. Congress House Committee on the Judiciary 2013, p. 74). 
Furthermore, there is considerable reason to believe that Democratic legislators would be 
particularly concerned with the interests of their foreign-born constituents. A Pew (2015) 
survey on party identification reports that Latino and Asian voters favor Democrats over 
the Republicans by as much as 42 percentage points. Furthermore, Gay (2007) finds that 
Democrats in California’s State Assembly are highly responsive to their minority 
constituents, many of whom are Latino and Asian – the two ethnoracial minority groups 
that have been the most vocal about their opposition to E-Verify. Therefore, I predict 
that: 
 
H4: Democratic-controlled legislatures with large agricultural or foreign-born 
constituencies should be less likely to adopt E-Verify laws than those with smaller 
agricultural and foreign-born constituencies. 
 
If large, salient constituencies prevent Republican and Democratic legislatures 
from enacting E-Verify, do they also influence how individual legislators vote on E-
Verify legislation? I argue a qualified “yes”. The major difference between the state and 
individual levels of analysis is that legislators within and across the parties experience 
broad variation in terms of their constituency characteristics, leading to important 
differences in their proportions of agricultural and foreign-born constituents. Thus, at the 
individual level, we should not be surprised if we find that constituency effects are 
secondary party. This logic is supported by Aldrich and colleague’s (2008) study of the 
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Senate, which concludes that the attributes of senate districts – in which they include the 
proportion of the farming and foreign-born populations – have little bearing on Senator 
preferences except in cases where an issue is particularly crosscutting or salient. When 
issues lacked salience, party membership explained Senate voting. 
While Democrats have shown signs that they would potentially support E-Verify, 
Republicans have generally taken a hardline stance, spearheading the movement to enact 
a mandatory E-Verify system (Lind, Rankin and Harris 2016). Absent an incentive to do 
otherwise, we would expect that Republicans would follow the party line (Battista and 
Richman 2011; Bullock and Brady 1983; Hill 1983). Jenkins (2008) explains that state 
legislators are motivated to commit to the positions of their parties on a given issue for 
the same reason they are motivated to respond to the preferences of constituents: doing so 
helps them to achieve reelection goals and advance their careers. Thus, in general we 
should find a clear party divide in how legislators vote on E-Verify:  
 
H5: Republican legislators will be more likely than Democratic legislators to vote 
in favor of E-Verify legislation. 
 
Nevertheless, there are some Republicans who openly express their concerns 
about E-Verify. In Florida, where E-Verify passed via Executive Order, Republican State 
Senator, J.D. Alexander, explains that he was unwilling to vote for E-Verify legislation 
because of the “tremendous costs to employers” (Alexander, quoted in Mazzei 2011). In 
North Carolina, Democrats and Republicans who represent large agricultural districts 
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overrode Governor McCrory’s veto of legislation exempting agricultural businesses from 
E-Verify (Wilson 2013). These lawmakers worried that farmers who have grown to 
depend on (unauthorized) immigrant labor would be irrevocably harmed by E-Verify. 
Democratic Representative Larry Hall contends that an exception for the agricultural 
sector was necessary because “it expresses confidence in our farmers and it gives them a 
stable workforce” (Hall, quoted in Wilson 2013). Rhode Island Governor Lincoln Chafee 
(2010) claims that in addition to the problems caused for farming and small business, E-
Verify “ostracized our Latino communities… and it has done more harm than good.” 
Given the concern that both Republicans and Democrats express for E-Verify’s impact on 
particular communities, we should still find a strong relationship between constituency 
pressure and legislator voting:  
 
H6: Republican legislators with large agricultural constituencies and 
Democratic legislators with large agricultural or foreign-born 
constituencies should be less likely to vote in favor of E-Verify laws than 
those with smaller agricultural and foreign-born constituencies. 
 
In sum, the theory and hypotheses presented here contribute to our knowledge of 
state legislative behavior by arguing that legislators are responsive to their constituencies 
even when dealing with policy issues of lower salience. Conventional notions of 
responsiveness have assumed constituency influence to be limited to those policy issues 
that are especially salient to the general public and that party-based pressures drive 
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legislative behavior on issues of low-visibility. However, by shifting our perspective 
from the aggregate constituency to those sub-constituencies who are uniquely affected by 
the policy at hand, we can see that constituency pressures are capable of competing with 
and supplanting party-based pressures.  
   
Data & Methods 
I look at E-Verify in two stages. The first part of the analysis includes all states and 
examines what factors increase the probability of a state adopting an E-Verify law 
between 2006-2015. Following Newman et al. (2012), I use a discrete event history 
analysis (DEHA) where the dependent variable is coded 1 if a state adopted E-Verify and 
0 otherwise. The DEHA model predicts the occurrence of a particular event by 
comparing the characteristics of those population members for which the event did occur 
in a particular timeframe to those for which it did not occur in the same timeframe 
(Allison 1982). In this case, our population is the 50 U.S. states, the event is passing an 
E-Verify law, and the timeframe is yearly units from 2006-2015. States are coded 1 if 
they pass any E-Verify policy during one of these yearly timeframes. Since several states 
have implemented more than one E-Verify policy, gradually widening the scope of 
employers affected, a state remains in the dataset as long as it is “at-risk” of passing an E-
verify law. Once all employers are covered by a state’s E-Verify policy, that state has no 
probability of passing an additional E-Verify law and exits the dataset. So, for example, 
Arizona is coded 0 in 2006, 1 in 2007, and 1 again in 2008, but then exits the dataset 
since there are no other employers for which it could apply an E-Verify requirement.  
		
89 
Thus, my method of analysis differs from Newman and colleagues in three 
important ways. First, the timeframe is extended by five years, which adds 13 observed 
events to the analysis. Second, whereas states exit Newman et al.’s dataset as soon as 
they pass a policy, I allow them to remain until they have no probability of passing 
another E-Verify law. Given that the DEHA model’s estimates are based on comparing 
the characteristics of adoption and non-adoption states within each yearly time-unit, 
including these additional observations is crucial to accurately estimating why some 
states pass laws but others do not.17 Substantively, because these successive laws target 
different employers, we are able to parcel out any key differences in constituency effects 
depending on the type of employer targeted by the law. Finally, I exclude E-Verify laws 
that were implemented via Executive Order, as the determinants behind executive orders 
are likely to vary considerably from laws adopted by state legislatures. 
The second part of the study evaluates the motivations behind a legislator voting 
for or against E-Verify using a state fixed-effects logistic regression model. The 
dependent variable is coded 1 if the legislator voted in favor of the E-Verify bill and 0 if 
they voted against it (legislators who did not vote on the bill were excluded from the 
analysis). This results in the analysis of 28 bills and nearly 4,000 votes across 19 state 
legislatures.18 It should be noted that the votes analyzed are specific to E-Verify 
legislation that passed. Ideally, we would also be able to examine roll call records for 
states that proposed, but did not pass E-Verify. However, to the best of my knowledge, E-																																																								
17 Note that the models include a dummy variable for “previous policy” to account for the 
possibility that once a state passes one policy it is more likely to pass another.  
18 I do not include E-Verify laws enacted through Executive Orders, e.g. Idaho, Florida, 
Minnesota, and Rhode Island.  
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Verify has yet to fail due to “no” votes, but, rather, its fate has been repeatedly sealed 
during committee review. Some may worry (with good reason) that only analyzing voting 
behavior in states where E-Verify passed biases the results in favor of observing more 
support for E-Verify and potentially more partisan polarization. Yet, while E-Verify may 
be adopted by states where agriculture and foreign-born constituencies make up a smaller 
proportion of the overall population (leading to more unified support from Republican 
legislators), the size of these sub-constituencies varies markedly at the district-level. 
Consequently, we should still find constituency effects in those districts with the largest 
farm owner and foreign-born populations. If anything, by only having voting data from 
states that passed E-Verify, the bar is raised in terms of proving that sub-constituency 
preferences have an effect on legislative behavior.  
To determine what influences states to pass E-Verify laws and legislators to vote 
for or against them, I focus on three key independent variables: partisanship, the size of 
the agricultural constituency, and the size of the foreign-born constituency. At the state-
level partisanship is represented by two dummy variables: Democratic-controlled (43 
percent) and Republican-controlled (44 percent) legislatures (split legislatures are the 
omitted baseline category). The most Republican-leaning legislature in the dataset is 
Indiana’s 80th session with 74 percent of members identifying as Republicans. West 
Virginia’s 2012 legislative session is the most Democratic-leaning with 69 percent of 
members identifying as Democrats. Legislator party affiliation, coded 1 for Republicans 
and 0 for Democrats, was determined from legislator biographical information found 
either on the websites of the state legislatures or the individual’s personal website. 
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Approximately 58 percent of the legislators in the dataset identify as Republicans and 42 
percent as Democrats.  
To measure the size of the agricultural constituency I use the percentage of farm 
owners within the state and within each state legislative district. These estimates were 
obtained from the 2007 and 2012 USDA Census of Agriculture. The Census includes 
farm owner information at the national, state, and county level. To obtain estimates for 
the state legislative district level, I used the U.S. Census State Legislative Districts by 
Counties relationship files to merge the county-level data with the appropriate legislative 
district. Since districts often serve several partial counties, I divided each county’s total 
number of farm owners by the number of districts that each county spans. Next, I 
combined the farm owner sub-totals for each partial county within a district to arrive at a 
district total. This total was divided by the district’s population to arrive at the percentage 
of farm owners for each legislative district. While it is certainly true that not every 
county’s population is divided equally between the various legislative districts that 
represent it, this should be an adequate approximation of agricultural interests at the state 
district level.19 Overall, the size of the agricultural constituency ranges from 0 to 7 
percent at the state-level and from 0 to 12 percent at the state district-level.  
The foreign-born population, measured using estimates from the American 
Community Survey (ACS), is relatively larger than the agricultural constituency, 
reaching as much as 27 percent of a state’s population and just under 50 percent at the 																																																								
19 As an alternative measure, I also estimated the legislator-level analyses using the 
percentage of farm workers in each district – a statistic that is reported at the district-level 
by the American Community Survey. The results, available upon request, show no major 
deviations from the tables reported below.  
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district-level. I chose the foreign-born population to estimate constituency influences 
(rather than individual measures for Latino, Asian, and unauthorized populations) for two 
reasons. As discussed above, the foreign-born population captures a diverse cross-section 
of racial and ethnic minorities that feel E-Verify would negatively impact their lives and 
is highly correlated with individual group-based measures (e.g., the Latino or Asian 
population). Second, there are no reliable estimations of the size of the unauthorized 
population at the state-district level and even if there were, this population – unlike the 
foreign-born community – cannot hold its elected officials accountable through voting.  
In addition to the explanatory variables, the models employed below are 
composed of two sets of control variables. The first set captures characteristics of the 
legislatures and legislators. For both levels of analysis, I include measures of ideology, 
gender, and ethnicity. Although typically related, some studies have found that a 
legislator’s ideology acts independently of their partisanship to influence how they vote 
on legislation (Jenkins 2006). I use Shor and McCarty’s (2011) updated ideological 
scores for state legislatures and legislators to control for the influence of ideology on E-
Verify preference. These scores are derived from a combination of legislator responses to 
the Project Vote Smart National Political Awareness Test and 15 years of roll call voting 
data. Smaller values indicate a more liberal legislator and positive values more 
conservative. 
Given that Latino and female legislators tend to be associated with more liberal 
voting patterns as well as a proclivity for supporting legislation that advances immigrant 
interests (Bratton 2006; Bratton and Haynie 1999; Rocca, Sanchez, and Uscinski 2008; 
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Vega and Firestone 1995), I include dummy variables for each group. At the state-level, 
the percentage of a state’s legislators that are women or Latino were identified using data 
from the Center for American Women and State Politics and the National Directory of 
Latino Elected Officials, respectively. At the individual-level, each legislator’s gender 
and ethnicity were identified from legislator biographical information found either on the 
websites of state legislatures or the personal websites of the legislators.  
Finally, I included measures for candidate incumbency and electoral 
competitiveness at the individual-level. These variables are included to account for the 
possibility that legislators are less accountable to their constituents when their seats in 
office are “safe” (Mayhew 1974). Bernstein (1989: 100) boldly claims that incumbent 
legislators can “generally afford to vote for what they think is right.” Relatedly, Berry et 
al. (2000) find that legislators who run unopposed have a 0.988 probability of winning 
their next election. The bottom-line being that both of these factors could contribute to a 
legislator who feels less beholden to their constituents’ opinions. For elections that 
happened in 2010 or earlier, I used Klarner’s (2003) updated20 State Legislative Election 
Returns data series to determine incumbency and electoral competitiveness (whether or 
not the election was contested). Election results from post 2010 were acquired via the 
relevant Secretary of State website allowing the author to calculate incumbency and 
electoral competiveness for each legislator.  
The second set of control variables focus on state and district-level characteristics. 
Although the preferences of sub-constituencies have proven to be more reliable at 																																																								
20 Klarner’s updated data (through 2010) are available at: 
http://academic.udayton.edu/SPPQ-TPR/klarner_datapage.html. 
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predicting legislative behavior than estimates of average district preferences at the 
national level (Clinton 2006; Fenno 1978; Fiorina 1974; Goff and Grier 1993; Miller and 
Stokes 1963), it is possible that state legislative voting patterns are best captured by the 
state or district’s general ideology. As Bishin (2000) points out, the effect of the legal 
constituency – i.e. the average district ideology – is often underestimated because 
statistical models fail to also account for sub-constituencies. At the state-level, I use 
Berry et al.’s measure of citizen ideology, which aggregates state incumbent and 
challenger ideology scores weighted by voter support. The district estimates I use are 
from Tausanovitch and Warshaw’s (2013) American Ideology Project, which measures 
the average level of constituent conservatism/liberalism based on responses to the 
Annenberg National Election Study and the Cooperative Congressional Election Study 
from 2000 to 2011.  Smaller values indicate a more liberal citizenry and larger values 
more conservative. Consistent with extant studies on state-level immigrant-related 
policies, I also include the population size, the median household income, the 
unemployment rate, and the percentage of residents that obtained a bachelor’s degree or 
higher at the state and district-level.  Summary statistics for variables used in the state- 
and legislator-level analyses can be found in the appendix.  
 
State-level Results 
Existing scholarship on state legislative responsiveness would lead us to believe that 
because E-verify lacks general public salience, its passage/failure should be explained by 
legislative partisanship. I hypothesize, alternatively, that if we reconsider our notion of 
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constituency, constituency pressures are capable of playing a fundamental role in 
explaining less salient policy as well. Specifically, passage of E-Verify should be 
contingent on the size of those constituencies most affected by its implementation: farm 
owners and the foreign-born community. Table 3.221 begins our investigation. The first 
model tests the relationship between legislature partisanship and the likelihood of passing 
an E-Verify policy (controlling for states that passed a prior E-Verify policy). Consistent 
with the findings of Zingher (2014) and Newman et al. (2012), Model 2.1 reveals that 
there is no statistically discernible difference in the probability of Republican and 
Democratic controlled legislatures passing E-Verify legislation.  
In Model 2.2, I add the constituency variables to test our alternative explanation: 
salient constituencies – not partisanship – determine which state legislatures pursue E-
Verify. This model depicts a strong relationship between constituency size and policy 
output, confirming our first hypothesis: states with larger agricultural and foreign-born 
constituencies are significantly less likely to adopt E-Verify. Although there is some 
indication that Republican legislatures are more prone to adopt E-Verify, this relationship 
																																																								
21 Note that because we are using a discrete event history model, the reported 
observations in the tables are significantly lower than the 500 (50 states over 10 years) 
from which the models are estimated. This is due to two factors. First, states that are no 
longer “at risk” of adopting an E-Verify policy are dropped from the analysis (38 
observations). Then, since time periods are treated as year fixed-effects, timeframes in 
which no states adopted an E-Verify policy are also dropped, leading to 48 observations 
dropped from 2009 and 42 observations dropped from both 2013 and 2014. I reran the 
models in Tables 2, 3, and 4 without year fixed-effects. The main effects are unchanged 
and the full results can be found in the appendix.  
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disappears after we include our full set of control variables in Model 2.3 while 
constituency effects remain strong.22   
 
Table 3.2. Determinants of State Legislatures Adopting E-Verify 
 (2.1) (2.2) (2.3) 
Republican control  -0.043  (0.928) 1.632* (0.733) 0.690  (0.784) 
Democratic control  1.367  (0.796) 0.0933  (0.878) 0.610  (0.829) 
Farm owners   -0.708*** (0.186) -0.969** (0.306) 
Foreign-born    -0.136** (0.0502) -0.196** (0.0743) 
Legislature Characteristics    
Legislature ideology     0.471  (0.335) 
% Women     -4.466  (5.304) 
% Latino     4.516  (4.176) 
Prior Policy 1.350** (0.445)   1.160* (0.464) 0.805  (0.618) 
State Characteristics    
Average citizen ideology     -0.0186  (0.0298) 
Population (logged)     1.068** (0.410) 
Median household income 
(logged) 
    -0.897*** (0.267) 
Unemployment rate     -0.463  (0.371) 
Bachelor's degree (+)     0.105  (0.163) 
Constant -3.518*** (0.846) -1.799  (0.945) -2.402  (5.125) 
N 330 330 285 
R2 0.142 0.216 0.292 
Models use discrete event history models with state clustered standard errors and time-
period fixed-effects.  
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
According to Model 2.3 states with the fewest farm owners have about a 24 
percent chance of adopting an E-Verify law. This probability drops to 7 percent when 
that constituency grows to just 3 percent of the population. States with no foreign-born 
population have a 21 percent probability of implementing an E-Verify policy, but this 
drops to 15.6 percent when the foreign-born population grows to 3 percent of the state’s 
population. Figures 3.1a and 3.1b compare the marginal effects (from Model 2.3) of the 																																																								
22 To further verify that legislature partisanship has a marginal effect on E-Verify 
adoption, I substituted party control of the legislature with the legislature proportion of 
Republican members. Consistent with the shown models, I find that state legislatures 
with larger proportions of Republican members are no more likely to adopt E-Verify than 
Republican-minority legislatures. These results are available upon request.  
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agricultural and foreign-born constituencies on the probability of adopting an E-Verify 
law. As illustrated, there is about a 1 percent probability of a state adopting E-Verify by 
the time the agricultural and foreign-born constituencies reach 5 and 21 percent of the 
population, respectively. Aside from the constituency variables, there is very little that 
seems to influence states adopting E-Verify. 
 
 
Figures 3.1a & 3.1b. Marginal Effect of Farm Owners (top)  
and Foreign-born Constituency (bottom) on Probability of State  
Adopting an E-Verify Law (with 95% confidence intervals). 
  
 In Table 3.3, I replicate Model 2.3 based on the different employers targeted by 
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E-Verify: private, public, and contractors.23 Although farm owners and the foreign-born 
community have a negative effect on the probability of a state passing any type of E-
Verify mandate, this relationship is statistically significant in the case of private 
employers (Model 3.1) and contractors (Model 3.3), as predicted by the second 
hypothesis. The probability of passing a mandate specific to private employers decreases 
from 21 to 1.5 percent when the percentage of the farm owners increases from its 
smallest value to just three percent of the state population. Similarly, for E-Verify 
legislation specific to contractors, the probability of adoption drops from 14 percent to 
just over 1 percent as the farm owner population shifts from 0 to 3 percent of the state 
population. The presence of a large foreign-born community has a similar effect, 
decreasing the likelihood of adopting a private mandate from 25 percent to 5 percent and 
a contractor mandate from 13 to 4 percent once that group accounts for just 9 percent of 
the state population. Once again we find no meaningful relationship between partisan 
control of the legislature and probability of adopting an E-Verify mandate.  
 
Table 3.3. Determinants of State Adoption of E-Verify Targeting Specific Employers 
 (3.1) (3.2) (3.3) 
 Private Employers Public Employers Contractors 
Republican control  1.851  (1.768) -0.201  (1.678) -1.327  (0.996) 
Democratic control  0.189  (1.550) 1.339  (1.327) 0.282  (0.873) 																																																								
23 To confirm the robustness of constituency effects, I also analyzed a simpler model that 
looked at the relationship between farm owners, the foreign-born community and the 
probability of passing any E-Verify policy, a policy specific to private employers, a 
policy specific to public employers, and a policy specific to contractors. This analysis 
was done cross-sectionally rather than overtime. Corroborating the findings in Table 3, 
larger agricultural and foreign-born populations significantly reduce the probability of a 
state passing general E-Verify legislation or bills specific to private employers and 
contractors (but not has no significant effect on legislation specific to public employers). 
These results are available in the appendix.  
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Farm owners -1.383* (0.549) -0.211  (0.421) -0.942** (0.294) 
Foreign-born  -0.351* (0.166) -0.088  (0.187) -0.181* (0.0918) 
Legislature 
Characteristics 
   
Legislature ideology 0.152  (0.589) 1.068  (0.549) 0.930* (0.454) 
% Women -2.237  (7.223) -10.93  (6.592) -2.922  (4.046) 
% Latino 8.700  (4.763) -22.62  (17.60) 3.516  (5.043) 
Prior Policy 2.578** (0.917) -2.126  (1.669) -0.650  (1.105) 
State Characteristics    
Average citizen 
ideology 
0.004  (0.039) -0.077* (0.034) -0.041* (0.019) 
Population (logged) 0.324  (0.486) 2.923*** (0.670) 2.037** (0.697) 
Median household 
income (logged) 
-0.627  (0.453) -0.510  (0.744) -1.616* (0.705) 
Unemployment rate -0.283  (0.490) -0.424  (0.831) -1.045  (0.549) 
Bachelor's degree (+) -0.143  (0.245) 0.804* (0.330) 0.0498  (0.170) 
Constant 2.485  (7.137) -46.26** (15.54) -2.867  (6.245) 
N 208 251 318 
R2 0.418 0.327 0.253 
Models use discrete event history analysis with state clustered standard errors and time-
period fixed-effects.  
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
Yet, even if party control has no independent effect on whether or not states adopt 
E-Verify, there is reason to believe that farm owners and the foreign-born population will 
have unique effects on Republican- and Democratic-controlled legislatures. Model 4.1 
provides strong support for the third hypothesis: Republican legislatures are far less likely 
to adopt E-Verify if they have a large agricultural constituency. A Republican legislature 
with no agricultural constituents has a nearly 46 percent probability of passing an E-
Verify law. This probability drops dramatically to 4 percent when the agricultural 
constituency reaches just 3 percent of the state’s population, as illustrated in Figure 3.2. 
Indeed, despite the farm owners making up as much as 7 percent of a state’s population, 
E-Verify has not yet been implemented in any state where the total percentage of farm 
owners is greater than 3.1 percent.  
 
Table 3.4. Effect of Salient Constituencies on Republican & Democratic Legislatures 
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 (4.1) (4.2) 
 Republican Legislatures Democratic Legislatures 
Farm owners -1.265* (0.537) -0.149  (0.513) 
Foreign-born  -0.187  (0.127) -0.299* (0.141) 
Legislature Characteristics   
Legislature ideology 0.319  (0.536) 0.0301  (0.718) 
% Women -0.888  (9.803) -5.233  (7.795) 
% Latino 3.165  (9.249) 0.419  (6.476) 
Prior Policy 0.543  (1.163) 2.282  (1.321) 
State Characteristics   
Average citizen ideology -0.0484  (0.0966) -0.0217  (0.0275) 
Population (logged) 0.624  (0.433) 4.139* (1.834) 
Median household income 
(logged) -0.511  (0.272) -2.575  (1.346) 
Unemployment rate -0.177  (0.564) -2.845** (1.094) 
Bachelor's degree (+) -0.0552  (0.360) 0.0967  (0.173) 
Constant 2.060  (7.933) -15.40  (15.10) 
N 102 112 
R2 0.276 0.327 
Models use discrete event history models with state clustered standard errors and time-
period fixed-effects.  
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
  
 
Figure 3.2. Probability of a Republican Legislature  
Passing E-Verify as the State’s Proportion of Farm  
Owners Increases (with 95% confidence intervals). 
 
Like Republican legislatures, Model 4.2 tells us that salient constituents also 
impact Democratic legislatures. Although more E-Verify policies were adopted (10) in 
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states with above average percentages of foreign-born constituencies (7.9 percent), the 
relationship between partisanship and constituency responsiveness becomes even clearer: 
only 3 of those 10 policies were implemented in states with Democratic legislatures. 
Indeed, by the time the foreign-born population reaches 10 percent of the state’s 
population, there is less than a 5 percent chance that a Democratic legislature will pursue 
E-Verify. However, we only find partial support for the third hypothesis: both the 
foreign-born population and farm owners reduce the odds of a Democratic legislature 
adopting E-Verify, but only the effect of the foreign-born community reaches 
conventional thresholds of statistical significance. 
Combined, the models above demonstrate that when dealing with a policy issue of 
lesser general salience, state legislatures do not ignore constituency preferences, but 
rather respond to those sub-constituents for which the policy matters most. Nearly every 
state has introduced an E-Verify bill, but only 19 legislatures have passed E-Verify 
mandates. In all other cases the legislation died while in committee, never making it to 
the floor for a vote. The implication is clear: large agricultural and foreign-born 
constituencies play a crucial role in preventing Republican and Democratic legislatures, 
respectively, from making E-Verify part of their legislative agenda.  
  
Legislator-level Results 
The previous section established the strong influence that salient sub-constituencies can 
have on legislature adoption of E-Verify. Turning to the determinants of an individual 
legislators’ vote on such legislation, I expect that we will continue to find constituency 
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effects for those legislators who represent particularly large farming and foreign-born 
populations, but that partisanship should be the predominant factor explaining the voting 
preferences of legislators in general. To test what best explains legislator voting on E-
Verify I use state fixed-effects logistic regression models with state clustered standard 
errors. This controls for all time-invariant state characteristics that might be influencing 
the relationship between our variables of interest and the outcome. Model 5.1 of Table 
3.5 begins this investigation by regressing the legislator’s vote in favor (1) or opposition 
(0) to E-Verify against their party affiliation, coded 1 for Republican legislators and 0 for 
Democrats. Consistent with the fifth hypothesis’ prediction, Republican legislators are 
more likely to vote in favor of E-Verify than Democrats.  
 
Table 3.5. Determinants of Legislator Support for E-Verify  
Models use logistic regression with state-fixed effects and state-clustered standard errors 
in parentheses. 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
 (5.1) (5.2) 
Republican 3.208*** (0.129) 2.033*** (0.201) 
Farm owners  0.301  (0.646) 
Foreign-born   -0.143  (0.0932) 
Legislator Characteristics   
Ideology   0.369*** (0.110) 
Female   -0.0651  (0.133) 
Latino   -0.452  (0.343) 
Incumbent   -0.137  (0.135) 
Contested election   -0.0234  (0.135) 
District Characteristics   
Average ideology   0.876*** (0.235) 
Population (logged)   0.595*** (0.147) 
Median household income 
(logged) 
  0.181  (0.315) 
Unemployment rate   -1.554*** (0.284) 
Bachelor's degree (+)   -0.301** (0.0928) 
N 3918 3736 
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In fact, as shown in Figure 3.3, the 94 percent of Republicans voting ‘yea’ on E-
Verify is 33 percentage points more than the 61 percent of Democrats who favored the 
bill. According to the state-level analysis, the probability of E-Verify being implemented 
under a Republican legislature is 13.9 percent, only about 9 percentage points higher than 
under a Democratic legislature. Thus, while the state-level analysis alludes to the partisan 
difference in support for E-Verify, it fails to capture just how dissimilar the parties’ 
preferences are on this subject. Beyond Republican legislators being overwhelming more 
supportive of E-Verify than Democrats, Figure 3.3 illustrates that Democrats are 
themselves quite divided. This suggests that even at the legislator-level we may find 
meaningful constituency effects. I investigate this possibility later on in Tables 3.7 and 
3.8.   
 
 
 
Figure 3.3. Differences in Support for E-Verify Within and  
Between Parties. 
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 Model 5.2 confirms that the effect of legislator partisanship on support for E-
Verify persists even when controlling for a host of other factors. In fact, partisanship is 
by far the primary determinant of legislative voting behavior. Figure 3.4 provides a 
telling visual depiction of this finding. It compares the effect of the partisanship 
coefficient to the constituency variables as well as other statistically significant variables 
in the model. We see that in most cases the effect of partisanship on the probability of 
voting in favor of E-Verify is more than twice as large as the other coefficients.24  
 
 
Figure 3.4. Effect of Partisanship vs. Key Variables on  
E-Verify Support (with 95% confidence intervals).  
 
As pointed out in the state-level analysis, state adoption of E-Verify happens far 
more frequently in states with fewer farm owners and smaller foreign-born populations. 
In fact, of the states that enacted E-Verify mandates the agricultural and foreign-born 
populations did not exceed 3.1 percent and 19.4 percent of the population, respectively, 
																																																								
24 The variables were transformed to be on similar scales so that we could more easily 
compare the effect of their coefficients on the probability of a ‘yea’ vote.  
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while they accounted for as much as 7 and 27 percent of the population in states that did 
not pass E-Verify. Yet, within states that implemented E-Verify we do find sizeable 
variation in the district percentages of these populations: in some districts the farm 
owners make up as much as 12 percent of the total constituency and the foreign-born 
population 50 percent. Consequently, when we look at how Republican and Democratic 
legislators vote on E-Verify, we would anticipate, in accordance with hypothesis six, for 
these groups to influence partisan voting patterns.   
Models 6.1 and 6.2 test this expectation formally. Based on Figure 3.3, we know 
that Republicans in these states are exceedingly committed to supporting E-Verify, 
making the bar for finding a constituency effect quite high. We also know, based on the 
state-level results, that constituency factors only mattered for bills targeting private 
employers and contractors. Subsequently, Table 3.6 uses the same covariates from Model 
5.2, but eliminates legislative voting on bills that are specific to public employers. If 
Republicans are cross-pressured when it comes to E-Verify – inclined to support it from a 
partisan perspective, but compelled to oppose it because of a loyalty to agribusiness – 
then we should find a negative relationship between agriculture and Republican support 
when the proposed legislation targets private employers or contractors. Model 6.1 
confirms this.  Whereas the presence of a large constituency of farm owners appears to 
have no meaningful effect on the voting behavior of Republican legislators when 
considering all E-Verify bills,25 we can see from the results in Table 3.6 that the 
																																																								
25 Results from the same analysis using votes on all bill types can be found in the 
appendix. While the constituency variables have no meaningful effect on Republican 
		
106 
preferences of this group does matter when the bill specifically affects their interests. 
This substantiates our expectations in the sixth hypothesis, albeit with a caveat: 
republicans representing large agricultural constituencies are less likely to vote in favor 
of E-Verify when the mandate directly affects those employers.  
 
Table 3.6. The Influence of Salient Constituencies on Republican & Democratic 
Support for E-Verify 
 (6.1) (6.2) 
 Republican Legislators Democratic Legislators 
Farm owners -19.04* (22.02) 9.676  (16.23) 
Foreign-born  -9.160  (5.162) -7.011** (2.229) 
Legislator Characteristics   
Ideology 0.772** (0.279) 1.031* (0.502) 
Female 0.202  (0.294) 0.211  (0.216) 
Latino 0  (.) 0.304  (1.078) 
Incumbent -1.032** (0.328) -0.493  (0.575) 
Contested election -0.223  (0.606) 0.725  (0.457) 
District Characteristics   
Average ideology 0.544  (0.943) 1.940** (0.685) 
Population (logged) 1.659* (0.645) 0.716  (0.600) 
Median household income 
(logged) 0.164  (2.528) -2.785
*** (0.674) 
Unemployment rate 1.759  (2.798) -0.879  (0.500) 
Bachelor's degree (+) 1.559* (0.742) -0.00519  (0.328) 
Constant -17.47  (34.20) 23.31* (11.83) 
N 738 496 
Models use logistic regression with state-clustered standard errors in parentheses. 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
Unlike Republicans, Figure 3.3 depicted Democrats as noticeably divided on E-
Verify. Model 6.2 helps us to sort out this intraparty discord. Consistent with the state-
level analysis, a larger foreign-born constituency bolsters Democratic opposition to E-
Verify even at the voting stage while the presence of farm owners has no meaningful 
impact on how Democrats vote. Figure 3.5 shows us that all else equal in Model 6.2 the 
probability of a Democrat voting in favor of E-Verify drops from 0.65 when representing 																																																																																																																																																																					
legislators, the foreign-born community significantly reduces a Democratic legislator’s 
probability of voting ‘yea’ on E-Verify legislation. 
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a district with no foreign-born constituency to 0.05 when nearly half of their district’s 
population is made up of foreign-born constituents.  
 
 
Figure 3.5. Effect of Foreign-born Constituency on Democratic  
Support for E-Verify (with 95% confidence intervals). 
 
Interestingly, we also discover that both Republican and Democratic legislators 
are inclined to support E-Verify as the average conservatism of their districts grows. 
However, the magnitude of this effect is quite different for the two parties. While moving 
from the most liberal Republican-represented district to the most conservative only 
increases the probability of a Republican ‘yea’ vote by 4 percentage points, we can see 
from Figure 3.6 that the predicted probability of a Democratic ‘yea’ vote increases from 
0.15 in the most liberal districts to 0.89 in the most conservative (keeping all other 
variables from Model 6.2 at their means). This is consistent with the conclusions of 
Bishin (2000), who argues that the aggregate opinion of a constituency has more value in 
predicting responsiveness if we incorporate measures of sub-constituency preferences 
into our statistical models.  
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Figure 3.6. Effect of Average District Ideology on Democratic  
Support for E-Verify (with 95% confidence intervals). 
 
In sum, the legislator-level analysis demonstrates that there is a clear partisan 
dimension to voting, but that constituency characteristics can further help to clarify why 
legislators break from their party’s position. Republicans, for example, are nearly 
uniform in their support for E-Verify, but will yield to the pressures of agribusiness if the 
proposed legislation has a direct impact on agricultural interests. Democrats, on the other 
hand, vote against E-Verify more often than Republicans, but they are also more strongly 
swayed by their constituents in general.  
 
Conclusions 
This work contributes to growing efforts to better understand legislative behavior in the 
states by rethinking the connection between constituency pressure and responsiveness. I 
consider that at the state legislative-level, where it is not unusual for policies to be 
relevant only amongst a sub-constituency of the district populations, we can learn much 
from existing theories on sub-constituency pressure and legislative responsiveness at the 
national-level. Most state-level research has argued that legislative responsiveness is 
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limited to aggregate preferences on broadly salient issues. In contrast, I show that a 
policy issue need not be salient in general to evoke responsiveness, we just need to 
narrow our focus concerning whom that response is targeting.  
Using the case of E-Verify, I find that state policy and legislator voting is 
responsive to constituent preferences on less salient issues, but that the target of their 
responsiveness shifts from the aggregate to those specific sub-constituencies for which 
the policy is particularly relevant. Furthermore, that responsiveness plays out in different 
ways depending on the level of analysis. At the state-level, E-Verify is kept off the 
agenda in states where pressure from the agribusiness and foreign-born populations is 
strongest while such legislation passes in states where the voting power of these sub-
constituencies is considerably weaker. This effect occurs regardless of the legislature’s 
partisan composition. At the individual-level, we find a clear division in legislator 
support for E-Verify along party lines, but there is also evidence that sub-constituency 
pressures are capable of altering both Republican and Democratic positions.  
To provide greater cogency to this argument, future studies should seek two 
sources of information. First, actual data on public opinion toward E-Verify at both the 
state and district level would provide us with a more precise way of measuring legislative 
responsiveness to constituents. Second, without the roll call records of proposed 
legislation that failed, we need to know more about the legislative process that led to E-
Verify’s collapse: how far did E-Verify legislation get in the legislative process and why 
did it fail? As far as we know, E-Verify legislation dies in committee long before it 
reaches the floor for a vote. Do the co-sponsors who introduce this legislation and the 
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committee members who prevent its movement have distinct party- and/or constituent-
based interests in taking seemingly opposing actions? While this additional information 
would make for a stronger test of our hypotheses and overarching theory of legislative 
responsiveness, the models tested above provide ample evidence to warrant future 
research on the relationship between sub-constituency preferences and state/legislator 
responsiveness. 
These results also have important implications for our understanding of the 
relationship between the policy process and democratic representation more generally. If 
legislators practice a form of policy particularism toward groups that care deeply about 
issues when the larger constituency has weak or unknown preferences on them, should 
this behavior be considered more or less responsive in the democratic sense? The known 
alternatives, that legislators act based on their party’s preferences or the general ideology 
of their aggregate constituency, are both potentially antithetical to democratic 
representation, leading to policies that are highly incongruent with actual attitudes (Lax 
and Phillips 2012). Absent educating voters about ongoing legislation and improving the 
lines of communication between legislators and their constituents, responding to the 
preferences of a salient sub-constituency when the attitudes of the masses are unknown or 
only weakly defined may be the least-worst option for legislators who want to represent 
and defend the interests of their constituents.  
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APPENDIX 1: CHAPTER 1 
 
Table A1.1. Mayoral Elections in Data Set 
City State 
Election 
Year 
Election 
Type 
Election 
Stage 
Number of 
Candidates 
Mobile AL 2005 Nonpartisan Runoff 2 
Mobile AL 2013 Nonpartisan General 2 
Mobile AL 2005 Nonpartisan General 4 
Montgomery AL 2009 Nonpartisan General 4 
Montgomery AL 2011 Nonpartisan General 2 
San Francisco CA 1995 Nonpartisan Runoff 2 
San Francisco CA 1995 Nonpartisan General 3 
Los Angeles CA 2005 Nonpartisan General 4 
Los Angeles CA 2013 Nonpartisan General 4 
Oakland CA 2014 Nonpartisan General 6 
Sacramento CA 2008 Nonpartisan General 3 
Sacramento CA 2008 Nonpartisan Runoff 2 
Denver CO 2015 Nonpartisan General 3 
Denver CO 2011 Nonpartisan Runoff 2 
Denver CO 2011 Nonpartisan General 4 
Denver CO 1991 Nonpartisan General 3 
Denver CO 1999 Nonpartisan General 4 
Denver CO 2003 Nonpartisan General 5 
Washington DC 1994 Partisan General 2 
Washington DC 2014 Partisan General 2 
Jacksonville FL 2011 Nonpartisan General 4 
Jacksonville FL 2003 Nonpartisan Runoff 2 
Jacksonville FL 2015 Nonpartisan General 3 
Jacksonville FL 2011 Nonpartisan Runoff 2 
Jacksonville FL 2003 Nonpartisan General 4 
Orlando FL 2003 Nonpartisan General 5 
Orlando FL 2004 Nonpartisan General 3 
St. Petersburg FL 2009 Nonpartisan General 5 
Tampa FL 2011 Nonpartisan General 5 
Tampa FL 2007 Nonpartisan General 3 
Athens GA 2006 Nonpartisan Runoff 2 
Athens GA 2010 Nonpartisan General 4 
Athens GA 2006 Nonpartisan General 3 
Atlanta GA 2013 Nonpartisan General 3 
Atlanta GA 2009 Nonpartisan Runoff 2 
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Atlanta GA 2009 Nonpartisan General 3 
Augusta GA 1995 Nonpartisan General 2 
Augusta GA 2010 Nonpartisan General 3 
Augusta GA 1998 Nonpartisan Runoff 2 
Augusta GA 2002 Nonpartisan General 4 
Augusta GA 2002 Nonpartisan Runoff 2 
Augusta GA 1998 Nonpartisan General 4 
Augusta GA 2006 Nonpartisan General 3 
Macon GA 2013 Nonpartisan Primary 4 
Macon GA 2013 Nonpartisan General 2 
Aurora IL 2005 Nonpartisan General 4 
Aurora IL 2005 Nonpartisan Runoff 2 
Aurora IL 2009 Nonpartisan General 2 
Chicago IL 1999 Nonpartisan General 2 
Chicago IL 2003 Nonpartisan General 3 
Chicago IL 2015 Nonpartisan General 4 
Indianapolis IN 2011 Partisan Primary 3 
Wichita KS 2011 Nonpartisan General 2 
Wichita KS 2007 Nonpartisan General 2 
New Orleans LA 1994 Partisan Primary 5 
New Orleans LA 1994 Partisan General 2 
New Orleans LA 1990 Partisan General 2 
New Orleans LA 2006 Partisan General 2 
New Orleans LA 1998 Partisan Primary 2 
New Orleans LA 2010 Partisan Primary 4 
New Orleans LA 2014 Partisan Primary 2 
New Orleans LA 2006 Partisan Primary 4 
Boston MA 2013 Nonpartisan Primary 3 
Baltimore MD 1995 Partisan Primary 2 
Baltimore MD 1999 Partisan Primary 3 
Baltimore MD 1991 Partisan General 2 
Detroit MI 2013 Nonpartisan General 2 
Detroit MI 2013 Nonpartisan Primary 3 
St. Louis MO 1993 Partisan Primary 4 
St. Louis MO 2001 Partisan Primary 3 
St. Louis MO 1993 Partisan General 2 
St. Louis MO 2005 Partisan General 2 
St. Louis MO 2013 Partisan Primary 2 
St. Louis MO 2009 Partisan Primary 3 
St. Louis MO 2009 Partisan General 2 
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Charlotte NC 2001 Partisan Primary 3 
Charlotte NC 2001 Partisan General 2 
Albany NY 2005 Partisan General 2 
Albany NY 2013 Partisan Primary 2 
Albany NY 2005 Partisan Primary 2 
Albany NY 2009 Partisan General 2 
Albany NY 2009 Partisan Primary 2 
Buffalo NY 1997 Partisan Runoff 2 
Buffalo NY 2001 Partisan Primary 2 
Buffalo NY 1997 Partisan General 3 
Buffalo NY 2005 Partisan General 2 
Buffalo NY 2009 Partisan Primary 2 
NYC NY 2013 Partisan Primary 4 
NYC NY 2009 Partisan General 2 
NYC NY 2005 Partisan Primary 5 
Syracuse NY 2009 Partisan General 3 
Syracuse NY 2009 Partisan Primary 4 
Cincinnati OH 2009 Nonpartisan Primary 2 
Cincinnati OH 2001 Nonpartisan Primary 2 
Cincinnati OH 2005 Nonpartisan Primary 2 
Cleveland OH 2005 Nonpartisan General 6 
Cleveland OH 2005 Nonpartisan Primary 6 
Columbus OH 2011 Partisan General 2 
Columbus OH 1995 Partisan General 2 
Columbus OH 1991 Partisan General 2 
Columbus OH 2007 Partisan General 2 
Columbus OH 1999 Partisan General 2 
Philadelphia PA 2007 Partisan General 2 
Philadelphia PA 1999 Partisan Primary 3 
Philadelphia PA 2015 Partisan Primary 3 
Philadelphia PA 2007 Partisan Primary 5 
Philadelphia PA 2011 Partisan General 2 
Philadelphia PA 1991 Partisan Primary 4 
Philadelphia PA 2003 Partisan General 2 
Philadelphia PA 1999 Partisan General 2 
Pittsburg PA 2009 Partisan Primary 3 
Pittsburg PA 2013 Partisan Primary 3 
Memphis TN 1991 Nonpartisan Primary 2 
Memphis TN 1995 Nonpartisan Primary 2 
Houston TX 2011 Nonpartisan General 5 
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Houston TX 1991 Nonpartisan General 2 
Houston TX 1997 Nonpartisan Runoff 2 
Houston TX 2013 Nonpartisan General 3 
Houston TX 1991 Nonpartisan Runoff 2 
Houston TX 1997 Nonpartisan General 2 
Houston TX 2015 Nonpartisan General 6 
Houston TX 1999 Nonpartisan General 3 
Houston TX 2003 Nonpartisan General 3 
Houston TX 2009 Nonpartisan General 2 
Seattle WA 2009 Nonpartisan Primary 5 
Milwaukee WI 2012 Nonpartisan Primary 2 
Milwaukee WI 2012 Nonpartisan General 2 
Milwaukee WI 2004 Nonpartisan General 2 
 
 
Table A1.2. Effect of Partisan Cues on Black Vote Share (no Partisan Primaries) 
 (2.1) (2.2) (2.3) 
% Party mentions   40.017***  (11.571) 31.52***  (6.938) 
% Race mentions     2.009  (7.763) 
Nonpartisan elections -10.61*  (4.143) -2.157  (7.678) 7.801  (5.075) 
% Party mentions x 
nonpartisan elections 
 5.313 (15.357)  
Incumbent     26.14***  (4.808) 
3(+) Candidates     -8.249*  (3.510) 
Election Type     0  (.) 
General     6.133  (5.380) 
Runoff     12.29  (8.474) 
Population (logged)     1.233  (2.266) 
% Black     0.131  (0.142) 
% White     0.0141  (0.178) 
% Democratic vote     0.0948  (0.152) 
Bachelor’s degree     0.0800  (0.216) 
Median household 
income (logged) 
    -2.846  (6.833) 
% Unemployed     -0.0610  (0.464) 
Constant 46.18***  (3.718) 25.596**  (7.555) 15.79  (93.53) 
N 101 101 100 
R2 0.083 0.318 0.614 
Note: All Models use OLS regression with a dummy variable for contests that occurred 
in the same election sequence and robust standard errors in parentheses.  
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
Table A1.3. Effect of Partisan Cues on Black Election Victory (no Partisan 
Primaries) 
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 (3.1) (3.2) (3.3) 
% Party mentions   4.313*  (1.835) 4.537**  (1.478) 
% Race mentions   0.244  (1.070)  1.413  (0.836) 
Nonpartisan elections -0.722  (0.471) -0.0847  (2.290)   
% Party mentions x 
nonpartisan elections 
   1.994  (1.821) 
Incumbent     3.672**  (1.227) 
3(+) Candidates     0.0191  (0.851) 
Election Type      
General     0.209  (0.913) 
Runoff     1.013  (1.309) 
Population (logged)     0.122  (0.443) 
% Black     0.00808  (0.0269) 
% White     0.00611  (0.0356) 
% Democratic vote     0.0507  (0.0313) 
Bachelor’s degree     0.0282  (0.0424) 
Median household 
income (logged) 
    -0.584  (1.444) 
% Unemployed     -0.130  (0.0963) 
Constant 0.323  (0.440) -1.829  (1.017) -3.364  (17.71) 
N 101 101 100 
R2 0.018 0.120 0.288 
Note: Models are logistic regressions with a dummy variable for contests that occurred in 
the same election sequence and robust standard errors in parentheses.  
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
Table A1.4. Effect of Partisan Cues on Black Vote Share (Only 1 Black Candidate in 
Election) 
 (4.1) (4.2) (4.3) 
% Party mentions   31.98**  (10.68) 24.18***  (6.679) 
% Race mentions    -7.061  (8.358) 
Nonpartisan elections -8.266*  (3.768) -6.653  (6.220) -0.468  (4.465) 
% Party mentions x 
nonpartisan elections 
 12.07  (14.18)   
Incumbent     20.94***  (4.328) 
3(+) Candidates     -14.28***  (3.236) 
Election Type      
General     0.889  (4.078) 
Runoff     8.267  (8.610) 
Population (logged)     1.166  (1.724) 
% Black     0.0635  (0.124) 
% White     -0.0378  (0.168) 
% Democratic vote     -0.188  (0.163) 
Bachelor’s degree     0.0810  (0.150) 
Median household 
income (logged) 
    0.359  (7.287) 
% Unemployed     0.379  (0.475) 
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Constant 41.70***  (3.122) 28.25***  (5.800) 22.59  (80.27) 
N 106 106 104 
R2 0.076 0.287 0.626 
Note: All Models use OLS regression with a dummy variable for contests that occurred in 
the same election sequence and robust standard errors in parentheses.  
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
 
Table A1.5. Effect of Partisan Cues on Black Victory (Only 1 Black Candidate in 
Election) 
 (5.1) (5.2) (5.3) 
% Party mentions   2.573  (1.318) 2.928*  (1.363) 
% Race mentions     0.630  (1.955) 
Nonpartisan elections -0.439  (0.403) 1.389  (1.946)  
% Party mentions x 
nonpartisan elections 
 -0.482  (0.834) 1.024  (0.893)    
Incumbent     3.892**  (1.317) 
3(+) Candidates     -0.318  (0.728) 
Election Type      
General     0.779  (0.734) 
Runoff     1.621  (1.306) 
Population (logged)     0.473  (0.381) 
% Black     0.0363  (0.0280) 
% White     0.0371  (0.0343) 
% Democratic vote     0.0298  (0.0357) 
Bachelor’s degree     0.0469  (0.0356) 
Median household 
income (logged) 
    0.469  (1.534) 
% Unemployed     -0.0636  (0.103) 
Constant -0.133  (0.325) -1.222  (0.677) -20.08  (17.31) 
N 106 106 104 
R2 0.009 0.079 0.303 
Note: Models are logistic regressions with a dummy variable for contests that occurred in 
the same election sequence and robust standard errors in parentheses.  
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
 
Table A1.6. Effect of Partisan Cues on Black Vote Share (no “Linked” Contests”) 
 (6.1) (6.2) (6.3) 
% Party mentions   34.05**  (10.32) 30.46***  (6.120) 
% Race mentions     -6.898  (6.468) 
Nonpartisan 
elections -7.722  (4.107) -5.359  (6.504) 6.394  (3.562)   
% Party mentions x 
nonpartisan 
elections 
  20.29  (14.77)   
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Incumbent     26.94***  (4.290) 
3(+) Candidates     -10.76***  (2.827) 
Population (logged)     0.400  (1.660) 
% Black     0.0339  (0.120) 
% White     -0.0559  (0.164) 
% Democratic vote     -0.0482  (0.141) 
Bachelor’s degree     -0.0204  (0.187) 
Median household 
income (logged) 
    -5.626  (7.503) 
% Unemployed     -0.0444  (0.440) 
Constant 41.91***  (3.394) 25.83***  (5.988) 84.84  (86.81) 
N 101 101 100 
R2 0.043 0.280 0.675 
Note: Models A7.1, A7.2, and A7.3 use OLS regression. All models use robust standard 
errors in parentheses.  
p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
 
Table A1.7. Effect of Partisan Cues on Black Victory (no “Linked” Contests”) 
 (7.1) (7.2) (7.3) 
% Party mentions   3.098*  (1.281) 4.161**  (1.367) 
% Race mentions   0  (.) 0.0669  (1.894)   
Nonpartisan 
elections -0.218  (0.424) 0.116  (0.868) 1.917
*  (0.838)   
% Party mentions 
x nonpartisan 
elections 
  1.283  (1.988)   
Incumbent     4.184***  (1.238) 
3(+) Candidates     -0.734  (0.638) 
Population 
(logged)     0.0532  (0.408) 
% Black     -0.00539  (0.0283) 
% White     -0.00512  (0.0418) 
% Democratic vote     0.0230  (0.0341) 
Bachelor’s degree     0.0401  (0.0435) 
Median household 
income (logged)     -0.369  (1.641) 
% Unemployed     -0.179  (0.126) 
Constant -0.307  (0.343) -1.814*  (0.707) -1.062  (19.06) 
N 101 101 100 
R2 0.002 0.100 0.368 
Note: Models A7.4, A7.5 and A7.6 use logistic regression. All models use robust 
standard errors in parentheses.  
p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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APPENDIX 2: CHAPTER 2 
1. Robustness Check for Model Specifications 
 
The number of deportations ranges from to more than 35,000, with a mean of 126.74. 
That means that 30 observations are more than 2 standard deviations above the mean and 
45 are more than 1 standard deviation above the mean. To reassure readers that the results 
found in Table’s 2.3 and 2.4 are not merely a result of a few extreme outliers, I reran the 
models dropping all observations 1 and 2 standard deviations above the mean. As the 
Table’s A2.1 and A2.2 demonstrate, when making this adjustment the coefficients and 
statistical significance of the main explanatory variables increase suggesting an even 
stronger fit. While Conservatism still has a null effect on deportations, in Model 3.1 
dropping these observations resulted in a positive coefficient for Conservatism with p-
values of 0.912 and 0.654 in the 1 and 2 standard deviation models, respectively. On the 
other hand, in Model 3.2 Conservatism maintains its negative relationship, as shown in 
Table A2.2. Despite a somewhat more ambiguous relationship between Conservatism and 
deportations, both Tables A2.1 and A2.2 demonstrate a strong relationship between the 
resource variables and the outcome and a weak relationship between Conservatism and 
Deportations.  
 
Table A2.1. Dropping All Observations 1 & 2 Standard Deviations Above Mean, 
Model 3.1 
 Model 3.1:  Dropping if >1 SD 
Model 3.1 
Dropping if > 2 SD 
Independent Variables   
Private Correctional Facility 0.828** (0.284) 0.806** (0.282) 
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IGSA Contract 0.633*** (0.133) 0.643*** (0.128) 
Budget per resident  0.082*** (0.019) 0.085*** (0.021) 
Conservatism 0.00008  (0.0035) 0.001  (0.004) 
Latino Population 0.038*** (0.004) 0.043*** (0.006) 
Crime Rate 2.01e-05  (2.55e-05) 2.27e-05  (2.31e-05) 
County Population (centered) 0.006*** (0.0006) 0.006*** (0.0005) 
GDP Fruits & Vegetables  0.131  (0.134) 0.089  (0.136) 
GDP Construction  -0.029  (0.083) -0.045  (0.082) 
Unemployment Rate -0.022  (0.017) -0.028  (0.018) 
287(g) Participant -0.040  (0.089) -0.051  (0.090) 
Border State -0.141  (0.141) -0.163  (0.141) 
Dream Act -0.280** (0.095) -0.288** (0.095) 
Favors SB1070 0.028*** (0.005) 0.027*** (0.005) 
State % Unauthorized 0.280*** (0.040) 0.279*** (0.040) 
Constant -1.067** (0.473) -0.948* (0.473) 
Inflated Model   
Private Correctional Facility -0.558  (1.678) -0.595  (1.712) 
IGSA Contract -0.392  (0.485) -0.390  (0.490) 
Budget per resident  -0.149* (0.069) -0.148* (0.070) 
Conservatism 0.003  (0.012) 0.004  (0.013) 
Latino Population -0.807*** (0.245) -0.810*** (0.251) 
Crime Rate -0.0004  (0.0009) -0.0004  (0.001) 
County Population (centered) -0.144*** (0.025) -0.146*** (0.025) 
GDP Fruits & Vegetables  0.327  (0.358) 0.312  (0.360) 
GDP Construction  0.370  (0.229) 0.369  (0.231) 
Unemployment Rate 0.180*** (0.051) 0.180*** (0.052) 
287(g) Participant -0.519  (0.354) -0.522  (0.362) 
Border State -0.979  (1.131) -1.00  (1.154) 
Dream Act 0.719  (0.386) 0.717  (0.393) 
Favors SB1070 0.022  (0.026) 0.021  (0.027) 
State % Unauthorized -0.330  (0.170) -0.332  (0.173) 
Constant -14.88*** (3.250) -15.07*** (3.275) 
Observations 2226 2241 
AIC 6.749 6.851 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
 
Table A2.2. Dropping All Observations 1 & 2 Standard Deviations Above Mean, 
Model 3.2 
 Model 3.2:  Dropping if >1 SD 
Model 3.2: 
Dropping if > 2 SD 
Independent Variables   
Private Correctional Facility 0.746** (0.278) 0.725** (0.272) 
IGSA Contract 0.777*** (0.139) 0.785*** (0.133) 
Budget per resident  0.0735*** (0.016) 0.073*** (0.016) 
Conservatism -0.003  (0.004) -0.004  (0.004) 
Foreign-born Population 0.133*** (0.010) 0.134*** (0.009) 
Crime Rate 1.23e-05  (2.34e-05) 1.21e-05  (2.11e-05) 
% Change in Latino Population 0.003*** (0.0007) 0.003*** (0.0007) 
County Population (centered) 0.004*** (0.0006) 0.004*** (0.0005) 
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GDP Fruits & Vegetables  -0.024  (0.119) -0.036  (0.118) 
GDP Construction  0.107  (0.078) 0.106  (0.078) 
Unemployment Rate 0.029  (0.021) 0.027  (0.021) 
Median Household Income (centered) 0.001** (0.0004) 0.001** (0.0004) 
287(g) Participant 0.014  (0.084) 0.014  (0.084) 
Border State 0.276  (0.142) 0.288* (0.143) 
Dream Act -0.076  (0.100) -0.071  (0.100) 
Favors SB1070 0.021*** (0.005) 0.020*** (0.005) 
State % Unauthorized 0.153*** (0.043) 0.147*** (0.043) 
Constant -1.784*** (0.480) -1.697*** (0.479) 
Inflated Model   
Private Correctional Facility -0.069  (0.819) -0.081  (0.823) 
IGSA Contract -0.418  (0.509) -0.424  (0.509) 
Budget per resident  -0.247* (0.108) -0.249* (0.109) 
Conservatism -0.008  (0.012) -0.009  (0.012) 
Foreign-born Population -0.478*** (0.113) -0.478*** (0.113) 
Crime Rate -0.001  (0.001) -0.001  (0.001) 
% Change in Latino Population -0.001(0.0007) -0.001  (0.0006) 
County Population (centered) -0.157*** (0.029) -0.156*** (0.029) 
GDP Fruits & Vegetables  0.435  (0.369) 0.433  (0.369) 
GDP Construction  0.477  *(0.233) 0.475  (0.232) 
Unemployment Rate 0.133* (0.067) 0.131  (0.068) 
Median Household Income (centered) -0.007** (0.002) -0.006** (0.002) 
287(g) Participant -0.444  (0.351) -0.439  (0.349) 
Border State -1.412* (0.617) -1.419* (0.615) 
Dream Act 1.072** (0.384) 1.079** (0.382) 
Favors SB1070 -0.040  (0.026) -0.041  (0.026) 
State % Unauthorized -0.755*** (0.173) -0.759*** (0.172) 
Constant -11.74** (3.97) -11.53** (3.956) 
Observations 2226 2241 
AIC 6.643 6.732 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
 
To further check the robustness of the findings, I log transformed the dependent 
variable, the number of deportations (replacing log(0) with 0), and then ran an OLS 
regression model. As Table A2.3 reveals, the directional relationships between our 
independent variables and the outcome remain unchanged. Furthermore, none of the key 
explanatory variables lose significance. Comparing the log-transformed version of Model 
3.1 to Model 3.2, we see that once again Model 3.2 is a better fit. Both the R-squared and 
the adjusted R-squared report that Model 3.2 accounts for approximately 10 percent more 
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of the variance in the dependent variable, indicating that the addition of the change in 
Latino population and median household income variables as well as the replacement of 
the Latino population variable with the foreign-born population were all constructive 
modifications.  
 
Table A2.3. OLS Models of 3.1 & 3.2 with Logged Deportations as Outcome 
 Model 3.1:  Logged Deportations 
Model 3.2: 
Logged Deportations 
Independent Variables   
Private Correctional Facility 0.489** (0.161) 0.468*** (0.145) 
IGSA Contract 0.777*** (0.102) 0.612*** (0.092) 
Budget per resident  0.062*** (0.013) 0.035** (0.011) 
Conservatism -0.018*** (0.002) -0.014*** (0.002) 
Foreign-born Population  0.133*** (0.007) 
Latino Population  0.02*** (0.003)    
Crime Rate 0.00004*** (0.000008) 0.00003*** (0.000007) 
% Change in Latino Population  0.002*** (0.0002) 
County Population (centered) 0.001*** (0.0001) 0.0007*** (0.00009) 
GDP Fruits & Vegetables  0.104  (0.086) -0.194** (0.078) 
GDP Construction  -0.394*** (0.058) -0.154** (0.053) 
Unemployment Rate -0.076*** (0.012) 0.019  (0.012) 
Median Household Income 
(centered)   0.003
*** (0.003) 
287(g) Participant -0.112  (0.080) 0.025  (0.072) 
Border State -0.253  (0.132) 0.177  (0.116) 
Dream Act -0.394*** (0.080) -0.288*** (0.071) 
Favors SB1070 0.034*** (0.004) 0.029*** (0.004) 
State % Unauthorized 0.329*** (0.031) 0.173*** (0.029) 
Years Activated=3 0.803*** (0.158) 0.632*** (0.142) 
Years Activated=4 1.234*** (0.154) 1.086*** (0.138) 
Years Activated=5 2.380*** (0.164) 2.087*** (0.148) 
Years Activated=6 3.028*** (0.236) 2.709*** (0.211) 
Years Activated=7 2.835*** (0.409) 2.534*** (0.368) 
Constant 0.616  (0.435) -0.901** (0.404) 
Observations 2271 2271 
R-Squared 0.5448 0.6336 
Adj. R-Squared 0.5407 0.6300 
AIC 3.461 3.246 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
 
 
2. Checking the Effects of Potentially Influential Observations  
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Following Garay et al. (2011) and Xie et al. (2008), I use generalized Cook’s distance to 
explore the possibility that my results are a product of influential observations. The 
models in Table A2.4 use a cutoff of D>4/N= 0.002, which reveals 141 potentially 
influential observations, while the models in Table A2.5 use D>1 as a cutoff, leading to 
one suspect observation. In neither case do the directional effects or statistical 
significance of the main explanatory variables change. 
 
Table A2.4. Models without Influential Observations (According to Generalized 
Cook’s Distance) 
 Model 3.1  D>0.002 
Model 3.2 
D>0.002 
Independent Variables   
Private Correctional Facility 0.372* (0.147) 0.487* (0.213) 
IGSA Contract 0.456*** (0.0982) 0.529*** (0.106) 
Budget per resident  0.0888*** (0.0233) 0.0372  (0.0253) 
Conservatism -0.00746** (0.00284) -0.0125*** (0.00330) 
Foreign-born Population  0.119*** (0.00844) 
Latino Population 0.0382*** (0.00331)  
Crime Rate 0.00004* (0.00002) 0.00003  (0.00002) 
% Change in Latino Population  0.00190** (0.000598) 
County Population (centered) 0.00485*** (0.000423) 0.00334*** (0.000407) 
GDP Fruits & Vegetables  -0.0738  (0.0928) -0.204* (0.0946) 
GDP Construction  -0.209*** (0.0571) 0.00599  (0.0682) 
Unemployment Rate -0.0459*** (0.0129) 0.0182  (0.0192) 
Median Household Income (centered)  0.00150*** (0.000348) 
287(g) Participant -0.0627  (0.0737) 0.0351  (0.0744) 
Border State 0.169  (0.108) 0.537*** (0.112) 
Dream Act -0.493*** (0.0728) -0.326*** (0.0777) 
Favors SB1070 0.0298*** (0.00413) 0.0223*** (0.00462) 
State % Unauthorized 0.380*** (0.0304) 0.258*** (0.0352) 
Constant -0.338  (0.371) -1.089** (0.419) 
Inflated Model   
Private Correctional Facility -0.552  (1.967) 0.172  (0.760) 
IGSA Contract -0.330  (0.537) -0.470  (0.501) 
Budget per resident  -0.0828  (0.0889) -0.273* (0.125) 
Conservatism 0.000803  (0.0124) -0.0139  (0.0122) 
Foreign-born Population  -0.478*** (0.111) 
Latino Population -0.904*** (0.253)   
Crime Rate -0.000202  (0.000454) -0.000600  (0.00125) 
% Change in Latino Population  -0.002  (0.0009) 
County Population (centered) -0.143*** (0.0246) -0.153*** (0.0292) 
GDP Fruits & Vegetables  0.343  (0.368) 0.380  (0.379) 
GDP Construction  0.246  (0.242) 0.442  (0.234) 
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Unemployment Rate 0.151** (0.0493) 0.109  (0.0630) 
Median Household Income (centered)  -0.006** (0.002) 
287(g) Participant -0.583  (0.356) -0.392  (0.339) 
Border State -0.735  (1.078) -1.202* (0.562) 
Dream Act 0.609  (0.385) 0.953* (0.374) 
Favors SB1070 0.0325  (0.0248) -0.0410  (0.0235) 
State % Unauthorized -0.204  (0.164) -0.667*** (0.167) 
Constant -14.69*** (3.143) -10.74** (3.909) 
Observations 2130 2130 
AIC 6.361 6.291 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
 
 
Table A2.5. Models without Influential Observations (According to Generalized 
Cook’s Distance) 
 Model 3.1 D>1 
Model 3.2 
D>1 
Independent Variables   
Private Correctional Facility 0.684** (0.261) 0.664* (0.274) 
IGSA Contract 0.628*** (0.119) 0.728*** (0.133) 
Budget per resident  0.0835*** (0.0220) 0.0672*** (0.0158) 
Conservatism -0.00518  (0.00435) -0.0145** (0.00552) 
Foreign-born Population  0.163*** (0.0184) 
Latino Population 0.0499*** (0.00574)  
Crime Rate 0.00003  (0.00002) 0.000009  (0.00002) 
% Change in Latino Population  0.00328*** (0.0008) 
County Population (centered) 0.00402*** (0.000553) 0.00243*** (0.0006) 
GDP Fruits & Vegetables  -0.0127  (0.127) -0.179  (0.120) 
GDP Construction  -0.0149  (0.0824) 0.231** (0.0870) 
Unemployment Rate -0.0439* (0.0183) 0.0296  (0.0229) 
Median Household Income (centered)  0.0017** (0.0005) 
287(g) Participant -0.0123  (0.0925) 0.0598  (0.0899) 
Border State -0.145  (0.143) 0.379* (0.154) 
Dream Act -0.283** (0.0947) -0.0804  (0.101) 
Favors SB1070 0.0241*** (0.00585) 0.0154* (0.00615) 
State % Unauthorized 0.283*** (0.0407) 0.128** (0.0451) 
Constant -0.453  (0.505) -1.326* (0.532) 
Inflated Model   
Private Correctional Facility -0.821  (1.784) -0.145  (0.937) 
IGSA Contract -0.395  (0.503) -0.466  (0.526) 
Budget per resident  -0.148* (0.0697) -0.262* (0.116) 
Conservatism 0.00158  (0.0131) -0.0146  (0.0134) 
Foreign-born Population  -0.480*** (0.116) 
Latino Population -0.839*** (0.252)  
Crime Rate -0.000494  (0.00128) -0.00119  (0.00151) 
% Change in Latino Population  -0.00129  (0.000725) 
County Population (centered) -0.150*** (0.0265) -0.160*** (0.0314) 
GDP Fruits & Vegetables  0.288  (0.372) 0.378  (0.395) 
GDP Construction  0.401  (0.239) 0.551* (0.247) 
		
124 
Unemployment Rate 0.179*** (0.0543) 0.134  (0.0729) 
Median Household Income (centered)  -0.00645** (0.00227) 
287(g) Participant -0.502  (0.382) -0.408  (0.366) 
Border State -1.106  (1.272) -1.483* (0.675) 
Dream Act 0.738  (0.415) 1.156** (0.401) 
Favors SB1070 0.0169  (0.0294) -0.0484  (0.0269) 
State % Unauthorized -0.342  (0.181) -0.814*** (0.180) 
Constant -15.06*** (3.469) -11.41** (4.219) 
Observations 2270 2270 
AIC 7.131 7.022 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
 
3.  Assessing Standard Errors and Model Parameters 
 
Although King and Roberts (2015) have noted that robust standard errors may hide bias, 
running the models with classical standard errors produces no substantive differences, 
negligible difference between the errors, and consistent AIC statistics. Furthermore, as 
others have pointed out (Cameron and Trivedi; Cantoni and Ronchetti 2001; Hilbe 2001; 
Mebane and Sekhon 2004), robust standard errors are an appropriate choice for ZINB 
models because they are able to overcome inconsistent and high levels of variance 
resulting from the heteroskedasticity characteristic of ZINB models. Indeed, Mebane and 
Sekhon (2004) go so far as to say that “nonrobust estimation should be avoided whenever 
possible” when dealing with overdispersed data (408). Based on the results in Tables 
A2.6 and A2.7 below, the classical standard errors seem to be slightly underestimated 
when compared to the robust standard errors, inflating the significance of the coefficients 
and illustrating the preference for a robust estimation method.  
 
Table A2.6. Robust vs. Classical Standard Errors for Model 3.1 
 Robust SEs Classical SEs 
Independent Variables   
Private Correctional Facility 0.604* (0.274) 0.604*** (0.160) 
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IGSA Contract 0.616*** (0.118) 0.617*** (0.105) 
Budget per resident  0.073***  (0.018) 0.0728*** (0.0182) 
Conservatism -0.008  (0.005) -0.00827* (0.00329) 
Foreign-born Population   
Latino Population 0.043*** (0.007) 0.0427*** (0.00345) 
Crime  0.00003(0.00002) 0.0000324
* (0.000014
2) 
% Change in Latino Population   
County Population (centered) 0.004*** (0.0005) 0.00384*** (0.000262) 
GDP Fruits & Vegetables  -0.008(0.122) -0.00848  (0.106) 
GDP Construction  0.067  (0.099) 0.0669  (0.0641) 
Unemployment Rate -0.044*(0.018) -0.0444** (0.0161) 
Median Household Income (centered)   
287(g) Participant 0.024  (0.097) 0.0237  (0.0915) 
Border State 0.025  (0.189) 0.0246  (0.143) 
Dream Act -0.284** (0.095) -0.284** (0.0897) 
Favors SB1070 0.017  *(0.008) 0.0167** (0.00513) 
State % Unauthorized 0.304*** (0.044) 0.304*** (0.0370) 
Constant -0.413  (0.566) -0.131  (0.456) 
Inflated Model   
Private Correctional Facility -0.954  (1.848) -0.954  (1.663) 
IGSA Contract -0.389  (0.514) -0.389  (0.560) 
Law Enforcement Budget -0.149* (0.070) -0.149* (0.0747) 
Conservatism 0.0004  (0.013) 0.0004  (0.0126) 
Foreign-born Population    
Latino Population -0.880*** (0.249) -0.880*** (0.191) 
Crime -0.0006  (0.001) -0.000599  (0.00108) 
% Change in Latino Population    
County Population (centered) -0.149*** (0.027) -0.150*** (0.0239) 
Fruits & Vegetables GDP 0.312  (0.381) 0.312  (0.352) 
Construction GDP 0.435  (0.245) 0.435  (0.244) 
Unemployment Rate 0.179*** (0.056) 0.179*** (0.0492) 
Median Household Income (centered)   
287(g) Participant -0.491  (0.395) -0.491  (0.381) 
Border State -1.080  (1.313) -1.081  (1.173) 
Dream Act 0.7524(0.431) 0.755  (0.390) 
Percent Favors SB1070 0.011  (0.031) 0.0112  (0.0257) 
State Percent Unauthorized -0.342  (0.186) -0.342* (0.166) 
Constant -14.711*** (3.630) -14.71*** (2.962) 
Observations 2271 2271 
AIC 7.191 7.191 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
 
Table A2.7. Robust vs. Classical Standard Errors for Model 3.2 
 Robust SEs Classical SEs 
Independent Variables   
Private Correctional Facility 0.588* (0.281) 0.588*** (0.155) 
IGSA Contract 0.712*** (0.131) 0.712*** (0.0998) 
Budget per resident  0.063*** (0.016) 0.0635*** (0.0136) 
Conservatism -0.014** (0.005) -0.0142*** (0.00321) 
Foreign-born Population 0.160*** (0.017) 0.160*** (0.00923) 
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Latino Population   
Crime  0.00001  (0.00002) 0.0000132  (0.0000120) 
% Change in Latino Population 0.003*** (0.0008) 0.00333*** (0.000540) 
County Population (centered) 0.0024*** (0.0006) 0.00241*** (0.000242) 
GDP Fruits & Vegetables  -0.179  (0.117) -0.179  (0.0960) 
GDP Construction  0.250** (0.086) 0.250*** (0.0633) 
Unemployment Rate 0.018* (0.024) 0.0177  (0.0178) 
Median Household Income (centered) 0.001(0.0006) 0.001** (0.0004) 
287(g) Participant 0.042  (0.092) 0.0422  (0.0857) 
Border State 0.436** (0.162) 0.436** (0.141) 
Dream Act -0.085  (0.099) -0.0853  (0.0863) 
Favors SB1070 0.009(0.007) 0.00958* (0.00485) 
State % Unauthorized 0.143** (0.046) 0.143*** (0.0355) 
Constant -0.986* (0.586) -0.986* (0.458) 
Inflated Model   
Private Correctional Facility -0.168  (0.974) -0.168  (0.860) 
IGSA Contract -0.462  (0.533) -0.462  (0.540) 
Law Enforcement Budget -0.261* (0.115) -0.262* (0.114) 
Conservatism -0.013 (0.013) -0.0134  (0.0118) 
Foreign-born Population -0.472*** (0.116) -0.472*** (0.115) 
Latino Population   
Crime -0.001  (0.001) -0.00132  (0.00129) 
% Change in Latino Population -0.001  (0.0007) -0.00130  (0.000796) 
County Population (centered) -0.164*** (0.032) -0.165*** (0.0269) 
Fruits & Vegetables GDP 0.365  (0.399) 0.365  (0.352) 
Construction GDP 0.564* (0.250) 0.564* (0.236) 
Unemployment Rate 0.132  (0.072) 0.132* (0.0622) 
Median Household Income (centered) -0.007** (0.002) -0.007** (0.002) 
287(g) Participant -0.429  (0.372) -0.429  (0.359) 
Border State -1.477* (0.674) -1.477* (0.633) 
Dream Act 1.155** (0.409) 1.155** (0.376) 
Percent Favors SB1070 -0.053* (0.027) -0.0531* (0.0226) 
State Percent Unauthorized -0.815*** (0.183) -0.815*** (0.162) 
Constant -11.624** (4.267) 11.62*** (3.318) 
Observations 2271 2271 
AIC 7.077 7.077 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
 
4. Accounting for Possible Problems of Collinearity  
 
The main source of collinearity from the model is from demographic and attitudinal 
variables related to immigration. Table A2.8 shows the most troublesome of these 
relationships, namely the correlation between the Latino and foreign-born population 
variables and the correlation between the percentage of state residents that are 
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unauthorized and the percentage of voters favoring SB1070. The former was taken care 
of by not including the Latino population variable in Model 3.2. Surprisingly, there is 
relatively little correlation between Latino population growth and the foreign-born and 
Latino population variables. Furthermore, being a 287(g) participant or from a county 
that votes for the Republican presidential candidate is not strongly correlated with these 
variables.  
 
Table A2.8. Correlation between Variables Related to Immigration 
 
Foreign-
Born Latino 
% Change 
Latino Unauthorized 
 Favors 
SB1070 
Border 
State 
    
287(g) 
Foreign-
born 1 
   
   
Latino  0.6976 1 
  
   
% Change 
Latino -0.0641 -0.1567 1 
 
   
Unauthorize
d  0.4969 0.5953 -0.1072 1 
   
Favors 
SB1070 -0.332 -0.5237 0.1621 -0.7046 
1   
Border State  0.3707 0.6142 -0.1754 0.6600 -0.6385 1  
287(g) 0.0680 0.0548 0.0797 0.1091 0.1278 -0.0912 1 
Conservatis
m -0.1915 -0.0607 0.0383 0.0740 0.0457 0.1734 0.0129 
 
 
To address the potential impact of collinearity on the results, I ran multiple 
models, excluding these variables one at a time and in groups. In general, this resulted in 
certain control variables gaining or losing statistical significance, but in only one case 
does the directional effect of a variable change: the percent favoring SB1070 becomes 
negative (but statistically insignificant) in model 3.1 when you exclude the unauthorized 
variable. I am happy to share these results, but did not include them here, as there is 
basically no change in the main effects of the models. Overall, the mean VIF is 1.78 for 
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both Model 3.1 and 3.2, indicating that even in the full models collinearily is not inflating 
the variance of the coefficients much.  
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APPENDIX 3: CHAPTER 3 
 
Table A3.1. Replication of Table 3.2 with No Year Fixed-Effects. 
 (A3.1) (A3.2) (A3.3) 
Republican control  1.152  (0.798) 1.391  (0.810) 0.378  (0.854) 
Democratic control  -0.245  (0.912) -0.209  (0.924) 0.697  (0.875) 
Farm owners   -0.602***  (0.160) -0.746*  (0.304) 
Foreign-born    -0.0878**  (0.0304) -0.102*  (0.0506) 
Legislature 
Characteristics 
   
Legislature ideology     0.762*  (0.348) 
% Women     -3.303  (7.462) 
% Latino     1.405  (5.343) 
Prior Policy 0.903*  (0.413) 0.744  (0.423) 0.125  (0.668) 
State Characteristics    
Average citizen 
ideology 
    -0.0220  (0.0363) 
Population (logged)     0.441  (0.314) 
Median household 
income (logged) 
    -0.0768  (0.155) 
Bachelor's degree +     0.0679  (0.193) 
Unemployment rate     0.0754  (0.151) 
Constant -3.487***  (0.737) -2.146**  (0.769) -7.314  (6.229) 
N 462 462 381 
R2 0.085 0.137 0.191 
State clustered standard errors in parentheses 
^ p < 0.1,  * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
 
Table A3.2. Replication of Table 3.3 with No Year Fixed-Effects. 
 Private Employers Public Employers Contractors 
Republican control  0.809  (1.434) -0.226  (1.520) -0.752  (0.951) 
Democratic control  0.0198  (1.139) 1.217  (1.198) 0.543  (0.840) 
Farm owners -0.802^  (0.461) -0.236  (0.318) -0.755*  (0.311) 
Foreign-born  -0.192*  (0.0931) -0.0245  (0.0826) -0.115^  (0.0714) 
Legislature 
Characteristics 
   
Legislature ideology 0.585  (0.501) 1.191  (0.616) 1.102**  (0.421) 
% Women 5.325  (8.567) -13.48  (6.897) -1.299  (5.128) 
% Latino 5.183  (3.357) -25.55  (13.84) 0.0355  (5.467) 
Prior Policy 1.653*  (0.804) -2.857  (1.657) -1.190  (0.975) 
State Characteristics    
Average citizen 
ideology 
-0.00657  (0.0461) -0.0703  (0.0364) -0.0364  (0.0276) 
Population (logged) 0.113  (0.354) 2.058**  (0.651) 0.771*  (0.310) 
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Median household 
income (logged) 
-0.140  (0.177) 0.127  (0.285) -0.186  (0.205) 
Bachelor's degree + -0.289  (0.272) 0.722**  (0.238) 0.0372  (0.165) 
Unemployment rate 0.319  (0.228) 0.0282  (0.270) -0.217  (0.212) 
Constant -0.259  (7.372) -42.96**  (14.46) -8.868  (6.761) 
N 381 381 419 
R2 0.300 0.288 0.178 
State clustered standard errors in parentheses 
^ p < 0.1,  * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
 
Table A3.3. Replication of Table 3.4 with No Year Fixed-Effects. 
 Republican Legislatures Democratic Legislatures 
Farm owners -1.144*  (0.582) 0.186  (0.395) 
Foreign-born  -0.0783  (0.0540) -0.149**  (0.0531) 
Legislature Characteristics   
Legislature ideology 0.737  (0.423) 0.201  (0.557) 
% Women 0.454  (9.576) -9.435  (6.963) 
% Latino -0.485  (7.775) -2.820  (6.172) 
Prior Policy -0.0619  (0.0697) 0.00755  (0.0333) 
State Characteristics -0.204  (0.926) 1.953  (1.074) 
Average citizen ideology   
Population (logged) 0.254  (0.424) 1.636  (1.181) 
Median household income 
(logged) 
0.0797  (0.165) -0.532  (0.682) 
Bachelor's degree + -0.184  (0.333) 0.0951  (0.332) 
Unemployment rate 0.115  (0.184) -0.755  (0.712) 
Constant -0.420  (9.328) -17.30  (13.08) 
N 153 176 
R2 0.197 0.241 
State clustered standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
 
To confirm the robustness of the constituency effects, Table A3.4 uses a simpler model to 
test the relationship between constituency size and passing E-Verify. I do this by looking 
at the states cross-sectionally rather than over time. Thus, we have 50 observations to 
determine whether constituency characteristics influenced whether an E-Verify bill was 
passed in general as well as whether these constituencies have different effects depending 
on the type of bill passed: those applying only to private employers, to contractors, or to 
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public/state agencies. Corroborating our previous findings, the presence of both a large 
agricultural and a large foreign-born population significantly reduces the probability of a 
state passing general E-Verify legislation or bills specific to private employers and 
contractors.  
 
Table A3.4. Effect of Constituencies on State Legislature Passing E-Verify 
Legislation (Cross-Sectional) 
 Any Employer/ 
All Bills 
Private 
Employers 
Contractors Public/State 
Employers 
Farm owners -0.901** (0.337) -2.385*(1.140) -0.616*(0.249) -0.214  (0.209) 
Foreign-Born  -0.253*(0.105) -1.230*(0.499) -0.170*(0.077) -0.026  (0.056) 
Constant 2.605*(1.167) 7.128*  (3.362) 1.524  (0.860) -0.317  (0.745) 
N 50 50 50 50 
R2 0.202 0.546 0.113 0.01 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
Table A3.5. The Influence of Salient Constituencies on Republican & Democratic 
Support for All E-Verify Bills 
 (6.1) (6.2) 
 Republican Legislators Democratic Legislators 
Farm owners 4.052 (12.64) 2.402 (8.515) 
Foreign-born  -2.821 (3.249) -2.297* (1.133) 
Legislator Characteristics   
Ideology -0.0589 (0.225) 0.107 (0.150) 
Female -0.0433 (0.307) -0.156 (0.165) 
Latino 0 (.) -0.622 (0.366) 
Incumbent 0.0970 (0.235) -0.139 (0.191) 
Contested election -0.143 (0.256) 0.0174 (0.183) 
District Characteristics   
Average ideology -0.0431 (0.532) 1.705*** (0.314) 
Population (logged) 0.359 (0.268) 0.872*** (0.202) 
Median household income 
(logged) -0.0277 (0.659) 0.0859 (0.425) 
Unemployment rate -2.862*** (0.712) -0.989** (0.359) 
Bachelor's degree (+) -0.0605 (0.203) -0.354** (0.122) 
N 1691 1486 
Models use logistic regression with state-fixed effects and state-clustered standard errors in parentheses. 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
		
132 
Table A3.6. Summary Statistics for Legislature-Level 
Republican Control 500 0.438 0.497 0 1 
Democratic Control 500 0.43 0.496 0 1 
Farm owners 500 1.497 1.359 0.145 6.429 
Foreign-born  500 7.867 6.278 0.050 27.305 
Legislature ideology 419 0.075 1.303 -2.752 2.246 
Percent women 500 0.238 0.069 0.088 0.42 
Percent Latino 500 0.041 0.078 0.000 0.446 
Citizen ideology 500 52.274 16.010 13.482 93.248 
Population (logged) 500 15.163 1.010 13.150 17.483 
Median household 
income (logged) 
500 12.180 1.742 10.517 16.318 
Unemployment rate 500 4.763 1.269 2.2 9.3 
Bachelor's degree (+) 500 17.609 2.787 10 24.8 
 
 
Table A3.7. Summary Statistics for Legislator-Level 
Republican 4225 0.578 0.494 0 1 
Farm owners 4188 0.775 1.14 0 11.549 
Foreign-born  4173 6.795 6.734 0 49.667 
Ideology 4158 0.266 0.856 -3.045 2.662 
Female 4221 0.197 0.398 0 1 
Latino 4225 0.019 0.137 0 1 
Incumbent 4168 0.692 0.462 0 1 
Contested election 4225 0.664 0.472 0 1 
Average ideology 4215 0.069 0.313 -1.124 0.967 
Population (logged) 4223 10.988 1.293 4.192 12.787 
Median household 
income (logged) 
4223 10.564 1.122 4.349 11.917 
Unemployment rate 4223 8.323 3.12 2.9 30.2 
Bachelor's degree (+) 4223 8.442 7.12 0 65.0 
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